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Minimal informationally complete quantum measurements (MICs) furnish probabilistic
representations of quantum theory. These representations cleanly present the Born rule as
an additional constraint in probabilistic decision theory, a perspective advanced by QBism.
Because of this, their structure illuminates important ways in which quantum theory differs
from classical physics. MICs have, however, so far received relatively little attention. In
this dissertation, we investigate some of their general properties and relations to other topics
in quantum information. A special type of MIC called a symmetric informationally com-
plete measurement makes repeated appearances as the optimal or extremal solution in dis-
tinct settings, signifying they play a significant foundational role. Once the general struc-
ture of MICs is more fully explicated, we speculate that the representation will have unique
advantages analogous to the phase space and path integral formulations. On the conceptual
iv
side, the reasons for QBism continue to grow. Most recently, extensions to the Wigner’s
friend paradox have threatened the consistency of many interpretations. QBism’s resolution
is uniquely simple and powerful, further strengthening the evidence for this interpretation.
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Ninety-five years ago, physicists got something right. Quantum theory has since en-
joyed experimental confirmation of a degree unprecedented in the history of science. Its
application in materials allowed us to understand semiconductors well enough to design
microchips, enabling the modern technological era. Stimulated emission led to lasers and
nuclear spin led to magnetic resonance imaging. In the decades following 1925, physi-
cists produced each part of what is now known as the Standard Model, a “quantum field
theory” which has allowed for incredible predictive precision in high energy collision ex-
periments. For example, the National Institute of Standards and Technology reports the
value of the fine structure constant to a relative standard uncertainty of 1.5 × 10−10 [1].
Even more excitingly, the very same quantum theory is now pointing the way to the next
technological era; fully fault-tolerant quantum computers are still speculative, but the so-
called Noisy Intermediate-Scale Quantum era, which already promises advantages, has
begun [2].
So quantum theory is “right,” but what is it right about? What about nature makes it
the right theory? In classical physics, physical postulate and formalism closely play off
of one another. One might, roughly speaking, think about the classical laws of physics in
much the same way that an engineer looks at the schematics of a machine, with the calcu-
lations neatly following from a description of its constituents. Classical mechanics even
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has this conception in the name—one was to think of it as the physics of the machine that
is our reality. Quantum theory frustrates this view. Some try to view quantum theory as a
point-for-point substitution of classical notions, with wavefunctions as direct, drop-in re-
placements for the so-called elements of reality. From this perspective, quantum mechan-
ics is simply a more complicated schematic; one with complex numbers and operators,
but conceptually the same kind of entity as classical mechanics before it. However, this
style of approach is fraught with difficulties which may be insuperable. More importantly,
such an association ignores all evidence that the formalism is a different kind of theory,
one more about our knowledge than a representation of physical fact [3].
Discussing the relative merits and weaknesses of different approaches to the under-
standing of quantum theory is not our purpose in this dissertation.1 Instead, our primary
intent is to pursue technical questions which arise from one particularly flexible and com-
pelling epistemic view: QBism, the “subjective Bayesian” approach to quantum theory.
There are several excellent accounts of this interpretation [4–8].2 Although the technical
questions we address were motivated by QBist intuitions, it is not necessary for the reader
to fully familiarize themselves with QBism prior to reading this dissertation as the perti-
nent concepts are introduced as they arise in each chapter.
QBism says that quantum theory is an addition to probabilistic decision theory. What
does this mean? The basic quantum scenario goes like this. An experimentalist plans to
perform an experiment and would like to forecast their expectations for what they will
find upon making a measurement at the end. Quantum theory instructs them to pick an
initial quantum state for reasoning about the system, a quantum channel to transform the
state in accordance with their understanding of the experiment, and a particular quantum
1Although we do indulge in Chapter 8.
2For nearly 3000 combined pages of correspondence chronicling the development of QBism, see [9]
and [10].
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measurement comprised of effect operators associated to the outcomes of the measure-
ment they intend to perform. If they manage to do so, the probabilities they seek can then
be computed from the final quantum state and the measurement with the Born rule.3
The theory tells you how to use quantum states, channels, and measurements, but
it doesn’t prescribe a particular way of determining them. Take, for example, quantum
states. In textbook exercises, the quantum state one needs is typically in the problem
statement, but in the lab it is never so simple. Experimenters need to familiarize them-
selves with the lab, their equipment, calibration samples, and likely many other things
before they start to have a hunch that one quantum state will work better than another.
Having finally done enough to confidently express a quantum state is often a momen-
tous occasion, involving quite a bit of statistical and probabilistic legwork. This process
may take many forms, but the key point is that one’s expectations for a sufficient diver-
sity of potential interactions with a system is what determines the state that an experi-
menter uses. In other words, probabilities fix the quantum state and the quantum state, in
turn, may be used to produce probabilities. A similar story can be told for channels and
measurements [4]. Cast in this way, quantum theory is about how such input and output
probabilities are constrained and these constraints are in addition to the logical constraints
probability theory itself already mandates.
If this is what quantum theory is from a conceptual standpoint, one immediately ques-
tions the necessity of actually using the intermediate mathematical tools of states, chan-
nels, and effects. After all, these objects only figure in the figuring; probabilities are the
ultimate deliverable. That quantum theory can, in principle, be expressed purely in terms
of probabilities is not altogether surprising. And, of course, the particular packaging rep-
3The technical setting for what we have sketched is the general formulation used in quantum informa-
tion theory. For a concise and complete introduction, see [11].
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resented by the standard representation has many advantages—there are reasons it is the
standard and little reason to expect that any alternative would ever fully supplant it. But
useful alternatives may expose traits of the theory which are obscured in the typical con-
ception. For example, in phase space representations of quantum theory, the principle ad-
vantage is that aspects of classical phase space analysis become possible within quantum
theory. Another example is the path integral formulation. Although equivalent to the stan-
dard representation, this purely representational innovation enabled significant advances.
On the face of it, a purely probabilistic representation is likely to be hopelessly messy and
unilluminating. Wootters put it this way [12]:
It is obviously possible to devise a formulation of quantum mechanics with-
out probability amplitudes. One is never forced to use any quantities in one’s
theory other than the raw results of measurements. However, there is no rea-
son to expect such a formulation to be anything other than extremely ugly.
If this intuition holds, then while the considerations above may express quantum theory’s
conceptual meaning, these insights may have less lasting practical value than the analo-
gies which led to previous representations have had.
The central theme of this dissertation is that this intuition does not hold. Not only are
there formulations which are not extremely ugly, there are clean and physically illumi-
nating options. The key to these formulations is a class of quantum measurements called
minimal informationally complete quantum measurements (MICs).
In Chapter 2 we will thoroughly introduce this class of measurements. MICs are quan-
tum reference measurements. This means that a probability distribution for the outcomes
of a single MIC measurement is equivalent to a specification of a quantum state, and
the fact that they are “minimal” refers to the fact that the probability distribution has the
4
fewest number of entries possible. MICs illuminate the structure of quantum theory and
how it departs from the classical. In this chapter, we establish general properties of MICs,
explore constructions of several classes of them, and make some developments to the the-
ory of MIC Gram matrices, that is, the matrix of Hilbert–Schmidt inner products of MIC
effect operators. These Gram matrices turn out to be a rich subject of inquiry, relating
linear algebra, number theory and probability. Unlike the measurement operators corre-
sponding to quantum observables, a MIC can never be an orthogonal set. In a deep sense,
we will see that the ideal measurements of quantum physics are not orthogonal bases.
In this chapter we also meet the symmetric informationally complete quantum measure-
ments (SICs), a special class of MICs distinguished by being rank-1, meaning all effects
are proportional to rank-1 projectors, and equiangular, meaning the Hilbert–Schmidt in-
ner product between any two distinct effects is the same. SICs are in many ways optimal
among MICs. This chapter provides further context to this view.
In Chapter 3 we describe a general procedure for associating a MIC with a purely
probabilistic representation of the Born Rule. Such representations provide a way to un-
derstand the Born Rule as a consistency condition between probabilities assigned to the
outcomes of one experiment in terms of the probabilities assigned to the outcomes of
other experiments. In this setting, the difference between quantum and classical physics
is the way their physical assumptions augment bare probability theory: Classical physics
corresponds to a trivial augmentation—one just applies the Law of Total Probability (LTP)
between the scenarios—while quantum theory makes use of the Born Rule expressed in
one or another of the forms of our general procedure. To mark the irreducible difference
between quantum and classical, one should seek the representations that minimize the
disparity between the expressions. We prove that the representation of the Born Rule ob-
tained from a SIC minimizes this distinction in at least two senses—the first to do with
5
unitarily invariant distance measures between the rules, and the second to do with avail-
able volume in a reference probability simplex (roughly speaking a new kind of uncer-
tainty principle). Both of these arise from a useful result in majorization theory.
The reference process described in Chapter 3 constitutes an “entanglement breaking”
quantum channel, a channel which always produces a probabilistic mixture of a previ-
ously agreed upon set of states. In Chapter 4 we consider an alternative channel based on
the most familiar quantum state update rule, the Lüders rule. Using this construction, we
establish an if-and-only-if condition for the existence of a d-dimensional SIC in terms of
a particular depolarizing channel. Moreover, the channel in question satisfies two entropic
optimality criteria.
The desire to retain some phase space concepts in quantum mechanics inspired the
development of Wigner functions. Although Wigner functions provide a way to do quan-
tum physics with a phase space, they require the use of “probability” distributions that
can go negative, that is, quasiprobabilities. This is an extremely unsatisfying move from
our perspective, as the decision theoretic character of true probabilities is central to our
strategy for developing a new representation. In Chapter 5 we lay the groundwork for
relating MIC and Wigner function representations and identify the need to translate the
many decades of phase space quasiprobability results to the language of reference prob-
abilities. We observe that the operator bases corresponding to minimal discrete Wigner
functions, which we call Wigner bases, are orthogonalizations of MICs. By not impos-
ing a particular discrete phase space structure at the outset, we are able to push Wigner
functions to their limits in a suitably quantified sense, revealing a new way in which SICs
are significant. Finally, we speculate that astute choices of MICs from the orthogonaliza-
tion preimages of Wigner bases may in general give quantum measurements conceptually
underlying the associated quasiprobability representations.
6
The appearance of negative terms in quasiprobability representations of quantum the-
ory is known to be inevitable, and, due to its equivalence with the onset of contextual-
ity, of central interest in quantum computation and information. Until recently, however,
nothing has been known about how much negativity is necessary in a quasiprobability
representation. Zhu [13] proved that the upper and lower bounds with respect to one type
of negativity measure among unbiased Wigner bases are in one-to-one correspondence
with the SICs. In Chapter 6 we define a family of negativity measures which includes
Zhu’s as a special case and consider another member of the family which we call “sum
negativity.” We prove a sufficient condition for local maxima in sum negativity and find
exact global maxima in dimensions 3 and 4. Notably, we find that Zhu’s result on the
SICs does not generally extend to sum negativity, although the analogous result does hold
in dimension 4. At the end of the chapter, the Hoggar SIC in dimension 8 makes an ap-
pearance in a conjecture on sum negativity. We anticipate further developments along
these lines once the relation between MICs and Wigner bases described in Chapter 5 is
brought into the fold.
MICs have thus far received very little attention. In fact, the work in this dissertation
represents a significant portion of what has been written about them. The situation may be
beginning to change [14, 15]. We hope that the subject will continue to grow in popular-
ity. As we will articulate many times in subsequent chapters, we believe that developing
a deep understanding of the structure of these measurements will be instrumental in dis-
covering precisely what it is about reality that makes quantum theory our best means for
navigating it.
Our attitude towards physics is an intuitive interplay between the technical and con-
ceptual, striving to knead out a coherent point of view. Chapters 7 and 8 are drawn from
the conceptual side. The emphasis of each is QBism itself.
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The focus of Chapter 7 concerns two very instructive modifications of the Wigner’s
friend paradox [16]. One concerns a recent no-go theorem by Frauchiger and Renner [17]
and the other is a thought experiment by Baumann and Brukner [18]. The resolution of
Wigner’s original thought experiment was central to the development of QBist thinking.
Careful treatment of these modifications has accordingly sharpened our intuitions. We
show that the paradoxical features emphasized in these works disappear once both friend
and Wigner are understood as agents on an equal footing with regard to their individual
uses of quantum theory. Wigner’s action on his friend then becomes, from the friend’s
perspective, an action the friend takes on Wigner. When two agents take actions on each
other, each agent has a dual role as a physical system for the other agent. No user of quan-
tum theory is more privileged than any other.
Chapter 8 is a catalog of frequently asked questions about QBism. These remarks
(many of them lighthearted) should be considered supplements to more systematic treat-
ments appearing in the literature.
We take stock of the journey so far in Chapter 9, the conclusion. Although there we
conclude this dissertation, the journey has just begun.
1.1 Author Contributions
The following chapters comprise monographs coauthored by the author of this dis-
sertation during his time in the QBism Group at the University of Massachusetts Boston.
Three have been published, one will soon appear, two others have been submitted for pub-
lication, and one stands alone as a whimsical collection of essay answers to frequently
asked questions. If read like a book, the reader will encounter repetition of some concepts
in this dissertation from chapter to chapter, presented in different ways. These repetitions
are partially an artifact of the chapters being separate manuscripts, each of which had to
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set the scene anew. But preserving them was also a conscious choice because some points
bear repeating; the author himself has occasionally had to hear the same thing many times
before it stuck.
Each of the following chapters, excluding the conclusion, is a manuscript. All but
Chapter 8 have appeared in publications or have been submitted to journals. In our group,
author ordering is alphabetical rather than in contribution order. Accordingly, in the fol-
lowing list we make explicit our role in each paper, referring to other authors by their ini-
tials. The chapters have been arranged in a pedagogically motivated order, rather than
chronologically.
1. Chapter 2 “MIC Facts” is the main text of [19]:
J. B. DeBrota, C. A. Fuchs, and B. C. Stacey, “Analysis and Synthesis of Minimal
Informationally Complete Quantum Measurements,” submitted to Physical Review
X Quantum.
I was the primary contributor to this work. I produced about two thirds of the proofs
and all of the numerical content and figures. The majority of the remaining third
was contributed by BCS and a smaller amount is due to CAF, although typeset by
BCS and myself. This document has a long history and it underwent many signifi-
cant revisions. At a conceptual level, all three authors contributed substantially. The
writing portion was close to evenly split between BCS and myself. BCS is responsi-
ble for much of the text in the introduction. CAF contributed some of the direction
of research, asked important questions, suggested analysis methods for a few of the
results, and edited the draft.
2. Chapter 3 “LTP analogs” is the main text and appendices of [20]:
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J. B. DeBrota, C. A. Fuchs, and B. C. Stacey, “Symmetric informationally complete
measurements identify the irreducible difference between classical and quantum
systems,” Physical Review Research, vol. 2, pp. 013074, 2020.
I was the primary contributor this work. I produced the final versions of all proofs
and was the primary, although not sole, contributor to their development. I was re-
sponsible for the initial mathematical framing which led to the questions we ex-
plored; subsequently, we three were equally involved in the research directions. I
drafted all technical parts and figures. CAF and BCS wrote the introductory para-
graphs, asked important questions, produced early versions of some proof argu-
ments, otherwise suggested analysis methods, and edited the draft.
3. Chapter 4 “Lüders MIC Channels” is the main text and appendices of [21]:
J. B. DeBrota and B. C. Stacey, “Lüders channels and the existence of symmetric
informationally-complete measurements,” Physical Review A, vol. 100, p. 062327,
2019.
I was the primary contributor to this work, but not by a large margin. BCS and I
closely collaborated at every stage of this work. I produced the final versions of all
proofs. BCS asked important questions, originated some proof direction ideas, and
advocated for the emphases which appear in the final version. I drafted all or nearly
all technical parts and BCS drafted the majority of the conceptual content.
4. Chapter 5 “The Principal Wigner Function” is the main text of [22]:
J. B. DeBrota and B. C. Stacey, “Discrete Wigner Functions from Informationally
Complete Measurements,” submitted to Physical Review X Quantum.
I was the primary contributor to this work. I proposed the direction of research and
conjectured and proved every result in the draft. All technical sections were entirely
written by me. BCS wrote about half of the introduction, the majority of Section 2,
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and about half of the penultimate section, all of which are predominately concep-
tual content. BCS additionally asked important questions during the research phase.
5. Chapter 6, “Sum Negativity” is the main text of [23]:
J. B. DeBrota and C. A. Fuchs, “Negativity bounds for Weyl–Heisenberg quasiprob-
ability representations,” Foundations of Physics, vol. 47, pp. 1009–30, 2017.
I was the primary contributor to this work. I proved all of the results, conducted all
numerics, and drafted the paper. CAF proposed some of the direction of research,
suggested key analysis methods, asked important questions, and edited the draft.
6. Chapter 7 “Wigner’s Friends” is the main text of [24]
J. B. DeBrota, C. A. Fuchs, and R. Schack, “Respecting One’s Fellow: QBism’s
Analysis of Wigner’s Friend,” to appear in Foundations of Physics, 2020.
I was the least significant contributor to this work. My primary role was partici-
pation in the numerous discussions and brainstorming sessions over the course of
the last couple of years which eventually led to the positions represented in the pa-
per. A few of the key conclusions appearing in the draft can be traced to my ques-
tions and perspectives. RS wrote the bulk of the draft and CAF wrote some parts.
I proofread and suggested revisions and emphases at several stages of the writing
process.
7. Chapter 8 “FAQBism” is the main text of [25]:
J. B. DeBrota and B. C. Stacey, “FAQBism,” arXiv:1810.13401, 2018.
BCS was the primary author of this work. I was involved in discussions surround-
ing all of the topics addressed and I primarily drafted a minority of the subsections.
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A significant part of science is the pursuit of measurements that are as informative as
possible. Attempts to provide an elementary explanation of “the scientific method” some-
times convey the notion that an ideal measurement is one which is exactly reproducible,
always yielding the same answer when applied in succession. But this notion has fairly
obvious problems, for example, when the system being measured is dynamical. When the
experiment’s sought outcome is the position of Mars at midnight, the numbers will not be
the same from one night to the next, and yet Kepler could run a scientific revolution on
that data. A more refined standard would be that an ideal measurement is one that pro-
vides enough information to project the complete dynamical trajectory of the measured
system through phase space. Quantum physics frustrates this ambition by denying the
phase space: Quantum uncertainties are not uncertainties about the values of properties
that pre-exist the act of measurement. Yet the ideal of a sufficiently informative measure-
ment, the expectations for which fully fix the expectations for any other, can still be trans-
lated from classical thought to quantum, and doing so illuminates the nature of quantum
theory itself.
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LetHd be a d-dimensional complex Hilbert space, and let {Ei} be a set of positive
semidefinite operators on that space which sum to the identity:
N∑
i=1
Ei = I. (2.1)
The set {Ei} is a positive-operator-valued measure (POVM), which is the mathemati-
cal representation of a measurement process in quantum theory. Each element in the set
— called an effect — stands for a possible outcome of the measurement [1, §2.2.6]. A
POVM is said to be informationally complete (IC) if the operators {Ei} span L(Hd), the
space of Hermitian operators onHd, and an IC POVM is said to be minimal if it contains
exactly d2 elements. For brevity, we can call a minimal IC POVM a MIC.
A matrix which captures many important properties of a MIC is its Gram matrix, that
is, the matrix G whose entries are given by
[G]ij := trEiEj . (2.2)
Of particular note among MICs are those which enjoy the symmetry property






These are known as symmetric informationally complete POVMs, or SICs for short [2–5].
In addition to their purely mathematical properties, SICs are of central interest to the tech-
nical side of QBism, a research program in the foundations of quantum mechanics [6–9].
Investigations motivated by foundational concerns led to the discovery that SICs are in
many ways optimal among MICs [10–12]. In this paper, we elaborate upon some of those
results and explore the conceptual context of MICs more broadly.
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MICs provide a new way of understanding the Born Rule, a key step in how one uses
quantum physics to calculate probabilities. The common way of presenting the Born Rule
suggests that it fixes probabilities in terms of more fundamental quantities, namely quan-
tum states and measurement operators. MICs, however, suggest a change of viewpoint.
From this new perspective, the Born Rule should be thought of as a consistency condition
between the probabilities assigned in diverse scenarios — for instance, probabilities as-
signed to the outcomes of complementary experiments. The bare axioms of probability
theory do not themselves impose relations between probabilities given different condi-
tionals: In the abstract, nothing ties together P (E|C1) and P (E|C2). Classical intuition
suggests one way to fit together probability assignments for different experiments, and
quantum physics implies another. The discrepancy between these standards encapsulates
how quantum theory departs from classical expectations [13, 14]. MICs provide the key
to addressing this discrepancy; any MIC may play the role of a reference measurement
through which the quantum consistency condition may be understood. To understand
MICs is to understand how quantum probability is like, and differs from, classical.
In the next section, we introduce the fundamentals of quantum information theory and
the necessary concepts from linear algebra to prove a few basic results about MICs and
comment on their conceptual meaning. Among the results included are a characterization
of unbiased MICs, a condition in terms of matrix rank for when a set of vectors in Cd can
be fashioned into a MIC, and an explicit example of an unbiased MIC which is not group
covariant. In Section 2.3, we show how to construct several classes of MICs explicitly and
note some properties of their Gram matrices. In Section 2.4, we explore several ways in
which SICs are optimal among MICs for the project of differentiating the quantum from
the classical, a topic complementing one of our recent papers [12]. To conclude, in Sec-
tion 2.5, we conduct an initial numerical study of the Gram matrix eigenvalue spectra of
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randomly-chosen MICs of four different types. The empirical eigenvalue distributions we
find have intriguing features, not all of which have been explained yet.
2.2 Basic Properties of MICs
We begin by briefly establishing the necessary notions from quantum information the-
ory on which this paper is grounded. In quantum physics, each physical system is asso-
ciated with a complex Hilbert space. Often, in quantum information theory, the Hilbert
space of interest is taken to be finite-dimensional. We will denote the dimension through-
out by d. A quantum state is a positive semidefinite operator of unit trace. The extreme
points in the space of quantum states are the rank-1 projection operators:
ρ = |ψ〉〈ψ|. (2.4)
These are idempotent operators; that is, they all satisfy ρ2 = ρ. If an experimenter as-
cribes the quantum state ρ to a system, then she finds her probability for the ith outcome
of the measurement modeled by the POVM {Ei} via the Hilbert–Schmidt inner product:
p(Ei) = tr ρEi. (2.5)
This formula is a standard presentation of the Born Rule. The condition that the {Ei} sum
to the identity ensures that the resulting probabilities are properly normalized.
If the operators {Ei} span the space of Hermitian operators, then the operator ρ can be
reconstructed from its inner products with them. In other words, the state ρ can be calcu-
lated from the probabilities {p(Ei)}, meaning that the measurement is “informationally
complete” and the state ρ can, in principle, be dispensed with. Any MIC can thus be con-
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sidered a “Bureau of Standards” measurement, that is, a reference measurement in terms
of which all states and processes can be understood [15]. Writing a quantum state ρ is
often thought of as specifying the “preparation” of a system, though this terminology is
overly restrictive, and the theory applies just as well to physical systems that were not
processed on a laboratory workbench [16].
Given any POVM {Ei}, we can always write its elements as unit-trace positive semidef-
inite operators with appropriate scaling factors we call weights:
Ei := eiρi, where ei = trEi. (2.6)
If the operators ρi are all rank-1 projectors, we will refer to the set {Ei} as a rank-1 POVM.
We will call a POVM unbiased when the weights ei are all equal. Such operator sets rep-
resent quantum measurements that have no intrinsic bias: Under the Born Rule they map
the “garbage state” (1/d)I to a flat probability distribution. For an unbiased MIC, the
condition that the elements sum to the identity then fixes ei = 1/d.
A column (row) stochastic matrix is a real matrix with nonnegative entries whose
columns (rows) sum to 1. If a matrix is both column and row stochastic we say it is dou-
bly stochastic. The following theorem allows us to identify an unbiased MIC from a glance
at its Gram matrix or Gram matrix spectrum.
Theorem 1. Let {Ei} be a MIC and λmax(G) be the maximal eigenvalue of its Gram ma-
trix G. The following are equivalent:
1. {Ei} is unbiased.
2. dG is doubly stochastic.
3. λmax(G) = 1/d.
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Proof. The equivalence of the first two conditions is readily shown. We show (2) ⇐⇒
(3). Let |v〉 := 1
d
(1, . . . , 1)T be the normalized d2 element uniform vector of 1s. If dG is
doubly stochastic, |v〉 is an eigenvector of dG with eigenvalue 1, and the Gershgorin disc
theorem [17] ensures λmax(G) = 1/d. For any MIC,




with equality iff |v〉 is an eigenvector of G with eigenvalue 1/d. Since G|v〉 = (e1, . . . , ed2)T,
|v〉 is an eigenvector of G iff ei = 1/d for all i.
Given a basis for an inner product space, the dual basis is defined by the condition
that the inner products of a vector with the elements of the dual basis provide the coeffi-
cients in the expansion of that vector in terms of the original basis. In our case, let {Ẽi}










linear independence of the {Ei} implies that
trEiẼj = δij , (2.10)
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In the familiar case when the original basis is orthonormal, the dual basis coincides with
it: When we write a vector v as an expansion over the unit vectors (x̂, ŷ, ẑ), the coeffi-
cient of x̂ is simply the inner product of x̂ with v.
A MIC is a positive semidefinite operator basis. For positive semidefinite operators A
and B, trAB = 0 iff AB = 0. Recall that a Hermitian matrix which is neither positive
semidefinite nor negative semidefinite is known as an indefinite matrix.
Theorem 2. The dual basis of a MIC is composed entirely of indefinite matrices.
Proof. Suppose Ẽ1 ≥ 0. The definition of a dual basis tells us tr Ẽ1Ek = 0 for all k 6= 1.
Because they are both positive semidefinite, Ẽ1Ek = 0 for all k 6= 1. This means the









≤ (d− 1)2 < d2 − 1, (2.12)
so they cannot be linearly independent. If Ẽ1 ≤ 0, −Ẽ1 is positive semidefinite and the
same logic holds.
Corollary. No element in a MIC can be proportional to an element of the MIC’s dual
basis.
Corollary. No MIC can form an orthogonal basis.
Proof. Suppose {Ei} is a MIC which forms an orthogonal basis, that is, trEiEj = ciδij
for some constants ci. Summing this over i reveals cj = ej , the weights of the MIC. Thus
the dual basis is given by Ẽj = Ej/ej = ρj which is a violation of Corollary 2.2.
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Corollary. No MIC outcome can ever be assigned probability 1.
Proof. MIC probabilities provide the expansion coefficients for a state in the dual basis.
If P (Ei) = 1 for some i, the state would equal the dual basis element, but a state must be
positive semidefinite.
Corollary. No effect of a MIC can be an unscaled projector.
Proof. Suppose E1 were equal to an unscaled projector P . Then any eigenvector of P is a
pure state which would imply probability 1 for the MIC outcome E1, which is impossible.
Theorem 2.2 and the subsequent corollaries have physical meaning. In classical prob-
ability theory, we grow accustomed to orthonormal bases. For example, imagine an ob-
ject that can be in any one of N distinct configurations. When we write a probability
distribution over these N alternatives, we are encoding our expectations about which of
these configurations is physically present — about the “physical condition” of the ob-
ject, as Einstein would say [18], or in more modern terminology, about the object’s “on-
tic state” [19]. We can learn everything there is to know about the object by measuring
its “physical condition”, and any implementation of such an ideal measurement is repre-
sented by conditional probabilities that are 1 in a single entry and 0 elsewhere. In other
words, the map from the object’s physical configuration to the reading on the measure-
ment device is, at its most complicated, a permutation of labels. Without loss of gener-
ality, we can take the vectors that define the ideal measurement to be the vertices of the
probability simplex: The measurement basis is identical with its dual, and the dual-basis
elements simply label the possible “physical conditions” of the object which the measure-
ment reads off.
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In quantum theory, by contrast, no element of a MIC may be proportional to an el-
ement in the dual. This stymies the identification of the dual-basis elements as intrinsic
“physical conditions” ready for a measurement to read.
Theorem 3. No elementwise rescaling of a proper subset of a MIC may form a POVM.
Proof. Since a MIC is a linearly independent set, the identity element is uniquely formed





If a linear combination of a proper subset Ω of the MIC elements could be made to also













which is a violation of linear independence.
Corollary. No two elements in a d = 2 MIC may be orthogonal under the Hilbert–
Schmidt inner product.
Proof. An orthogonal pair of elements in dimension 2 may be rescaled such that they sum
to the identity element. Therefore, by Theorem 3, they cannot be elements of a MIC.
These results also have physics implications. For much of the history of quantum me-
chanics, one type of POVM had special status: the von Neumann measurements, which
consist of d elements given by the projectors onto the vectors of an orthonormal basis of
Cd. Indeed, in older books, these are the only quantum measurements that are considered
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(often being defined as the eigenbases of Hermitian operators called “observables”). We
can now see that, from the standpoint of informational completeness, the von Neumann
measurements are rather pathological: There is no way to build a MIC by augmenting a
von Neumann measurement with additional outcomes.
Another holdover from the early days of quantum theory concerns the process of up-
dating a quantum state in response to a measurement outcome. If one restricts attention
to von Neumann measurements, one may feel tempted to grant special importance to the
post-measurement state being one of the eigenvectors of an “observable”. This type of up-
dating is a special case of the more general theory developed as quantum mechanics was
understood more fully. The Lüders Rule [20, 21] states that the post-measurement state








In the special case of a von Neumann measurement, this reduces to replacing the state
for the system with the eigenprojector corresponding to the measurement outcome. A
physicist who plans to follow that procedure and then repeat the measurement imme-
diately afterward would expect to obtain the same outcome twice in succession. Some
authors regard this possibility as the essential point of contact with classical mechanics
and attempt to build an understanding of quantum theory around such “ideal” measure-
ments [22]. But, as we said in the introduction, obtaining the same outcome twice in suc-
cession is not a good notion of a “classical ideal”. Especially in view of the arbitrariness
of von Neumann measurements from our perspective, we regard this possibility as con-
ceptually downstream from the phenomenon of informationally complete measurements.
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Corollary 2.2 prompts a question: May any elements of a MIC in arbitrary dimension
be orthogonal? In other words, can any entry in a G matrix equal zero? We answer this
question in the affirmative with an explicit example of a rank-1 MIC in dimension 3 with
7 orthogonal pairs.
Example. When multiplied by 1/3, the following is a rank-1 unbiased MIC in dimension























































































































































These are projectors onto the following vectors inHd:
{
















(5,−1 + 2i,−3 + i), 1√
24















































































































































The process of finding this example led us to formulate the following:
Conjecture 1. A rank-1 MIC in dimension 3 can have no more than 7 pairs of orthogonal
elements.
Our next result characterizes when it is possible to build a rank-1 POVM out of a set
of vectors and specifies the additional conditions which must be met in order for it to
form a MIC. We make use of the Hadamard product [23], denoted ◦, which is element-
wise multiplication of matrices.
Theorem 4. Consider a set of N normalized vectors |φi〉 inHd and real numbers 0 ≤
ei ≤ 1. The following are equivalent:
1. Ei := ei|φi〉〈φi| forms a rank-1 POVM.
2. The Gram matrix g of the rescaled vectors
√
ei|φi〉 is a rank-d projector.
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Furthermore, if N = d2 and rank(g ◦ g∗) = d2, {Ei} forms a rank-1 MIC.
Proof. Suppose Ei forms a rank-1 POVM, that is,
∑
i
ei|φi〉〈φi| = I . (2.20)
It is easy to see that this is only possible if the set {√ei|φi〉} spansHd, and, consequently,
N ≥ d. It now follows that g is a rank-d projector because the left hand side of (2.20) is
a matrix that has the same nonzero spectrum as g [24]. On the other hand, if g is a rank-d
projector, N ≥ d and {√ei|φi〉} spans a d dimensional space because the rank of a Gram
matrix is equal to the dimension of the space spanned by the vectors. Using again the fact
the left hand side of (2.20) has the same nonzero spectrum as the Gram matrix, it must
equal the identity and thus the rank-1 POVM condition holds.
To be a MIC, N must equal d2. The remaining condition on {Ei} for it to form a rank-
1 MIC is that its elements be linearly independent. This is equivalent to the condition that
its Gram matrix G is full rank. The relation between g and G is given by the Hadamard
product of g with its conjugate,
g ◦ g∗ = G , (2.21)
and so, if N = d2 and rank(g ◦ g∗) = d2, {Ei} forms a rank-1 MIC.
For any two matrices A and B, the Hadamard product satisfies the rank inequality
rank(A ◦B) ≤ rank(A) rank(B) , (2.22)
so a rank-1 MIC is produced when rank(g ◦ g∗) achieves its maximal value with the min-
imal number of effects. Perhaps this criterion will lead to a way to conceptualize rank-1
MICs directly in terms of the vectors inHd from which they can be constructed.
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As a brief illustration, all rank-d projectors are unitarily equivalent so the specification
of g for the rescaled vectors of any rank-1 MIC is obtainable from any rank-d projector
by conjugating it with the right unitary. Specifying g specifies the MIC: g is equal to its
own square root, so its columns are the vectors up to unitary equivalence which form this
Gram matrix. To obtain these vectors as elements ofHd, one can simply write them in the
basis provided by the eigenvectors of g with nonzero eigenvalues. From a fixed starting
projector, then, finding a rank-1 MIC is equivalent to choosing a unitary in U(d2) which
maximizes rank(g ◦ g∗). Numerically this maximization appears to be typical, but we are
not aware of an explicit characterization. A further question to ask is whether there are
special classes of unitaries which give particular types of MICs.
We finish this section with a very brief discussion of the geometry of MIC space. For
this purpose it is not necessary to distinguish between MICs which differ only in permu-
tations of their effects. We further discuss this in the loose sense of not having chosen
any particular metric. The full sets of N -outcome POVMs are in general convex mani-
folds [25], but the requirement of linear independence prevents this from being true for
MICs — it is possible for a convex mixture of MICs to introduce a linear dependence and
thus step outside of the set. There do, however, exist infinite sequences and curves lying
entirely within the set of MICs. In these terms one can see that the space of MICs lacks
much of its boundary, that is, one can construct infinite sequences of MICs for which
the limit point is not a MIC. The simplest such limit point is the POVM consisting of the
identity and d2 − 1 zero matrices. Similarly there are MICs arbitrarily close to any POVM
with fewer than d2 elements which has been padded by zero matrices. Among unbiased
MICs, another limit point lying outside of the set is the trivial POVM consisting of d2
identical matrices Ei = 1d2 I . Provided they exist, SICs are limit points, at least among
equiangular MICs (see section 2.3.4), which are contained within the set.
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2.3 Explicit Constructions of MICs
2.3.1 SICs
The MICs that have attracted the most interest are the SICs, which in many ways are
the optimal MICs [10–12, 26, 27]. SICs were studied as mathematical objects (under the
name “complex equiangular lines”) before their importance for quantum information
was recognized [28–31]. Prior to SICs becoming a physics problem, constructions were
known for dimensions d = 2, 3 and 8 [32]. Exact solutions for SICs are now known in 79
dimensions:
d = 2–28, 30, 31, 35, 37–39, 42, 43, 48, 49, 52, 53, 57, 61–63, 67, 73, 74, 78, 79, 84, 91, 93,
95, 97–99, 103, 109, 111, 120, 124, 127, 129, 134, 143, 146, 147, 168, 172, 195, 199,
228, 259, 292, 323, 327, 399, 489, 844, 1299.
(2.23)
The expressions for these solutions grow complicated quickly, but there is hope that they
can be substantially simplified [33]. Numerical solutions have also been extracted, to high
precision, in the following dimensions:
d = 2–193, 204, 224, 255, 288, 528, 725, 1155, 2208. (2.24)
Both the numerical and the exact solutions have been found in irregular order and by var-
ious methods. Many entries in these lists are due to A. J. Scott and M. Grassl [4, 34, 35];
other explorers in this territory include M. Appleby, I. Bengtsson, T.-Y. Chien, S. T. Flam-
mmia, G. S. Kopp and S. Waldron.
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Together, these results have created the community sentiment that SICs should exist
for every finite value of d. To date, however, a general proof is lacking. The current fron-
tier of SIC research extends into algebraic number theory [36–40], which among other
things has led to a method for uplifting numerical solutions to exact ones [41]. The topic
has begun to enter the textbooks for physicists [42] and for mathematicians [24].




Πi, where Πi = |πi〉〈πi| , (2.25)
where we will take the liberty of calling any of the sets {Ei}, {Πi}, and {|πi〉} SICs. It
is difficult to find a meaningful visualization of structures in high-dimensional complex
vector space. However, for the d = 2 case, an image is available. Any quantum state for a




(I + xσx + yσy + zσz) . (2.26)
The coefficients (x, y, z) are then the coordinates for ρ in the Bloch ball. The surface of
this ball, the Bloch sphere, lives at radius 1 and is the set of pure states. In this picture, the













where s and s′ take the values ±1.














The flatness of this spectrum will turn out to be significant; we will investigate this point
in depth in the next section.
2.3.2 MICs from Random Bases
It is possible to construct a MIC for any dimension d. Let {Ai} be any basis of posi-






forms a MIC. If {Ai} consists entirely of rank-1 matrices, we obtain a rank-1 MIC.1 If
{Ai} is already a MIC, Ω = I and the transformation is trivial; MICs are the fixed points
of this mapping from one positive semidefinite operator basis to another. Thanks to this
property, this method can produce any MIC if the initial basis is drawn from the full space
of positive semidefinite operators.
This procedure was used by Caves, Fuchs and Schack in the course of proving a quan-
tum version of the de Finetti theorem [43]. (For background on this theorem, a key result
in probability theory, see [44, §5.3] and [45].) We refer to the particular MICs they con-
structed as the orthocross MICs. As the orthocross MICs are of historical importance, we
explicitly detail their construction and provide some first properties and conjectures about
it in the remainder of this subsection.
To construct an orthocross MIC in dimension d, first pick an orthonormal basis {|j〉}.
This is a set of d objects, and we want a set of d2, so our first step is to take all possible
1In the rank-1 case, this procedure is equivalent to forming what is called the canonical tight frame as-
sociated with the frame of vectors inHd whose outer products form the Ai matrices. For more information
on this, see [24].
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combinations:
Γjk := |j〉〈k|. (2.30)
The orthocross MIC will be built from a set of d2 rank-1 projectors {Πα}, the first d of
which are given by
Πα = Γαα. (2.31)
Then, for α = d+ 1, . . . , 1
2
d(d+ 1), we take all the quantities of the form
1
2
(|j〉+ |k〉) (〈j|+ 〈k|) = 1
2
(Γjj + Γkk + Γjk + Γkj), (2.32)




(|j〉+ i|k〉) (〈j| − i〈k|) = 1
2
(Γjj + Γkk − iΓjk + iΓkj), (2.33)
where again the indices satisfy j < k. That is, the set {Πα} contains the projectors onto
the original orthonormal basis, as well as projectors built from the “cross terms”.
The operators {Πα} form a positive semidefinite operator basis which can be plugged









The operator Ω for the initial set of vectors has a comparatively simple matrix rep-
resentation: The elements along the diagonal are all equal to d, the elements above the
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diagonal are all equal to 1
2
(1 − i), and the rest are 1
2
(1 + i), as required by Ω = Ω†. The
matrix Ω is not quite a circulant matrix, thanks to that change of sign, but it can be turned
into one by conjugating with a diagonal unitary matrix. Consequently, the eigenvalues
of Ω can be found explicitly via discrete Fourier transformation. The result is that, for











This mathematical result has a physical implication [15].
Theorem 5. The probability of any outcome Eα of an orthocross MIC, given any quan-











Proof. The maximum of tr (ρEα) over all ρ is bounded above by the maximum of tr (ΠEα),
where Π ranges over the rank-1 projectors. In turn, this is bounded above by the maxi-




−1Πα) ≤ λmax(Ω−1). (2.38)
The desired bound then follows.
Note that all the entries in the matrix 2Ω are Gaussian integers, that is, numbers whose
real and imaginary parts are integers. Consequently, all the coefficients in the characteris-
tic polynomial of 2Ω will be Gaussian integers, and so the eigenvalues of 2Ω will be roots
of a monic polynomial with Gaussian-integer coefficients. This is an example of how, in
the study of MICs, number theory becomes relevant to physically meaningful quantities
— in this case, a bound on the maximum probability of a reference-measurement out-
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come. Number theory has also turned out to be very important for SICs, in a much more
sophisticated way [36–40].
The following conjectures about orthocross MICs have been motivated by numerical
investigations. We suspect that their proofs will be relatively straightforward, but so far
they have eluded us.
Conjecture 2. The entries in G for orthocross MICs can become arbitrarily small with
increasing d, but no two elements of an orthocross MIC can be exactly orthogonal.
Conjecture 3. For any orthocross MIC, the entries in G−1 are integers or half-integers.
2.3.3 Group Covariant MICs
The method discussed in the previous subsection allows us to make fully arbitrary
MICs, but it is also possible to construct MICs with much more built-in structure. The
MICs which have received the most attention in the literature to date are the group covari-
ant MICs — those whose elements are the orbit of a group of unitary matrices acting by
conjugation. For additional discussion of group covariant IC POVMs, see [46].
The Gram matrix of a group covariant MIC is very simple. Suppose {Ei} is a group
covariant MIC, so Ei = UiE0U
†
i where E0 is the first element of the MIC and the index i
gives the element of the unitary representation of the group sending this element to the ith
element. Then all distinct elements of the Gram matrix are present in the first row because







for some k determined by the group. Another way to say this is that every row of the
Gram matrix of a group covariant MIC is some permutation of the first row.
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Note that any group covariant MIC is unbiased because conjugation by a unitary can-
not change the trace of a matrix, but the converse is not true; the simplest example of an
unbiased MIC which is not group covariant which we have encountered is the one given
in Example 2.2.
The most important group covariant MICs are the Weyl–Heisenberg MICs (WH MICs),
which are covariant with respect to the Weyl–Heisenberg group, defined as follows. Let
{|j〉 : j = 0, . . . , d− 1} be an orthonormal basis, and define ω = e2πi/d. Then the operator
X|j〉 = |j + 1〉, (2.40)
where addition is interpreted modulo d, effects a cyclic shift of the basis vectors. The
Fourier transform of the X operator is
Z|j〉 = ωj|j〉, (2.41)
and together these operators satisfy the Weyl commutation relation
ZX = ωXZ. (2.42)
The Weyl–Heisenberg displacement operators are
Dk,l := (−eπi/d)klXkZ l, (2.43)
and together they satisfy the conditions
D†k,l = D−k,−l, Dk,lDm,n = (−eπi/d)lm−knDk+m,l+n. (2.44)
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Each Dk,l is unitary and a dth root of the identity. The Weyl–Heisenberg group is the set
of all operators (−eπi/d)mDk,l for arbitrary integers m, and it is projectively equivalent to













forms a WH MIC.
2.3.4 Equiangular MICs
An equiangular2 MIC is one for which the Gram matrix takes the form
[G]ij = αδij + ζ . (2.47)
Equiangular MICs are unbiased (see Corollary 3 in [11]) and, because
∑
ij[G]ij = d, it is
easy to see that α = 1/d− d2ζ and that
1
d2(d+ 1)
≤ ζ < 1
d3
. (2.48)
SICs are rank-1 equiangular MICs for which ζ achieves the minimum allowed value. The
upper bound ζ value is approached by MICs arbitrarily close to Ei = 1d2 I for all i.
2Appleby and Graydon introduced the term SIM for an equiangular MIC of arbitrary rank; a rank-1
SIM is a SIC [47, 48].
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Armed with a SIC in a given dimension, one can construct an equiangular MIC for










≤ (β 6= 0) ≤ 1 . (2.49)
Even if a SIC is not known, it is generally much easier to construct equiangular MICs
when the elements are not required to be rank-1. One way to do this which always works
for any β ≤ 1
d+1
is by replacing the SIC projector in equation (2.49) with a quasi-SIC.3
Depending on the quasi-SIC, higher values of β may also work.
Another construction in odd dimensions are the Appleby MICs [50]. The Appleby






















For any quantum state ρ, the quantities




3See Appendix A of [49] for the definition and a construction of a quasi-SIC.
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are quasiprobabilities: They can be negative, but the sum over all of them is unity. The
quasiprobability function {Wk,l} is known as the Wigner function of the quantum state
ρ. This is an example of a relation we will study much more generally in a companion
paper [51].
2.3.5 Tensorhedron MICs
So far, we have not imposed any additional structure upon our Hilbert space. How-
ever, in practical applications, one might have additional structure in mind, such as a pre-
ferred factorization into a tensor product of smaller Hilbert spaces. For example, a register
in a quantum computer might be a set of N physically separate qubits, yielding a joint
Hilbert space of dimension d = 2N . In such a case, a natural course of action is to con-
struct a MIC for the joint system by taking the tensor product of multiple copies of a MIC
defined on the component system:
Ej1,j2,...,jN := Ej1 ⊗ Ej2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ EjN . (2.54)
Since a collection of N qubits is a natural type of system to consider for quantum compu-
tation, we define the N -qubit tensorhedron MIC to be the tensor product of N individual
qubit SICs.
Theorem 6. The Gram matrix of an N -qubit tensorhedron MIC is the tensor product
of N copies of the Gram matrix for the qubit SIC out of which the tensorhedron is con-
structed.




Πj ⊗ Πj′ , (2.55)
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tr [(Πj ⊗ Πj′)(Πk ⊗ Πk′)]. (2.56)




tr (ΠjΠk ⊗ Πj′Πk′). (2.57)








= [GSIC]jk[GSIC]j′k′ , (2.58)
which is just the definition of the tensor product:
G = GSIC ⊗GSIC. (2.59)
This extends in the same fashion to more qubits.







, m = 0, . . . , N. (2.60)
Proof. This follows readily from the linear-algebra fact that the spectrum of a tensor
product is the set of products {λiµj}, where {λi} and {µj} are the spectra of the fac-
tors.
We can also deduce properties of MICs made by taking tensor products of MICs that
have orthogonal elements. Let {Ej} be a d-dimensional MIC with Gram matrix G, and
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suppose that exactly N elements of G are equal to zero. The tensor products {Ej ⊗ Ej′}
construct a d2-dimensional MIC, the entries in whose Gram matrix have the form [G]jk[G]j′k′ ,
as above. This product will equal zero when either factor does, meaning that the Gram
matrix of the tensor-product MIC will contain 2d4N − N2 zero-valued entries. It seems
plausible that in prime dimensions, where tensor-product MICs cannot exist, the possible
number of zeros is more tightly bounded, but this remains unexplored territory.
2.4 SICs are Minimally Nonclassical Reference Measurements
What might it mean for a MIC to be the best among all MICs? Naturally, it depends
on what qualities are valued in light of which one MIC may be superior to another. As
mentioned in the introduction, for a large number of metrics, SICs are optimal. The au-
thors of this paper particularly value the capacity of MICs to index probabilistic represen-
tations of the Born Rule. For this use, the best MIC is the one which provides the most
useful probabilistic representation, adopting some quantitative ideal that a representation
should approach. One codification of such an ideal is as follows. In essence, we want to
find a MIC that furnishes a probabilistic representation of quantum theory which looks as
close to classical probability as is mathematically possible. The residuum that remains —
the unavoidable discrepancy that even the most clever choice of MIC cannot eliminate —
is a signal of what is truly quantum about quantum mechanics.
In a recent paper it was shown that SICs are strongly optimal for this project [12]. To
see why, consider the following scenario. An agent has a physical system of interest, and
she plans to carry out either one of two different, mutually exclusive procedures on it.
In the first procedure, she will drop the system directly into a measuring apparatus and
thereby obtain an outcome. In the second procedure, she will cascade her measurements,
sending the system through a reference measurement and then, in the next stage, feeding
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it into the device from the first procedure. Probability theory unadorned by physical as-
sumptions provides no constraints binding her expectations for these two different courses
of action. Let P denote her probability assignments for the consequences of following the
two-step procedure and Q those for the single-step procedure. Then, writing {Hi} for the




P (Hi)P (Dj|Hi). (2.61)
This equation is a consequence of Dutch-book coherence [7, 45] known as the Law of
Total Probability (LTP). But the claim that
Q(Dj) = P (Dj) (2.62)
is an assertion of physics, not entailed by the rules of probability theory alone. This as-
sertion codifies in probabilistic language the classical ideal that a reference measurement
simply reads off the system’s “physical condition” or “ontic state”.
We know this classical ideal is not met in quantum theory, that is, Q(Dj) 6= P (Dj).
Instead, as detailed in reference [12], Q(Dj) is related to P (Hi) and P (Dj|Hi) in a dif-
ferent way. To write the necessary equations compactly, we introduce a vector notation
where the LTP takes the form
P (D) = P (D|H)P (H) . (2.63)
To set up the quantum version of the above scenario, let {Hi} be a MIC and {Dj} be an
arbitrary POVM. Furthermore, let {σi} denote a set of post-measurement states for the
reference measurement; that is, if the agent experiences outcome Hi, her new state for the
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system will be σi. In this notation, the Born Rule becomes
Q(D) = P (D|H)ΦP (H) , with [Φ−1]ij := trHiσj . (2.64)
The matrix Φ depends upon the MIC and the post-measurement states, but it is always a
column quasistochastic matrix, meaning its columns sum to one but may contain negative
elements [12]. In fact, Φ must contain negative entries; this follows from basic structural
properties of quantum theory [52]. Now, the classical intution we mentioned above would
be expressed by Φ = I . However, no choice of MIC and set of post-measurement states
can achieve this. The MICs and post-measurement sets which give a Φ matrix closest to
the identity therefore supply the ideal representation we seek.
Theorem 1 in reference [12] proves that the distance between Φ and the identity with
respect to any unitarily invariant norm is minimized when both the MIC and the post-
measurement states are proportional to a SIC. Unitarily invariant norms include the Frobe-
nius norm, the trace norm, the operator norm, and all the other Schatten p-norms, as well
as the Ky Fan k-norms. Although this theorem was proven for foundational reasons, a
special case of the result turns out to answer in the affirmative a conjecture regarding a
practical matter of quantum computation [53, §VII.A].
What ended up being important for the optimality proof in [12] was that both the MIC
and the post-measurement states be proportional to SICs, but not necessarily that they be
proportional to the same SIC. Although the measures considered there were not sensitive
to this distinction, the same SIC case has obvious conceptual and mathematical advan-
tages. From a conceptual standpoint, when the post-measurement states are simply the
projectors Πi corresponding to the SIC outcome just obtained, our “throw away and repre-
pare” process is equivalent to Lüders rule updating, which there are independent reasons
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for preferring [21]. When the post-measurement states are the same SIC as the reference
measurement, Φ takes the uniquely simple form




where J is the Hadamard identity, that is, the matrix of all 1s. Inserted into (5.8) and writ-









P (Dj|Hi) , (2.66)
having the advantage that for each conditional probability given an outcome Hi, only the
ith reference probability figures into that term in the sum. This is not so for two arbitrarily
chosen SICs, and, as such, that case would result in a messier probabilistic representation.
This path is not the only one from which to arrive at the conclusion that SICs furnish
a minimally nonclassical reference measurement. Recall the close association of classi-
cality and orthogonality noted in section 2.2. From this standpoint, one might claim that
most “classical” or least “quantum” reference measurement is one that is closest to an or-
thogonal measurement.
While we know from Corollary 2.2 that a MIC cannot be an orthogonal basis, how
close can one get? One way to quantify this closeness is via an operator distance between
the Gramians of an orthogonal basis and a MIC. From the proof of Corollary 2.2, we
know that if a MIC could be orthogonal its Gram matrix would be [G]ij = eiδij . With
no further restrictions, we can get arbitrarily close to this ideal, for instance, with a MIC
constructed as follows. Consider a set of d2 matrices {Ai} where the first d of them are
the eigenprojectors of a Hermitian matrix and the remaining d2 − d are the zero matrix.
42
Then, for an arbitrary4 MIC {Bj}, we may form a new MIC, indexed by a real number
0 < t < 1,
Eti := tAi + (1− t)Bi . (2.67)
One may see that the Gram matrix of {Eti} approaches the orthogonal Gram matrix in the
limit t→ 1.
But at such an extreme, the usefulness of a MIC is completely destroyed. In the above
scenario when t is close to 1, the informational completeness is all but gone, as one has
to reckon with vanishingly small probabilities when dealing with a MIC close to the limit
point. Such a MIC fails miserably at being anything like a reasonable reference measure-
ment. Although formally capable of being a reference measurement, a biased MIC de-
prives us of an even-handed treatment of indifference; the garbage state, which is poised
in Hilbert space to capture pure state preparation indifference, would be represented by a
non-flat probability distribution. Worse, for any sufficiently biased MIC, i.e., one with any
weight less than 1/d2, the flat probability distribution is not reached by any density ma-
trix. Consequently, what we’re really after is an unbiased reference measurement which
is as close to an orthogonal measurement as possible. With this additional constraint, the
following theorem demonstrates that SICs are the optimal choice.
Theorem 7. The closest an unbaised MIC can be to an orthogonal basis, as measured by
the Frobenius distance between their Gramians, is when the MIC is a SIC.5
4As long as a linear dependence does not develop.
5An earlier paper by one of us (CAF) and a collaborator [7] made the claim that the condition of being
unbiased could be derived by minimizing the squared Frobenius distance; this is erroneous as the unequally
weighted example with {Eti} shows. For the purposes of that earlier paper, it is sufficient to impose by hand
the requirement that the MIC be unbiased, since this is a naturally desirable property for a standard refer-
ence measurement. Having made this extra proviso, the conceptual conclusions of that work are unchanged.
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The first inequality follows from two invocations of the Cauchy–Schwarz inequality and
achieves equality iff trE2i and trEiEj , for i 6= j, are constants, that is, iff the MIC
is an equiangular MIC. The third line is easy to derive from the fact that for any MIC,∑











with equality iff the MIC is rank-1. Thus the lower bound is saturated iff the equal weight
MIC is rank-1 and equiangular, that is, iff it is a SIC.
Theorem 7 concerned the Gramian of a MIC. We can, in fact, show a stronger result
on the inverse of the Gram matrix.
Theorem 8. Let G be the Gram matrix of an unbiased MIC, and let ‖·‖ be any unitarily
invariant norm (i.e., any norm where ‖A‖ = ‖UAV ‖ for arbitrary unitaries U and V ).
Then ∥∥∥∥I − 1dG−1
∥∥∥∥ ≥ ∥∥∥∥I − 1dG−1SIC
∥∥∥∥ , (2.69)
with equality if and only if the MIC is a SIC.
Proof. This is a special case of Theorem 1 in [12].
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As with the theorems we proved above about MICs in general, this mathematical re-
sult has physical meaning. Classically speaking, the “ideal of the detached observer” (as
Pauli phrased it [13]) is a measurement that reads off the system’s point in phase space,
call it λi, without disturbance. A state of maximal certainty is one where an agent is ab-
solutely certain which λi exists. An agent having maximal certainty about each of a pair
of identically prepared systems implies that she expects to obtain the same outcome for




2 = 1. (2.70)
There is also a quantum condition on states of maximal certainty. As before, we can ap-
proach the question, “What is the unavoidable residuum that separates quantum from
classical?” by finding the form of this quantum condition that brings it as close as pos-
sible to the classical version.





−1]ij = 1. (2.71)











Now, recall that while tr ρ = 1 holds for any quantum state, tr ρ2 = 1 holds if and only
if that operator is a pure state, i.e., a rank-1 projector. These operators are the extreme
points of quantum state space; all other quantum states are convex combinations of them.
In terms of the MIC’s dual basis, the pure-state condition is
∑
ij
p(Ei)p(Ej)tr ẼiẼj = 1 , (2.74)




−1]ij = 1 , (2.75)
as desired.
Equation (2.75) closely resembles the collision probability, (2.70). If G−1 were the
identity, they would be identical. On the face of it, it looks as though we should see how
close G−1 can get to the identity. One minor wrinkle is that we should actually compare
G−1 with dI instead of just with I , because an unbiased, orthogonal MIC (if one could
exist) would have the Gram matrix 1
d
I . So, how close can we bring G−1 to dI , by choos-
ing an appropriate unbiased MIC? We know the answer to this from Theorem 8: The best
choice is a SIC.
2.5 Computational Overview of MIC Gramians
In order to explore the realm of MICs more broadly, and to connect them with other
areas of mathematical interest, it is worthwhile to generate MICs randomly and study the
typical properties which result. In this section we focus on the Gram matrix spectra of
four MIC varieties whose constructions are described in section 2.3. These types are:
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1. Generic MICs: a MIC generated from an arbitrary positive semidefinite basis
2. Generic Rank-1 MICs: a MIC generated from an arbitrary rank-1 positive semidefi-
nite basis
3. WH MICs: a MIC obtained from the WH orbit of an arbitrary density matrix
4. Rank-1 WH MICs: a MIC obtained from the WH orbit of an arbitrary pure state
density matrix.
In Hilbert space dimensions 2 through 5 we generated 105 MICs with the following method-
ologies. We constructed the generic MICs as in section 2.3.2 and the WH MICs as in sec-
tion 2.3.3. Each generic MIC was obtained from a basis of positive semidefinite operators
and each WH MIC was obtained from the orbit of an initial density matrix. In the generic
rank-1 case, the pure states defining the basis of projectors were sampled uniformly from
the Haar measure. Likewise, in the rank-1 WH case, the initial vector was also sampled
uniformly from the Haar measure. The positive semidefinite bases for the arbitrary-rank
generic MICs and the initial states for the arbitrary-rank WH MICs were constructed as
follows. First, Hermitian matrices M were sampled from the Gaussian Unitary distri-
bution, and, for each of these, the positive semidefinite matrix M †M was formed. d2 of
these sufficed to form a positive semidefinite basis without loss of generality and a trace-
normalized instance served as the initial state for the WH MICs. For each MIC, we con-
structed its Gram matrix and computed the eigenvalues. Figures 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 are
histograms of the eigenvalue distributions for dimensions 2, 3, 4, and 5, respectively.
We note some expected and unexpected features of these distributions. In accordance
with Theorem 1, both group covariant types, being unbiased, always have the maximal
eigenvalue 1/d, while this is the lower bound for the maximal eigenvalue for the other
two types. Particularly in the unbiased cases, because the eigenvalues must sum to 1, not
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all of them can be too large, so it is perhaps not surprising that there are few eigenvalues
approaching 1/d and that all families show exponential decay until that value. However,
the spectra of rank-1 MICs, especially in dimensions 2 and 3 (Figures 2.1 and 2.2), dis-
play a richness of features for which we have no explanation.
Most surprising of all is the small eigenvalue plateau in Figure 2.2 for the d = 3 rank-
1 WH MICs. Further scrutiny has revealed that the plateau ends precisely at 1/12, the
average value for the non-maximal eigenvalues of an unbiased d = 3 MIC Gram matrix.






























which has the maximal amount of degeneracy allowed. As dimension 3 is also excep-
tional in the study of SICs, we conjecture that the two are related.
Conjecture 4. The plateau in the eigenvalue distribution for d = 3, seen in Figure 2.2,
is related to the existence of a continuous family of unitarily inequivalent SICs in that
dimension [54, 55].
2.6 Conclusions
We have argued that informational completeness provides the right perspective from
which to compare the quantum and the classical. The structure of Minimal Information-
ally Complete quantum measurements and especially how and to what degree this struc-
ture requires the abandonment of classical intuitions therefore deserves explicit study. We
have surveyed the domain of MICs and derived some initial results regarding their de-
parture from such classical intuitions as orthogonality, repeatability, and the possibility
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of certainty. Central to understanding MICs are their Gram matrices; it is through prop-
erties of these matrices that we were able to derive many of our results. We have only
just scratched the surface of this topic, as our conjectures and unexplained numerical
features of Gram matrix spectra can attest. In a sequel, we will explore another applica-
tion of Gram matrices. They hold a central role in the construction of Wigner functions
from MICs [56–58], and Wigner functions are a topic pertinent to quantum computa-
tion [59–63].
Many properties of MIC Gram matrices remain unknown. Numerical investigations
have, in some cases, outstripped the proving of theorems, resulting in the conjectures we
have enumerated. Another avenue for potential future exploration is the application of
Shannon theory to MICs. Importing the notions of information theory into quantum me-
chanics has proved quite useful over the years at illuminating strange or surprising fea-
tures of the physics [64–66]. One promising avenue of inquiry is studying the probabilis-
tic representations of quantum states using entropic measures. In the case of SICs, this
has already yielded intriguing connections among information theory, group theory and
geometry [56, 67–70]. The analogous questions for other classes of MICs remain open
for investigation.
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Figure 2.1: d = 2 random MIC Gram matrix spectra, N = 105, bin size 1/200.
Figure 2.2: d = 3 random MIC Gram matrix spectra, N = 105, bin size 1/198.
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Figure 2.3: d = 4 random MIC Gram matrix spectra, N = 105, bin size 1/200.
Figure 2.4: d = 5 random MIC Gram matrix spectra, N = 105, bin size 1/200.
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Quantum information theory represents a change of perspective. Rather than regard-
ing quantum physics as a limitation on our abilities—the typical sentiment of older texts—
we have learned that it can augment them. In frustrating some ambitions, it enables more
subtle ones. Deviation from classicality is a resource, and the idea that this resource can
be quantified as a modification of the classical probability calculus dates to the beginning
of the field [1]. More recent inquiries have developed this notion precisely: The “neg-
ativity” in a Wigner-function representation of quantum states is now understood to be
valuable in its own right [2–11]. But what does this line of thinking say about quantum
mechanics itself? Can one, following the lead of Carnot, take what might seem a state-
ment of “mere” engineering and find a physical principle? In this paper, we prove some
strong results in this regard in the context of finite dimensional Hilbert spaces. In particu-
lar, we find the unique form of the quantum mechanical Born Rule that makes it resemble
the classical Law of Total Probability (LTP) as closely as possible in at least two senses.
Both come from a significant majorization result which may be of general interest for re-
source theory. This way of tackling the distinction between quantum and classical arises
naturally in the quantum interpretive project of QBism [12, 13], where the Born Rule is
seen as an empirically motivated constraint that one adds to probability theory when us-
ing it in the context of alternative (complementary) quantum experiments. We expect the
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techniques developed here to give an alternative way to explore the paradigm of negativity
and to be of use for a range of practical problems.
The standard procedure in quantum theory for generating probabilities starts with an
observer, or agent, assigning a quantum state ρ to a system. When the agent plans to mea-
sure the system, she represents the outcomes of her measurement with a positive operator-
valued measure (POVM) {Dj}. Assigning ρ implies that she assigns the Born Rule prob-
abilities Q(Dj) = tr ρDj for the outcomes of her measurement. In this way, any quantum
state ρ may be regarded as a compilation of probability distributions for all possible mea-
surements. However, one does not have to consider all possible measurements to com-
pletely specify ρ. In fact, there exist measurements which are informationally complete
(IC) in the sense that ρ is uniquely specified by the agent’s expectations for the outcomes
of that single measurement [14]. With respect to an IC measurement, any quantum state,
pure or mixed, is equivalent to a single probability distribution. In this paper, we consider
minimal informationally-complete POVMs (MICs) for finite dimensional quantum sys-
tems. These sets of operators form bases for the vector space of Hermitian operators and
lead to probability distributions with the fewest number of entries necessary for recon-
structing the quantum state. MICs furnish a convenient way to bypass the language of
quantum states, making quantum theory analogous to classical stochastic process theory,
in which one puts probabilities in and gets probabilities out.
One can eliminate the need to use the operators ρ and Dj in the Born Rule by reex-
pressing it as a relation between an agent’s expectations for different experiments. Sup-
pose our agent has a preferred reference process consisting of a measurement to which
she ascribes the MIC {Hi}, and, upon obtaining outcome i, the preparation of a state σi,
drawn from a linearly independent set of post-measurement states {σi}. (See Fig. 3.1.) In
her choice of this reference process, she requires linearly independent post-measurement
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states so that the inner products trDjσi will uniquely characterize the operators Dj . Let
P (Hi) be her probabilities for the measurement {Hi} and P (Dj|Hi) be her conditional
probabilities for a subsequent measurement of {Dj}. What consistency requirement among
Q(Dj), P (Hi), and P (Dj|Hi) does quantum physics entail?






















:= trHiσj = hitr ρiσj , (3.3)
for ρi := Hi/hi and hi := trHi. The invertibility of Φ is assured by the linear indepen-
dence of the MIC and post-measurement sets. This implies that the coefficients of ρ in the
















P (Dj|Hi) , (3.5)
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Figure 3.1: The solid and dashed lines represent two hypothetical procedures an agent
contemplates for a system assigned state ρ. The solid line represents making a direct mea-
surement of a POVM {Dj}. The dotted line represents making the MIC measurement
{Hi} first, preparing a post-measurement state σi, and then finally making the {Dj} mea-
surement. For the solid path, the agent assigns one set of probabilities Q(Dj). For the
dotted path, she assigns two sets of probabilities: P (Hi) and P (Dj|Hi). Unadorned by
physical assumptions, probability theory does not suggest a relation between these paths.
The Born Rule in the form of Eq. (5.8) is such a relation.
where P (Dj|Hi) = trDjσi is the probability for outcome Dj conditioned on obtaining
Hi in the reference measurement. In more compact matrix notation, we can write
Q(D) = P (D|H) ΦP (H) , (3.6)
where P (D|H) is a matrix of conditional probabilities.








SICs have yet to be proven to exist in all finite dimensions d, but they are widely believed
to [23] and have even been experimentally demonstrated in some low dimensions [25–
28]. The SIC projectors associated with a SIC are the pure states ρi = dHi. In dimension
2, a SIC can be represented as a regular tetrahedron inscribed in the Bloch sphere. (States
defining a qubit SIC can be extracted from Feynman’s 1987 essay “Negative probabili-
ties” [29].) In higher dimensions, they are, of course, harder to visualize. When there is
no chance of confusion, we will refer to the set of projectors as SICs as well. Prior work
has given special attention to the reference procedure where the measurement and post-
measurement states are the same SIC [12, 30, 31]. In this case we denote Φ by ΦSIC and









P (Dj|Hi) . (3.8)
Recall that the LTP expresses the simple consistency relation between the probabil-
ities one assigns to the second of a sequence of measurements, the probabilities one as-
signs to the first, and the conditional probabilities for the second given the outcome of the
first. Written in vector notation, this is
P (D) = P (D|H)P (H) . (3.9)
We write P (D) as opposed to Q(D) to indicate that it is the probability vector for the
second of two measurements. Q(D), on the other hand, is the vector of probabilities as-
sociated with a single measurement. Aside from the presence of Φ matrix, Eq. (5.8) is
functionally equivalent to the LTP.
Although P (H), P (D|H), and Q(D) are probabilities, ΦP (H) often is not. One may
see by summing both sides of Eq. (3.5) over j that the vector is normalized, but in gen-
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eral it may contain negative numbers and values greater than 1. Such a vector is known
as a quasiprobability, and matrices like Φ—real-valued matrices with columns summing
to 1—which take probabilities to quasiprobabilites are called column-quasistochastic ma-
trices [32]. The subset of column-quasistochastic matrices with nonnegative entries are
the column-stochastic matrices. The inverse of a column-stochastic matrix is generally
a column-quasistochastic matrix; in our case, inspection of Eq. (3.3) reveals that Φ−1 is
column-stochastic.
What would it mean if Φ could equal I? In this case we would have Q(D) = P (D).
Then, conceptually, it wouldn’t matter if the intermediate measurement were performed
or not. Put another way, we could behave as though measurements simply revealed a pre-
existing property of the system, as in classical physics where measurements provide infor-
mation about a system’s coordinates in phase space.
Some amount of what makes quantum theory nonclassical resides in the fact that Φ
cannot equal I . How close, then, can we make Φ to I by wisely choosing our MIC and
post-measurement states? It turns out that ΦSIC is closest to the identity with respect to
the distance measure induced by any member of a large family of operator norms called
unitarily invariant norms (see section 3.5 in [33]). A unitarily invariant norm is one such
that ‖A‖ = ‖UAV ‖ for all unitary matrices U and V . These norms include the Schatten
p-norms (among which are the trace norm, the Frobenius norm, and the operator norm
when p = 1, 2, and∞ respectively) and the Ky Fan k-norms. This result codifies the
intuition that Eq. (3.8) represents the “simplest modification one can imagine to the LTP”
[34, p. 1971].
To prove this, we will make use of the theory of majorization [33, 35]. Suppose x and
y are vectors of N real numbers and that x↓ and y↓ are x and y sorted in nonincreasing
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y↓i , for k = 1, . . . , N . (3.10)
If the last inequality is an equality, we say x majorizes y, denoted x  y.
Another variant of majorization, called log majorization or multiplicative majoriza-
tion, is also studied [35]. We say that x weakly log majorizes y from below, denoted






y↓i , for k = 1, . . . , N . (3.11)
If the last inequality is an equality, we say x log majorizes y, denoted x log y. Taking the
log of both sides of Eq. (3.11) demonstrates that log majorization is majorization between
the vectors after an element-wise application of the log map. Log majorization is strictly
stronger than regular majorization; x w log y =⇒ x w y, but the reverse implication is
not true. Majorization is a partial order on vectors of real numbers sorted in nonincreasing
order.
Throughout this paper we will make use of the standard inequalities between the arith-





















with equality in all cases if and only if xi = c for all i. We now turn to two lemmas.
Lemma 2. Let Φp denote the column-quasistochastic matrix associated with a MIC and a
proportional post-measurement set. Then det Φp ≥ det ΦSIC with equality iff the MIC is a
SIC.
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Proof. We may write Φ−1p = GA
−1 where Gij := trHiHj is the Gram matrix of the MIC
elements and Aij := hiδij . Note that Φ−1p has real, positive eigenvalues because it has the











hi = d . (3.13)
One of the eigenvalues of Φp, which we denote λd2(Φp), must equal 1 because an equal-
entry row vector is always a left eigenvector with eigenvalue 1 of a matrix with columns





≤ d− 1. (3.14)
The reciprocal of this expression is proportional to the harmonic mean of the first d2 − 1












−1 ≥ d+ 1 , (3.15)
which, noting that λd2(Φp) = 1, implies
det Φp ≥ (d+ 1)d
2−1 = det ΦSIC . (3.16)
Equality is achieved in this iff all the λi(Φp) are equal, so Eq. (3.16) is saturated iff λ(Φp) =
λ(ΦSIC). We next show this implies that in fact the MIC is a SIC.
For any Φ−1p , we may write Φ
−1
p = P
−1DP where the rows of P are the left-eigenvectors
of Φ−1p and D is the diagonal matrix of eigenvalues of Φ
−1




the row vector (1/d, . . . , 1/d) is the (scaled) left-eigenvector of Φ−1p with eigenvalue 1,
and so it is the first row of P when the eigenvalues are in descending order. Left-eigenvectors
of a matrix are right-eigenvectors of the transpose of the matrix, so we have
(Φ−1p )
T |v〉 = A−1G|v〉 = A−1GA−1A|v〉
= A−1Φ−1p A|v〉 = λ|v〉 ,
=⇒ Φ−1p A|v〉 = λA|v〉 ,
(3.17)
where 〈v| is an arbitrary left-eigenvector of Φ−1p . Combined with our choice of scale for
the first row of P , we conclude that the first column of P−1 is (h1, h2, . . . , hd2)T .
Now suppose Φp is such that λ(Φp) = λ(ΦSIC). Then G = P−1DPA where [D]ij =
1
d+1





























(hjδij + hihj) . (3.18)
In the last step we used that [P ]1j = 1/d and [P−1]i1 = hi. If this Gram matrix comes










i ) , (3.19)
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and the fact that tr ρi ≤ 1 to show that hi ≥ 1/d. As the average hi value must be 1/d,
this implies that hi = 1/d for all i and furthermore that each ρi is rank-1. Substituting this





that is, the MIC is a SIC and Φp = ΦSIC.
Let s(A) denote the vector of singular values of the matrix A in nonincreasing order.
The proof of the following lemma may be found in Appendix A.
Lemma 3. Let Φ be the column-quasistochastic matrix associated with an arbitrary ref-
erence process. Then
s(Φ) w log s(ΦSIC) , (3.21)
with equality iff the MIC and post-measurement states are SICs.
We are now poised to prove:
Theorem 9. Let Φ be the column-quasistochastic matrix associated with an arbitrary
reference process. Then for any unitarily invariant norm ‖·‖,
‖I − Φ‖ ≥ ‖I − ΦSIC‖ , (3.22)
with equality iff the MIC and post-measurement states are SICs.
Proof. By Corollary 3.5.9 in [33], every unitarily invariant norm is monotone with respect
to the partial order on matrices induced by weak majorization of the vector of singular
values. I − Φ is singular with exactly one eigenvalue equal to zero, so one of its singular
67
values is zero as well. Then
s(I − Φ) 
{∑
i si(I − Φ)
d2 − 1
, . . . ,
∑
i si(I − Φ)
d2 − 1
}








si(I − Φ) ≥
∑
i











= d(d2 − 1) , (3.25)
where the first inequality follows Eq. 3.3.13a in [33], the second follows from the triangle
inequality, and the last follows from Lemma 3.
It is known that no quasiprobability representation of quantum theory can be entirely
nonnegative [36]. What does this mean in our formalism?
Let N be the normalized hyperplane of d2-element quasiprobability vectors. Within
this is the (d2 − 1)-simplex of probability vectors, ∆. For any MIC, d-dimensional quan-
tum state space Qd is mapped by the Born Rule to a convex subset of ∆, denoted P . Note
that Φ−1(∆) is equal to the convex hull of the d2 probability vectors trHjσi, that is, the
probabilities for the MIC measurement for each post-measurement state. Consequently,
Φ−1(∆) ⊂ P , which implies ∆ ⊂ Φ(P). These inclusions must be strict, i.e., Φ 6= I:
When the MIC and post-measurement states are rank-1, the vertices of the simplex will be
among the pure-state probability vectors, but P contains more pure states than there are
68
Figure 3.2: N is the normalized hyperplane of d2-element quasiprobability vectors and
the outer, black triangle represents the (d2 − 1)-simplex ∆ of probabilities. For a given
MIC, the inner, green triangle is the simplex Φ−1(∆), the blue circle is the image of Qd
under the Born Rule, denoted P , and the red circle is Φ(P). P and Φ(P) are portrayed
with circles to capture convexity and inclusion relationships only; they need not bear any
resemblance to spheres.
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vertices of Φ−1(∆). Since the image of some probability vectors consistent with quantum
theory must leave the probability simplex under the application of Φ, we have demon-
strated that the appearance of negativity is unavoidable in our framework and is in fact
characterized by the fact that Φ cannot equal the identity. Figure 3.2 illustrates the situa-
tion.
The weak log majorization result of Lemma 3 has at least one more important impli-
cation for quantifying the quantum deviation from classicality. Instead of looking at the
functional form of Eq. (5.8) and considering how much of a deviation from the LTP it rep-
resents, one may approach the problem from a geometric perspective.
Classically one can always imagine assigning probability 1 to an outcome of a puta-
tive “maximally informative measurement”—for instance when one knows the system’s
exact phase space point. However, in an interpretation of quantum theory without hidden
variables, whatever one might mean by “maximally informative,” one cannot mean that
the reference measurement’s full probability simplex is available. Indeed, quantum me-
chanics does not allow probability 1 for the outcome of any MIC measurement [37]. Thus
deviation from classicality can also be captured by the fact that the region of probabilities
compatible with quantum states is strictly smaller than the full (d2 − 1)-simplex. In this
setting, the irreducible deviation from classicality is defined by the largest possible region
for a reference measurement’s probability simplex. The following theorem establishes
that a SIC measurement uniquely maximizes the Euclidean volume of this region, thereby
answering a question raised by one of us in 2002 [34, pp. 475, 571].
Theorem 10. For any MIC in dimension d, let P denote the image of Qd under the Born
Rule and let volE(P) denote its Euclidean volume. Then
volE(P) ≤ volE(PSIC) , (3.26)
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Γ(1) · · ·Γ(d)
Γ(d2)
. (3.27)
The proof of Theorem 10 involves methods of differential geometry which would be dis-
tracting here. We direct the interested reader to Appendix B for details.












Γ(1) · · ·Γ(d) . (3.29)
When d = 2, quantum state space is the Bloch ball and PSIC is the largest ball which








≈ 0.3023 . (3.30)








≈ 0.0138 . (3.31)
In general, the ratio is very rapidly decreasing, signifying a greater and greater deviation
from classicality with each Hilbert space dimension.
Theorems 9 and 10 show that the SICs provide a way of casting the Born Rule in
wholly probabilistic terms, which by two different standards make the difference between
classical and quantum as small as possible. Of all the representations deriving from our
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general procedure, the representation given by Eq. (3.8) is the essential one for specifying
how quantum is quantum.
3.1 Appendix A: Proof of Lemma 3





= trEiσj . (3.32)















[α]ik p(k|j) , (3.34)
where p(k|j) is the probabilistic representation of the state σj with respect to the SIC
{Hk}. The α matrix must be invertible because it is a transformation between two bases,





















































This expression is the sum of the absolute square entries of a matrix, which is equivalent





















Eq. (3.35) shows that α−1Φ−1 is column-stochastic and thus that one of its eigenvalues is







































= det Φ−1SIC .
(3.44)




αikαjltrHkHl ⇐⇒ G = αGSICαT
⇐⇒ detG = (detα)2 detGSIC ,
(3.45)
where G is the MIC Gram matrix and GSIC is the SIC Gram matrix. Recall the definition
of the A matrix from the proof of Lemma 2. The arithmetic-geometric mean inequality
shows detA ≤ (1/d)d2 with equality iff hi = 1/d. Then, since G = Φ−1p A, Lemma 2
shows
detG = (det Φ−1p )(detA) ≤ (det Φ−1SIC)(1/d)d
2
= detGSIC , (3.46)
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with equality iff the MIC is a SIC. This implies (detα)2 ≤ 1, and so | detα| ≤ 1. Since
| detα−1Φ−1| = | detα−1|| det Φ−1|, we conclude that
| det Φ−1| ≤ det Φ−1SIC . (3.47)
Equivalently, det ΦSIC ≤ | det Φ|. Theorem 3.3.2 in [33] shows s(A) log |λ(A)| for an
arbitrary matrix A. To show the desired weak log majorization result, we wish to prove













log | det Φ|
d2 − 1
, . . . ,













= (log(d+ 1), . . . , log(d+ 1), 0) = λ(log ΦSIC) .
(3.48)
Thus,
s(Φ) log |λ(Φ)| w log λ(ΦSIC) = s(ΦSIC) . (3.49)
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If {Hi} and {σj} are SICs, Φ−1ij = 1dtr ΠiΠ
′


















































1 + tr ΠiΠj
d(d+ 1)
=









where Psym is the projector onto the symmetric subspace ofH⊗2d and in the third step we
employed the fact that the SICs form a minimal 2-design [16]. This shows that the modu-
lus of Φ is equal to ΦSIC and thus the singular values of Φ and ΦSIC coincide.
On the other hand, suppose s(Φ) = s(ΦSIC). The product of all the singular values is
the absolute value of the determinant [33], so | det Φ−1| = det Φ−1SIC =⇒ | detα| =
1 =⇒ detG = detGSIC ⇐⇒ {Ei} is a SIC. Carrying through the consequences
of the MIC being a SIC allows us to see from Eq. (3.37) that σj is rank-1 because the up-





[β]jk Πk . (3.51)








[β]jk trEiΠk = [Φ
−1
SICβ
T ]ij , (3.52)
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so | det Φ−1| = | det Φ−1SIC|| det βT | = det Φ−1SIC implies | det β| = 1. Denoting the Gram
matrix of states by g, we have, in the same way as before,
det g = (det β)2 det gSIC = det gSIC . (3.53)
We now prove that det g = det gSIC implies that the basis of projectors forms a SIC. The
following lemma is due to Huangjun Zhu [39]. We only use part of Zhu’s conclusion, but
the lemma is of enough interest to present in full.
Lemma 4 (Zhu). Let λ be the spectrum of the Gram matrix g of a normalized basis of
positive semidefinite operators Πj sorted in nonincreasing order. Then λ  λSIC with
equality iff Πj forms a SIC.
Proof. By assumption trΠ2j = 1 for all j. Since the eigenvalues of Πj are nonnegative,






λi(Πj) = trΠj. (3.54)





where |A〉〉 := ∑ij[A]ij|i〉|j〉. F has the same spectrum as the Gram matrix [g]ij =
〈〈Πi|Πj〉〉 = tr ΠiΠj . To see this, form a projector out of the state
∑
i|Πi〉〉|i〉 where |i〉
is an orthonormal basis inHd2 and perform partial traces over each subsystem. The re-
sults are gT and F , and so, by the Schmidt theorem, the spectra of F and g are equal:
λ(g) = λ(F) = λ.
The expectation value of any operator with respect to an arbitrary normalized state is
less than or equal to its maximal eigenvalue. Thus, a lower bound on the maximal eigen-
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2 ≥ d. (3.56)
As our basis is normalized, tr g = d2, so
∑
i λi = d
2. With this constraint and our bound





















The second majorization becomes an equality when λ1 = d. From Eq. (3.56), we can see
that all Πj must be rank-1 for this condition to be satistfied. Furthermore, we see that in
this case 1√
d
|I〉〉 is an eigenvector of F which achieves the maximal eigenvalue d. When
both majorizations are equalities the spectrum λSIC tells us that F takes the form of a
weighted sum of a projector and the identity superoperator I, specifically
F = d
d+ 1
(I + |I〉〉〈〈I|) . (3.58)
By Cor. 1 in [40], this implies the Πj form a SIC.




2 − λ1 . (3.59)
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Then because the arithmetic mean is greater than or equal to the geometric mean with






















with equality iff λ2 = · · · = λ2d = d
2−λ1





= det gSIC , (3.62)
with equality iff λ = λSIC. By Lemma 18, we have equality iff the post-measurement
states form a SIC.
3.2 Appendix B: Proof of Theorem 10
Equation (3.4) expanded instead in the ρi basis allows us to relate the differential ele-





The Hilbert–Schmidt line element is then




[Φ]ij[Φ]kl(tr ρiρk)dpjdpl . (3.64)
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As in the proof of Lemma 2, we write Φ = AG−1 where [G]ij = trHiHj is the Gram
matrix for the MIC and [A]ij = hiδij . Note further that tr ρiρj = [A−1GA−1]ij . Then









The Hilbert–Schmidt volume element on the space of Hermitian operators in L(Hd) may
now be related to the Euclidean volume element in Rd2 ,
dΩHS =
√




| detG|dΩHS . (3.67)
The larger detG, the larger the corresponding Euclidean volume. Recall Eq. (3.46) which
says
detG ≤ detGSIC , (3.68)
with equality iff the MIC is a SIC. Thus, for any region in operator space, the Euclidean
volume is maximal with respect to the SIC basis. In particular, the SIC basis gives the
largest volume among positive semidefinite operators A satisfying 1 − ε ≤ trA ≤ 1 + ε
for any ε > 0. As ε → 0, we obtain quantum state space Qd and the corresponding region
in Rd2 will have the largest hyperarea within ∆ when computed with the SIC basis.
To calculate this hyperarea, we need to find the metric on ∆ induced by the Hilbert–
Schmidt metric in the SIC basis. We may parameterize ∆ by
X =









d2 where the Latin index runs from 1 to d
2 − 1












It is easily seen that G−1SIC = d(d + 1)I − J where J is the Hadamard identity. One may
then calculate gSIC = d(d+ 1)(I + J) and det gSIC = d2(d2 + d)d
2−1. The induced volume
element on ∆ is then
dωHS = d
√
(d2 + d)d2−1dp1 · · · dpd2−1 . (3.71)
In a similar way, it may be checked that the Euclidean metric in Rd2 induces a volume
element dAE on ∆ satisfying
1
d





(d2 + d)d2−1dAE . (3.73)
We may now integrate over quantum state space to obtain
volHS(Qd) =
√
(d2 + d)d2−1volE(PSIC) . (3.74)
Życzkowski and Sommers [41] calculate the Hilbert–Schmidt volume of finite-dimensional





Γ(1) · · ·Γ(d)
Γ(d2)
, (3.75)
from which Eq. (3.27) follows.
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A minimal informationally complete (MIC) quantum measurement for a d dimen-
sional Hilbert spaceHd is a set of linearly independent positive semidefinite operators
{Ei}, i = 1, . . . , d2, which sum to the identity [1, 2]. If every element in a MIC is propor-
tional to a rank-n projector, we say the MIC itself is rank-n. If the Hilbert–Schmidt inner
products trEiEj equal one constant for all i 6= j and another constant when i = j, we
say the MIC is equiangular. A symmetric informationally complete (SIC) quantum mea-









The theory of quantum channels provides a means to discuss the fully general way
in which quantum states may be transformed. A standard result [7] has it that a quantum
channel E may always be specified by a set of operators {Ai}, called Kraus operators,








Consider a physicist Alice who is preparing to send a quantum system through a chan-
nel that she models by E . Alice initially describes her quantum system by assigning to it a
density matrix ρ. The state E(ρ) encodes Alice’s expectations for measurements that can
potentially be performed after the system is sent through the channel. More specifically,
let Alice’s channel be a Lüders MIC channel (LMC) associated with the MIC {Ei}, which
may be understood in the following way. Alice plans to apply the MIC {Ei}, and upon
obtaining the result of that measurement, invoke the Lüders rule [8, 9] to obtain a new








where we have introduced the principal Kraus operators {
√
Ei}, the unique positive














which is a weighted average of the states from which Alice plans to select the actual state
she will ascribe to the system after making the measurement. (For more on the broader
conceptual context of this operation, see [10, 11].)
LMCs are a proper subset of all quantum channels as many valid channels are unre-
lated to a MIC and do not admit a representation in terms of principal Kraus operators.
For example, a unitary channel is not an LMC.
Throughout this paper, we will frequently use the fact that any MIC element Ei is pro-
portional to a density matrix Ei := eiρi, where we call the proportionality constants {ei}
the weights of the MIC. Because the {Ei} sum to the identity, the weights {ei} sum to the
trace of the identity, which is just the dimension d.
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We refer to the LMC obtained from a SIC as the SIC channel ESIC. We may charac-
terize the SIC channel in any dimension in which a SIC exists using the convenient no-
tion of a dual basis. Given a basis for a vector space, any vector in that space is uniquely
identified by its inner products with the basis elements. These inner products are the co-
efficients in the expansion of the vector over the elements of the dual basis. Likewise, the
inner products with the elements of the dual basis are the coefficients in the expansion
over the original basis. A consequence of this is that, if {Hi} denotes the original basis
and {H̃j} denotes its dual basis, then
trHiH̃j = δij. (4.5)
It follows that if {Hi} is a SIC, then the dual basis is given by
H̃j = (d+ 1)Πj − I , (4.6)








(trXΠj)Hj − (trX)I .
(4.7)





















Going forward, given an LMC E and input state ρ, let λ denote the eigenvalue spec-
trum of the post-channel state E(ρ) and λmax denote the maximum eigenvalue of this
state. We use the notation f(|ψ〉〈ψ|) to denote the average value of the function f(|ψ〉〈ψ|)
over all pure state inputs |ψ〉〈ψ| with respect to the Haar measure. We now prove a lemma
applicable to arbitrary LMCs upon which our later results rely.













We may lower bound λmax given such an input as follows:






If we now average over all pure states with the Haar measure, we will produce a generic










We can evaluate this integral using a known property of the Haar measure [4]. Integrating
a tensor power over pure state projectors gives a result proportional to the projector Psym


















































































The following theorem reveals that the SIC channel’s action is unique to SICs among
LMCs.





Proof. If a SIC exists, take E = ESIC. For the other direction, we will first demonstrate
that the MIC which gives rise to this LMC must be rank-1. Having established this, we
will be able to see that the unitaries relating different Kraus operators for this LMC are
directly related to the MIC weights. This will allow us to show that the principal Kraus
operators have the Gram matrix of a SIC and must form a SIC themselves.













Thus the lower bound in Lemma 5 is saturated. This can only occur when tr
√
ρi = 1 for
all i which implies that the MIC is rank-1.
In Appendix A we define and construct the quasi-SICs, that is, sets of Hermitian, but
not necessarily postive semidefinite, matrices {Qi} which have the same Hilbert–Schmidt
inner products as SIC projectors, and we demonstrate that they furnish a Hermitian basis
of constant-trace Kraus operators Ai which give the same action as E . Any other set of
Kraus operators with the same effect will be related to this set by a unitary remixing, and





[U ]ijAj . (4.20)





j[U ]ij . Furthermore, since the Aj form a Hermitian basis, one may see
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that is, the MIC is a SIC.
4.2 Depolarizing Lüders MIC Channels
The SIC channel falls within a class of channels called depolarizing channels [12]. A







≤ α ≤ 1 . (4.25)
The SIC channel corresponds to α = 1
d+1
. One might wish to know when an LMC is a
depolarizing channel. From Theorem 11, we know the only LMC with α = 1
d+1
is the SIC
channel. What range of α are achievable by LMCs?
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The answer to this question is any 1
d+1
≤ α < 1. To see this, note that the eigenvalue














Recall the lower bound on the average maximal eigenvalue for any LMC given a pure
state input from Lemma 5 is 2
d+1
. As the spectrum for a depolarizing channel is constant
for pure state inputs, the lower bound on the average is the lower bound for any pure state





=⇒ α ≤ 0. The more negative α is, the larger
the maximal eigenvalue would be, so the largest it can get is when α = −1
d2−1 , in which
case λmax = dd2−1 <
2
d+1
. So, λmax = α + 1−αd ≥
2
d+1
=⇒ α ≥ 1
d+1
. When α = 1,
the channel is the identity channel, in other words, not depolarizing at all. It is easy to





I , but this
does not lead to a linearly independent set and is not a MIC. If a SIC exists, however, a
depolarizing LMC exists for any 1
d+1
≤ α < 1, as the next proposition shows.




















(d− 2)(d+ 1)(1− α)
+ 2
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≤ α < 1 . (4.30)













and then a routine calculation and the characterization of the SIC channel from Theorem
11 confirms the claim of the proposition.
Remark. When β = 1, the MIC {Ei} is the original SIC, whereas when β equals its




(−Πi + I) , (4.32)
indirectly noted in prior work [2, 13, 14] for extremizing a nonclassicality measure based
on negativity of quasi-probability.
Do any LMCs give rise to depolarizing channels in dimensions where one does not
have access to a SIC? If we replace the SIC projector in equation (4.31) with a quasi-SIC,
we may form Kraus operators effecting the same depolarizing channel,
Ki =
√









From (4.59), one can check that these will square to a valid MIC. For arbitrary β, how-
ever, Ki may fail to be positive semidefinite and would therefore not be a principal Kraus
operator. From the definition of a quasi-SIC, one sees that the eigenvalues of Qi are bounded
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below by −1. Even in this worst case, one can easily derive that Ki will be positive semidef-
inite for any nonzero β ≤ 3
d+3
. This range of β entitles any α ≥ d2−d−1
d2−1 . (The minimal α
is obtained from the most negative β.) When d = 2, this minimal α matches the lower
bound achieved by the SIC channel because every quasi-SIC is a SIC in this dimension,
but for all d > 2 the inequality is strict and monotonically increases with dimension. In
practice, the minimal eigenvalue among all of the quasi-SIC operators one constructs will
be significantly larger than −1, and so, depending on how close to a SIC one can make
their quasi-SIC, one should be able to get significantly closer to the SIC bound than the α
we have derived.
Fully classifying the MICs giving depolarizing LMCs for particular values of α > 1
d+1
appears to be a difficult problem; it is not clear what properties these MICs must satisfy.
For example, squaring the Ki operators from equation (4.33) results in MICs which are
dependent on one’s quasi-SIC implementation and need not be equiangular as the family
in equation (4.29) was. All principal Kraus operators which give rise to a depolarizing
channel with a given β (and corresponding α) will be related to the operators (4.33) by






for some unitary U . As in the proof of Theorem 11, all the elements of the unitary must
be real and so it is actually an orthogonal matrix. We have not been able to identify any
further necessary characteristics of the U in the completely general case, but the following
notable restriction yielded further structure. A MIC is unbiased if the traces of all the ele-
ments are equal, that is, if ei = 1d for all i. MICs in this class have the property that their
measurement outcome probabilities for the “garbage state” 1
d
I input is the flat probability
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distribution over d2 outcomes. From the standpoint of [1], this means they preserve the
intution that the state 1
d
I should correspond to a prior with complete outcome indifference
in a reference process scenario and accordingly warrant special attention. If we demand
that {Ei} be unbiased, then it is necessary, but not sufficient, that the orthogonal matrix
remixing (4.33) be doubly quasistochastic (see Appendix B).
4.3 Entropic Optimality
One way to evaluate the performance of a quantum channel is by using measures
based on von Neumann entropy,
S(ρ) = −tr ρ log ρ . (4.35)
In this section, we consider two such, proving in each case an optimality result for LMCs
constructed from SICs. To understand the conceptual significance of the bounds we will
derive, consider again Alice who is preparing to send a quantum system through an LMC.
Alice initially ascribes the quantum state ρ to her system, and before sending the system
through the channel, she computes E(ρ). After eliciting a measurement outcome, Alice
will update her quantum-state assignment, not to E(ρ) but rather to whichever ρ′i corre-
sponds to the outcome Ei that actually transpires. The state E(ρ) will generally be mixed,
while ρ′i will be a pure state in the case of a rank-1 MIC. This change from mixed to pure
represents a sharpening of Alice’s expectations about her quantum system. We can quan-
tify this in entropic terms, even for MICs that are not rank-1. In fact, for pure state inputs
we can calculate Alice’s typical sharpening of expectations by averaging the post-channel
von Neumann entropy over the possible input states using the Haar measure, denoted
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S(E(|ψ〉〈ψ|)). We will see that SIC channels give the largest possible typical sharpening
of expectations.
In the following we make use of a partial ordering on real vectors arranged in non-
increasing order called majorization [15]. A real vector x rearranged into nonincreasing
order is written as x↓. Then we say a vector x majorizes a vector y, denoted x  y, if all
of the leading partial sums of x↓ are greater than or equal to the leading partial sums of y↓







for k = 1 . . . N − 1 and ∑i xi = ∑i yi. Speaking heuristically, if x  y, then y is a
flatter vector than x. A Schur convex function is a function f satisfying the implication
x  y =⇒ f(x) ≥ f(y). A function is strictly Schur convex if the inequality is strict
when x↓ 6= y↓. When the inequality is reversed the function is called Schur concave.
Theorem 12. Let E be an LMC. S(E(|ψ〉〈ψ|)) ≤ log(d + 1) − 2
d+1
log 2 with equality
achievable if a SIC exists in dimension d.
Proof. From Lemma 5, we know that the average maximal eigenvalue for the output of an

























The Shannon entropy H(P ) = −∑i Pi logPi is a concave and Schur concave function
of probability distributions. Furthermore, the von Neumann entropy of a density matrix is
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If a SIC exists, taking E = ESIC achieves this upper bound.
Theorem 12 would have been more forceful if the upper bound were saturated “only
if” a SIC exists, but we were unable to demonstrate this property, and so we leave it as a
conjecture:
Conjecture 5. Equality is achievable in the statement of Theorem 12 only if a SIC exists
in dimension d.
We were, however, able to prove a strong SIC optimality result in the setting of bipartite
systems, applicable for example to Bell-test scenarios. The entropy exchange for a chan-
nel E upon input by state ρ is defined [7] to be the von Neumann entropy of the result of
sending one half of a purification of ρ, |Ψρ〉, through the channel:











≤ log d + d−1
d
log(d + 1) with equality
achievable iff a SIC exists in dimension d.
Proof. The purification of the state 1
d




Let λ be the eigenvalues of I ⊗ E(|ME〉〈ME|) arranged in nonincreasing order. We may
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lower bound the maximal eigenvalue as follows:







































































The upper bound now follows from the Schur concavity of von Neumann entropy.
If a SIC exists, it is easy to verify that
I ⊗ ESIC(|ME〉〈ME|) =
1
d
I ⊗ I + |ME〉〈ME|
d+ 1
(4.42)
which saturates the upper bound. Von Neumann entropy is strictly Schur concave [16],






, . . . , 1
d(d+1)
)
. Equation (4.40) shows
that |ME〉 is the maximal eigenstate and that {Ej} is a rank-1 MIC in the same way as in
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Theorem 11. By the spectral decomposition, we may write







where Pi are projectors into the other d2−1 eigenstates. As the full set of projectors forms
a resolution of the identity, we have
d2∑
i=2
Pi = I ⊗ I − |ME〉〈ME| , (4.44)
so
I ⊗ E(|ME〉〈ME|) =
1
d
I ⊗ I + |ME〉〈ME|
d+ 1
. (4.45)
It follows from (4.57) in Appendix A that







I ⊗ I , (4.46)
where the Qi are elements of a quasi-SIC. From the previous expression we now have




QTi ⊗Qi . (4.47)
Applying I ⊗ E directly to equation (4.46) gives us













QTi ⊗ [(d+ 1)E(Qi)− I] ,
(4.48)
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i = I . Comparing equations
(4.47) and (4.48), we may see that
Qi = (d+ 1)E(Qi)− I (4.49)
by multiplying both sides by Q̃Tj ⊗ I and tracing over the first subsystem. The quasi-SICs
form a basis for operator space, so it follows by linearity that
E(ρ) = I + ρ
d+ 1
, (4.50)
and so by Theorem 11 we are done.
4.4 Conclusions
In prior works we have emphasized the importance of MICs as a special class of mea-
surements. The considerations of this paper developed from the idea that MICs may nat-
urally furnish important classes of quantum channels as well. We affirmed this intuition
with the introduction of LMCs which enabled us to discover several new ways in which
SICs occupy a position of optimality among all MICs, supposing they exist. The ap-
pearance of additional equivalences with SIC existence plays two important roles. First,
it should aid those trying to prove the SIC existence conjecture in all finite dimensions,
and second, to our minds, it suggests that LMCs are a more important family of quantum
channels than has been realized. We hope this work will inspire more study of LMCs and
other types of channels derived from MICs not investigated here.
One example of such an alternative is a procedure where, when the agent implement-
ing the channel applies the MIC, they reprepare the measured system in such a way that
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they ascribe a fixed quantum state to it, the choice of new state being made based on the





where the states {σi} are the new preparations applied in consequence to the measure-
ment outcomes. Channels defined by a POVM and a set of repreparations are known as
entanglement-breaking channels [17]. When the POVM is a MIC, we can speak of an
entanglement-breaking MIC channel (EBMC). EBMCs coincide with LMCs for rank-1
MICs and repreparations proportional to the MIC, but not in general. While earlier work
already gives some indication that SIC channels are significant among EBMCs [1], we
suspect that there is much more to be discovered about EBMCs as a class.
Postscript
Due to a breakdown of our university email system, it was not until after Physical Re-
view A published this article that we became aware of the preprint “Entanglement Break-
ing Rank” by Pandey et al. [18]. Their Corollary 3.3 is equivalent to our Theorem 1, al-
beit proved from a different starting point. They consider all channels having the same
action as ESIC and ask when those channels can be achieved using only d2 rank-1 Kraus
operators. We consider channels defined by d2 Kraus operators (of arbitrary rank) and
ask when they can have the action of the SIC channel. We regret this oversight, and we
commend their paper to the reader’s attention. The silver lining is that we can now say the
SIC problem has attracted sufficient interest that the literature is not easy to keep up with.
Moreover, our attention having been called back to this paper after an interlude thinking
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about other aspects of SICs, we now believe that Conjecture 1 can be proven for the spe-
cial case of unbiased LMCs in d = 2. We now sketch the argument here.
Consider a MIC whose elements are constructed by taking the orbit of an operator
under the action of a discrete group of unitaries. Such a MIC is known as group covariant
and is necessarily unbiased. If {|ψj〉} is a set covariant with respect to the same group
as the MIC, then the post-channel states {E(|ψj〉〈ψj|)} are unitarily equivalent and thus
isospectral. We have the eigenvalue bound
λmax(E(|ψ0〉〈ψ0|)) ≥ 〈ψ0|E(|ψ0〉〈ψ0|)|ψ0〉 . (4.52)
In the case that the states {|ψj〉} comprise a SIC and the LMC is unbiased and rank-1,
that is, the MIC elements take the form Ei = 1d |φi〉〈φi|, we can evaluate this bound by










Supposing the entropic bound in Theorem 2 is saturated, then the MIC must be rank-1,
and the average maximum eigenvalue is equal to 2/(d + 1). If a SIC exists, then the dis-
crete average of the maximum eigenvalue over the SIC-state inputs is equal to the contin-
uous average over all pure states, because a SIC is a 2-design. Therefore, if a SIC exists
and the entropic bound is saturated, then the maximum eigenvalue of each post-channel
state for any SIC-state input is exactly 2/(d + 1). In addition, the eigenvector of the post-
channel state corresponding to this eigenvalue is the SIC-state input itself.
Eigenvalue information is most helpful in d = 2. Knowing the maximum eigenvalue
fixes the only other eigenvalue, and from the above, we have the complete eigendecompo-
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sition of the post-channel state for any SIC-state input. From here, we can essentially do
quantum channel tomography, fixing by linearity the action of the channel.
A careful study of Bloch-sphere geometry shows that an unbiased rank-1 MIC in
d = 2 is necessarily group covariant, and in fact is unitarily equivalent to a MIC covariant
under the Pauli group. Therefore, knowing that an LMC in d = 2 is unbiased and that the
entropic bound is saturated, we know the MIC is group covariant, and the above argument
applies.
4.5 Appendix A
Here we define and construct the quasi-SICs which furnish the Kraus operators needed
in Theorem 11 and which were referenced in Theorem 13. Although SIC existence is not
assured, one may always form a quasi-SIC in any finite dimension d. A quasi-SIC is a set
of Hermitian operators obeying the same Hilbert–Schmidt inner product condition as the
SIC projectors. As positivity is not demanded, it is relatively easy to construct a quasi-
SIC as follows [19]. Start with an orthonormal basis for the Lie algebra su(d) of traceless
Hermitian operators. With the Hilbert–Schmidt inner product this space is a (d2 − 1)-
dimensional Euclidean space, so it is possible to construct a regular simplex {Bi} con-
sisting of d2 normalized traceless Hermitian operators. In this case trBiBj = −1d2−1 when





















or, more generally, for an arbitrary operator X ,
E(X) = (trX)I +X
d+ 1
, (4.56)





















where TB indicates the partial transpose over the second subsystem. Then, with the help
of the vectorized notation for an operator |A〉〉 := ∑iA⊗I|i〉|i〉 and the identity |BAB〉〉 =
















































Q2i = I , (4.59)
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iAi = I .
4.6 Appendix B
A doubly quasistochastic matrix is a matrix of real numbers whose rows and columns
sum to 1. If we assume that {Ej} is an unbiased MIC, Ei = 1dρi, we will now show that U
is furthermore doubly quasistochastic.
The Gram matrix for the Ki operators (4.33) is
trKiKj = (1/d− γ)δij + γ (4.60)
where
γ =
d− 1− (d− 2)β + 2
√
(1− β)(1− β + dβ)
d(d+ 1)
. (4.61)
































from which we obtain ∑
j










Tracing both sides of (4.34) reveals that tr
√
Ei = trKi is a constant. Corollary 3 from














d(1/d− γ) + d3γI .
(4.65)















1− dγ + d3γ√
1− β + dβ + (d− 1)
√
1− β
= 1 . (4.67)
Thus U is doubly quasistochastic, as claimed.
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CHAPTER 5
THE PRINCIPAL WIGNER FUNCTION
5.1 Introduction
In the practical course of doing physics, managing coordinate systems is an impor-
tant skill. It is helpful to know how to choose a basis that makes a problem as simple as
possible, and it is beneficial to understand what can and cannot be eliminated by a clever
choice of reference frame. “One good coordinate system may be worth more than a hun-
dred blue-in-the-face arguments,” a colleague advises us [1]. To that end, this article will
explore two particular classes of normalized operator bases and the relations between
them.
We will work in the quantum theory of finite-dimensional systems familiar from the
study of quantum information and computation [2]. In this theory, each physical system
is associated with a Hilbert spaceHd ' Cd, where the dimension d can be taken as a
physical characteristic of the system. For example, in a quantum computer containing N
qubits, the dimension is d = 2N . A quantum state, the means of expressing the prepara-
tion of a system, is an operator on this Hilbert space that is positive semidefinite and has
a trace of unity. Measurements that one can perform upon a system are represented math-
ematically as positive-operator-valued measures (POVMs), which are resolutions of the
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identity into positive semidefinite operators:
n∑
i=1
Ei = I. (5.1)
Each effect Ei corresponds to a possible outcome of the measurement E = {Ei}, and the
probability of that outcome is calculated by the Born Rule:
p(Ei) = tr (ρEi). (5.2)
That is, probabilities are Hilbert–Schmidt inner products between the operators that stand
for outcomes and for preparations (or priors, in more probabilistic language). If the set
of effects {Ei} spans L(Hd), the space of linear operators onHd, then any operator in
this space can be expressed as a list of inner products. Such a POVM is informationally
complete, since any quantum-mechanical calculation about the system may be done in
terms of these inner products. In order to be informationally complete, a POVM must
span L(Hd), so it must contain at least d2 effects. An informationally complete POVM
with exactly d2 effects is a minimal informationally complete measurement, or MIC.
Because a MIC is informationally complete, it can serve as a reference measurement.
This means that any MIC has the property that if an agent has written a probability dis-
tribution over its d2 possible outcomes, she can then compute the probabilities that she
should assign to the outcomes of any other measurement; in other words, a MIC measure-
ment allows us to think of the Born Rule as furnishing a fully probabilistic representa-
tion of quantum theory. As we and collaborators have emphasized in the past, and will
revisit below, proofs of the impossibility of probabilistic representations of quantum the-
ory should actually be understood as proofs of the impossibility of probabilistic represen-
tations where the probabilities combine in a particular way inspired by classicality [3].
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When using a MIC E as a reference measurement, one must be mindful of its bias {ei},
composed of the weights ei := trEi ; if the weights are equal, then ei = 1/d and we call
the MIC unbiased. The bias of a MIC is an informational characteristic of the measure-
ment — it is equal to d times the Born Rule probabilities for the MIC measurement given
the quantum state of maximal indifference, the garbage state, ρ = 1
d
I .
Much of the community’s interest in MICs has focused upon the fascinating special
case of the symmetric informationally complete measurements, the SICs [4–7]. A SIC
is an unbiased MIC where each effect is proportional to a rank-1 projector — so, each
outcome of the measurement is specified by a ray in the Hilbert space — and the inner
products between any two effects are constant. This latter condition is captured by the








SICs have proved in many ways optimal among MICs [3, 8–12]. SICs will once again
occupy a privileged position from the perspective taken in this paper.
Projective measurements (i.e., those corresponding to projections onto the eigenspaces
of quantum observables) are not informationally complete; probabilities corresponding
to the outcomes of such measurements only provide a partial picture of one’s expecta-
tions for all possible measurements. It seems the feeling that projective measurements are
nevertheless the most conceptually significant variety combined with the development
of quasiprobabilistic representations with powerful phase space analogies produced in
some the intuition that probability theory itself was insufficient or at least inconvenient
to handle the oddities of quantum mechanics. The quantum foundations, information and
computation communities have, accordingly, often looked for deviations from classical
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behavior in the peculiarities of quasiprobability distributions (e.g., the appearance of neg-
ativity) [13–16]. Discrete Wigner function approaches in particular have received sub-
stantial theoretical and applied interest. Our purpose in this paper is to connect reference
measurement based probabilistic representations with a suitably generalized notion of
discrete Wigner function representations. Our hope is that a deeper understanding of this
association will be valuable to both probabilistic and quasiprobabilistic points of view and
ultimately help us better understand what is possible in a quantum world.
Our plan for this paper is as follows. In §5.2, we will use the MIC concept to intro-
duce probabilistic and quasiprobabilistic representations of quantum theory and identify
the intuition that there should be a natural relation between them. In §5.3 we consider
a generalization of a MIC we call a measure basis and use it to define discrete minimal
Wigner bases, setting the scene for a formal discussion of the intuitive relation noted ear-
lier. §5.4 is a brief interlude providing background and motivation from frame theory; in
particular we introduce the frame operator and the canonical tight frame. With the back-
ground in place, in §5.5 we define the principal Wigner basis and derive some of its first
properties, such as an induced equivalence class on the set of MICs. In §5.6 we begin to
apply the perspective gained in the previous section to MICs and Wigner bases appearing
in the literature. Here, we will prove Theorem 16, which bounds the distance between an
unbiased MIC and an unbiased Wigner basis. Theorem 17 then captures the special role
that SICs play in these considerations. In the broader picture of our research program,
Theorem 17 is the key result of the paper, for it demonstrates a new way in which SICs
are extremal among MICs. Finally, in §5.7 we discuss what has been learned, record a
few open questions, and anticipate a few fruitful directions for further research.
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5.2 Probability and Quasiprobability
As we noted above, a MIC may serve as a reference measurement. We can illustrate
the meaning of this by comparing and contrasting it with classical particle mechanics.
There, a “reference measurement” would just be an experiment that reads off the system’s
phase-space coordinates, i.e., the positions and momenta of all the particles making up the
system. Any other experiment, such as observing the total kinetic energy, is in principle a
coarse-graining of the information that the reference measurement itself provides.
To develop the analogy, consider the following scenario [17]. An agent Alice has a
physical system of interest, and she plans to carry out either one of two different, mutu-
ally exclusive laboratory procedures upon it. In the first protocol, she will drop the sys-
tem directly into a measuring apparatus and thereby obtain an outcome. In the second
protocol, she will cascade her measurements, sending the system through a reference
measurement and then, in the next stage, feeding it into the device from the first proto-
col. Probability theory in the abstract provides no consistency conditions between Alice’s
expectations for these two protocols. Different circumstances, different probabilities! Let
P denote her probability assignments for the consequences of following the two-step pro-
cedure and Q those for the single-step protocol. Then, writing {Hi} for the possible out-




P (Hi)P (Dj|Hi). (5.4)
This much is just logic, or more specifically speaking, a consequence of Dutch-book co-
herence [10, 18]. It is known as the Law of Total Probability (LTP). However, the claim
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that
Q(Dj) = P (Dj) (5.5)
is an assertion of physics, above and beyond probabilistic self-consistency. It codifies in
probabilistic language the idea that the classical ideal of a reference measurement simply
reads off the system’s pre-existing phase-space coordinates, or data equivalent thereto.
In quantum physics, life is very different. Instead of taking a weighted average of the
{P (Dj|Hi)} as in the LTP, Alice instead uses a mapping
Q(Dj) = µ ({P (Hi)}, {P (Dj|Hi)}) , (5.6)
where the exact form of the function µ depends upon her choice of MIC. Conveniently,
quantum theory is only so nonclassical that µ is a bilinear form, rather than a more convo-
luted function.
We can write our equations more compactly by introducing a vector notation, in which
omitted subscripts imply that an entire vector or matrix is being treated as an entity. Then
the LTP has the expression
P (D) = P (D|H)P (H) , (5.7)
while the quantum relation, the Born Rule, is1




1To obtain (5.8), expand an arbitrary state ρ in the basis {ρi}, ρi = Hi/hi, of quantum states propor-
tional to the MIC basis: ρ =
∑
i αiρi. Then, computing the MIC probabilities for ρ with the Born Rule, it
follows that α = ΦP (H). Thus, since P (Dj |Hi) = trDjρi, (5.8) follows from another application of the
Born Rule with the D measurement.
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The Born matrix Φ depends upon the MIC2 , but it is always a column quasistochastic
matrix, meaning its columns sum to one but may contain negative elements [3]. In fact,
Φ must contain negative entries; this follows from basic structural properties of quantum
theory [13]. As a consequence, ΦP (H) is a quasiprobability. Considering the operation
of Φ on P (H) as a single term results in an equation algebraically equivalent to the LTP
aside from the appearance of negativity in the last term. The same thing happens if we
regard Φ as acting to the left on P (H|D), but now the negativity has been relegated to the
first term. For an unbiased MIC, Φ is a symmetric matrix and we can do the same thing









where the principal square root Φ1/2, which also turns out to be quasistochastic, provides
a similar quasiprobabilistic interpretation to Φ1/2P (H) and the rows of P (D|H)Φ1/2.
One might then say that, for a given MIC, there is a certain “gauge freedom” about where
the negativity can occur if we wish to massage (5.8) into a form which fits together in
exactly the same way as the LTP [19]. As we will see later on, the even-handed gauge
choice (5.9) amounts to a Wigner function representation naturally associated with the
reference measurement MIC.
5.3 Discrete Minimal Wigner Functions
We now begin a more formal discussion of quasiprobability representations of quan-
tum theory constructed on orthogonal operator bases [20, 21], which were motivated in
2And, in general, a set of post-measurement states; in this case the post-measurement states ρi are pro-
portional to the MIC itself and so do not constitute another dependency. We considered the more general
update procedure extensively in [3].
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the first place by the demand that we cast the Born Rule structurally analogous to the LTP.
We first define the following generalization of a MIC:
Definition 1. A measure basis is a Hermitian basis L for L(Hd) for which
∑
i
Li = I and trLi ≥ 0 . (5.10)
The sum condition ensures that its inner products with a quantum state give a quasiprob-
ability in the same way the Born Rule gives probabilities for a POVM. As with a MIC,
the bias {li} of a measure basis consists of the weights li := trLi. The condition that
the weights are nonnegative permits us to carry over the probabilistic significance of a
MIC’s bias to a measure basis in general. It will also sometimes be useful to define the
diagonal bias matrix [A]ij := liδij of a measure basis. We extend the Born matrix defini-
tion to any measure basis in the natural way: In terms of its Gram matrix and bias matrix,
Φ = AG−1. Unless otherwise specified, a measure basis has a bias with weights denoted
by the lowercase letter equivalent of the basis elements, e.g. the bias of B is {bi}. In this
language, a MIC is a measure basis consisting of positive semidefinite operators.
A MIC cannot be orthogonal [22], but a measure basis can — this is the distinguishing
property of the operator bases corresponding to discrete Wigner functions which presently
concerns us. Accordingly, we define
Definition 2. A discrete minimal Wigner basis is an orthogonal measure basis.
We will generally omit the additional qualifiers “discrete” and “minimal” since we are
only considering finite dimensions and we will not be discussing quasiprobability repre-
sentations of quantum theory that use overcomplete operator bases.3 Up to proportion-
ality, what we call a Wigner basis is the set of “phase point operators” for most Wigner
3For a generalization of Wigner functions which does use overcomplete bases, see [23].
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function approaches in the literature. We prefer to use phase space agnostic terminology
as we have intentionally avoided building any particular conception of a discrete phase
space into our generalization. This move will hopefully allow us to eventually understand
precisely when, and to what extent, such conceptions are most useful. For the remainder
of the paper, when we speak of a Wigner function, we mean the quasiprobability distri-
bution one may obtain from a Wigner basis and a density matrix. There is not much to
say about Wigner bases at this level of generality, so for now we note two basic properties
before proceeding.
Proposition 2. The Gram matrix of a Wigner basis is equal to its bias matrix, [G]ij =
fiδij .
Proof. Let {Fi} be a Wigner basis. As it is orthogonal, the Gram matrix is diagonal, that
is, trFiFj = ciδij for some constants {ci}. The dual basis is the unique basis {F̃i} such
that tr F̃iFj = δij , so we must have Fi = ciF̃i. Then the sum constraint enforces tr F̃i = 1
and ci = fi follows.
Definition 3. Let F be a Wigner basis. The shifted Wigner basis of F is the set F S,




Proposition 3. The shifted Wigner basis is a Wigner basis with the same bias.






























5.4 The Frame Operator and the Canonical Tight Frame
In addition to the Gram matrix, another important operator for classifying sets of vec-
tors is the frame operator which appears in the theory of frames. For an introduction to
frame theory, we recommend the reference [24]. In the finite dimensional setting, a frame
for a Hilbert space is a spanning set of vectors; a basis is a frame with the minimal num-
ber of vectors to be a spanning set. Specializing to L(Hd), we define





(trXLi)Li , ∀X ∈ L(Hd) . (5.13)
The frame operator is self-adjoint with respect to the Hilbert–Schmidt inner product and
has the same nonzero spectrum as the Gram matrix; for a basis, such as a MIC, they are
isospectral. By inspection of the definition, one sees that the frame operator allows us to
construct and interconvert between the frame and the dual, L̃i := S−1(Li); for a basis,
the dual frame is exactly the dual basis. It is not hard to show that the inverse of the frame
operator is the frame operator of the dual. Likewise, for bases, the Gram matrix is also
invertible and its inverse is given by the Gram matrix of the dual basis
[G−1]ij = tr L̃iL̃j . (5.14)
We will also make use of the fact that the inner products of a vector with a frame give the







(trXLi)L̃i , ∀X ∈ L(Hd) . (5.15)
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When the frame operator for a set of vectors is proportional to the identity, a frame
is called tight; and when the constant of proportionality is unity, a tight frame is called
normalized. For all frames there is a naturally associated normalized tight frame known as
the canonical tight frame which is “halfway” to the dual, obtained by applying the inverse
square root of the frame operator to each vector. Intuitively, halfway between a basis and
its dual is an orthonormal basis, that is, a self-dual basis. Indeed, for bases, the canonical
tight frame construction is an orthogonalization procedure corresponding to a symmetric
version of the Gram–Schmidt algorithm [24]. The canonical tight frame is distinguished
by being the closest tight frame to the original frame in the sense of minimizing the least
squares error (Theorem 3.2 in [24]).
A MIC cannot be a tight frame4 — if its frame operator were proportional to the iden-
tity, its Gram matrix would have to be as well and a MIC cannot be an orthogonal basis.
For the same reason, an unbiased Wigner basis is a tight frame. The canonical tight frame
for a MIC {Ei} is the orthonormal operator basis {S−1/2(Ei)}. This cannot be a mea-
sure basis because the sum condition fails for a normalized operator basis, but if the MIC
is unbiased, 1/
√
d times the canonical tight frame is an unbiased Wigner basis. In what
follows, we will extend this observation to MICs and Wigner bases of arbitrary bias and
begin to explore the consequences.
4This is a good place to clear up a confusion that we have encountered a few times during conferences,
when people from different subfields try to communicate. A MIC is a basis for the d2-dimensional space
L(Hd). It is not overcomplete, but exactly complete, having just the right number of elements to span the
operator space while keeping itself a linearly-independent set. A rank-1 MIC, for which Ei = ei|ψi〉〈ψi|,
is specified by a set of weights {ei} and a set of vectors {|ψi〉}. These vectors are d2 in number and live
withinHd, so for that space, they would be overcomplete. The vectors {
√
ei|ψi〉} may be considered a
frame for the d-dimensional spaceHd, and, in fact, this is a normalized tight frame because the frame oper-
ator and POVM sum condition coincide: S =
∑
i ei|ψi〉〈ψi| = I . As an operator basis, however, a MIC is
never a tight frame.
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5.5 The Principal Wigner Basis
In this section we define the principal Wigner basis which is the most significant as-
sociation of a Wigner basis to a given MIC. We will see how the principal Wigner basis
induces an equivalence class among measure bases and MICs more specifically. We then
begin to study the structure of that class.
An arbitrary Wigner basis is not a tight frame; for bases this is because the tight frame
concept effectively demands orthogonality and that the vectors all have the same norm.
From Proposition 2, we see that the Hilbert–Schmidt norm of the Wigner basis elements
are the square roots of the weights. So for any Wigner basis, if we divide each element
by the square root of its weight, the result is a normalized tight frame. We would like to
think of Wigner bases playing the analogous role among measure bases that the canonical
tight frame plays among frames. This motivates the following modification of the frame
operator:
Definition 5. The rescaled frame operator SL of a measure basis L is the frame operator






















For all measure bases, SL(I) = I and, consequently, trSL(X) = trSL(X)I = trXSL(I) =
trX . In accordance with the motivation above, SF is the identity superoperator for a
Wigner basis F , which follows from Fi = fiF̃i. For a MIC E, SE is a trace-preserving
quantum channel we called the entanglement breaking MIC channel (EBMC) in a previ-
ous paper; an EBMC for a rank-1 MIC is also the Lüders MIC channel for that MIC [25].
It also turns out that the rescaled frame operator for a MIC has independently arisen in
122
a different context pertaining to quantum state tomography, suggesting a deeper signifi-

















The action of the Born matrix on the reference probability vector is thus equivalent to the
inverse rescaled frame operator on the effects. It is easy to see that S−1E (Ei) is the dual
basis element to the state ρi, so the expression (5.8) simply follows from inserting the
identity into the Born Rule:








This lets us understand the first type of quasiprobability grouping we discussed; trS−1E (Ei)ρ
is the ith element of the quasiprobability vector ΦP (E). We are now in place to see that
the even-handed gauge choice discussed above corresponds to a Wigner function.
Definition 6. The principal Wigner basis of a measure basis L is the set PW (L) = {Fi},
Fi := S−1/2L (Li) . (5.20)
Proposition 4. For a measure basis L, PW (L) is a Wigner basis with the same bias as L.
Proof. As the identity is an eigenvector with eigenvalue 1 of SL, this will also be true of





S−1/2L (Li) = S
−1/2
L (I) = I . (5.21)
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The bias is preserved because S−1/2L is trace-preserving. Orthogonality follows from the
















 = liδij .
(5.22)
Proposition 5. Let L be a measure basis with Gram matrix G and bias matrix A. The



















we must show [
√
Φ]ij = trS−1/2L (Li)L̃j . Note that


































where we used the fact that D̃j =
√
ljL̃j .
Applied to MICs, Proposition 4 demonstrates that the principal Wigner basis is in fact
a Wigner basis and Proposition 5 connects it to the probabilistic representations discussed
in §5.2; given any MIC reference measurement, there is an associated Wigner function
formed by dividing the effect of the Born matrix equally among the probabilities and
quasiprobabilities in (5.8).
The principal Wigner basis map satisfies several of the properties one would desire for
a “principal” definition. Global unitary conjugation acts equally on a MIC and its prin-
cipal Wigner basis; for any unitary U , if {Fi} is the principal Wigner basis of the MIC
{Ei}, {UFiU †} is the principal Wigner basis of the MIC {UEiU †}. This follows from
the invariance of the Gram matrix under a global unitary conjugation of the MIC. As a
consequence, if a MIC is group covariant, i.e., if it can be produced by taking the orbit of
an initial element under the action of a group, thereby making d2 elements out of one, its
principal Wigner basis is group covariant with respect to the same group. The principal
Wigner basis also respects tensor products in the following way. Let D and E be MICs,
not necessarily for the same dimensional Hilbert space. The elementwise tensor products
of their elements, {Di ⊗ Ej}, forms a MIC D ⊗ E for the product dimension. The princi-
pal Wigner basis for this MIC is equal to the tensor product of the principal Wigner bases
for the constituent MICs, that is, PW (D ⊗ E) = PW (D) ⊗ PW (E). This follows from
the observation that the tensor product of the Born matrices for the constituent MICs is
equal to the Born matrix of the tensor product MIC.
Definition 6 furnishes a map from any MIC to a particular Wigner basis. But which
MICs are in the preimage of a particular Wigner basis? As one might expect from an or-
thogonalization procedure, there are infinitely many MICs which share a principal Wigner
basis. We group those that do into an equivalence class.
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Definition 7. If PW (L) = PW (M) for two distinct measure bases L and M , we say L
and M are Wigner equivalent, denoted L ∼W M .
What can we say about the Wigner equivalence classes? The first thing to realize is that
the effects of a MIC of a given bias can have different norms depending on the purity of
ρi while, by contrast, for a Wigner basis, the norm of the elements is fixed by the bias.
This inspires us to guess that MICs which are “in the same direction” will be Wigner
equivalent. The following few results will make this intuition precise.
Proposition 6. Given a measure basis L and a real parameter t 6= 0, the set Lt = {Lti},









i = I and trL
t
i = li are obvious. What remains is to prove linear indepen-
































where we used the fact that
∑
i Li = I . Because {Li} is a basis, the expansion coefficients
are unique, so βi = t−1td
∑







i = βI = 0 =⇒ β = 0, but this is a contradiction, so Lt is a measure
basis.
Definition 8. Let L be a measure basis. Any measure basis Lt, defined by (5.27), is collinear
with L. If t > 0, it is parallel to L and if t < 0, it is antiparallel to L.
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Now we can prove that, in fact, all parallel measure bases are Wigner equivalent. Let
SPW (L) denote the shifted principal Wigner basis of a measure basis L.
Theorem 14. For any measure basis L,
PW (Lt) =

PW (L), if t > 0
SPW (L), if t < 0
. (5.29)
Proof. Because the relation between L and Lt is relatively simple, their Born matrices












In particular note that Φt for two t values with the same magnitude but opposite signs are
equal. Φ is column quasistochastic, so the left eigenvector with eigenvalue 1 is the all 1s
vector; it is easy to show that the corresponding right eigenvector is the vector of weights.
√




Φ = AJ . (5.31)















where |t| is the absolute value of t. Now we may use Proposition 5 to compute the princi-






























































































from which the claim follows.
Since all parallel measure bases are Wigner equivalent, all parallel MICs are as well. Con-
veniently, we have also learned that the shifted principal Wigner basis is the principal
Wigner basis of the antiparallel MICs. As the next lemma shows, there is always an in-
terval of MICs collinear with any measure basis. This interval corresponds to the intersec-
tion of collinear measure bases with the cone of positive semidefinite operators.
Lemma 6. Let L be a measure basis. Define σi := Li/li. Let λmaxi and λmini be the maxi-














Proof. As Lt is a measure basis, for it to be a MIC the elements must all be positive semidef-
inite. Thus we need to show λmin(Lti) ≥ 0 for all t in the range (5.34). Since trLi = li,
the average eigenvalue of Li is li/d, and so λmin(Li) ≤ li/d. Suppose t > 0. Then
λj(L
t








i) = tλmin(Li) + (1− t)
li
d
≥ 0 ⇐⇒ t ≤ 1
1− dλmini
. (5.36)
For this to be true for all i, t must be less than the minimum value of the right hand side.
The lower bound is similarly obtained by assuming t < 0 and making the appropriate
adjustments.
Starting with a particular MIC, we were able to see that all those parallel to it were
Wigner equivalent. But there are Wigner equivalent MICs which are not collinear; in
fact, the following theorem opens the way for the construction of arbitrarily many Wigner
equivalent MICs which are not collinear.
Theorem 15. Let F be a Wigner basis. For any measure basis L, S1/2L (F ) is a measure
basis collinear with MICs in the Wigner equivance class of F .
Proof. Note trS1/2L (Fi) = trS
1/2
L (Fi)I = trFiS
1/2
L (I) = trFi = fi. Now from Defini-
tion 5 and the proportionality of a Wigner basis to its dual it follows that











 = SL(X) .
(5.37)
From this we see that PW (S1/2L (F )) = F . Then from Lemma 6 we may construct MICs
collinear with S1/2L (F ) in the Wigner equivalence class of F .
We have likely only just begun to scratch the surface of this topic, but we have seen
enough to begin applying what we’ve learned. Before doing so in the next section we re-
mark on the significance of our observations. Wigner equivalence is a very broad group-
ing. Every MIC furnishes a distinct probabilistic representation of the Born Rule, but the
probabilistic representations obtained from any two Wigner equivalent MICs are related
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to the same quasiprobabilistic representation in the way we have seen. In other words,
a Wigner function representation of quantum theory is insensitive to differences among
the informationally complete measurements consistent with it. This is at least in part an
artifact of our level of treatment. For our purposes here, any MIC sufficed to furnish a
probabilistic representation, but this is not to say that any MIC would be practically useful
in that capacity. Wigner equivalence alone preserves bias, but, it seems, little else. A good
reference measurement should unmask features of quantum state space that were other-
wise hard to detect. It seems likely that the reference measurements standing a chance of
being useful in this regard would possess mathematical properties beyond the basic def-
inition of a MIC, perhaps being rank-1 or symmetric with respect to a particular group.
Indeed, as the phase point operators of most Wigner function approaches are covariant
with respect to the Weyl–Heisenberg group, furnishing discrete analogs of position and
momentum operators, we speculate that Weyl–Heisenberg covariant MICs are a class of
reference measurements which provide something reminiscent of a phase space without
sacrificing operational significance. We hope the general association we’ve identified
will allow for a dramatic sharpening of the correspondence between probabilistic and
quasiprobabilistic representations once refinements of this variety and others are adopted.
5.6 Behind Every Great Wigner Basis is a Great MIC
The previous section introduced the principal Wigner basis and the induced relation of
Wigner equivalence. We can carry this study further by specializing to unbiased Wigner
bases, the case of most practical and theoretical interest as, to our knowledge, it encom-
passes all of the Wigner functions derived from operator bases to date in the literature.
Pursuing this line of inquiry will lead us to a new way in which SICs are extremal among
MICs. We begin by showing that the principal Wigner basis of an unbiased MIC inher-
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its the closeness property enjoyed by the canonical tight frame. Because of the sum nor-
malization condition, there is also a farthest Wigner basis from a given unbiased MIC,
namely the shifted principal Wigner basis.
Theorem 16. Let E be an unbiased MIC and F be an unbiased Wigner basis. Let λk be






















where the lower bound is saturated iff F = PW (E) and the upper bound is saturated iff
F = SPW (E).
Proof. The lower bound follows from Theorem 3.2 in [24]. The key step is the demon-
















that is, F = PW (E). For the upper bound,
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with equality iff F S = PW (E), that is, iff F = SPW (E).
Theorem 16 does not seem to exactly generalize to the biased case; perhaps a different
condition is more appropriate for biased measure bases. However, this theorem inspires
us to ask the reverse question: What is the closest MIC to a given Wigner basis? This is
probably quite hard to answer in general, but it turns out we can answer it in an important
special case to which we now turn.
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As the next theorem demonstrates, the smallest and largest that the bounds in Theorem 16
can be both occur when the unbiased MIC is a SIC. The minimal lower bound result com-
plements the prior discovery that SICs are the closest MICs can come to being orthogonal
bases [11]. Consequently, the next theorem supports the intuition that SICs are the natural
analogues of orthogonal operator bases contained within the cone of positive semidefinite
operators.




















where the lower bound is saturated iff {Ei} is a SIC and {Fj} is its principal Wigner ba-
sis and the upper bound is saturated iff {Ei} is a SIC and {Fj} is its shifted principal
Wigner basis.
Proof. The matrix dG is doubly stochastic for an unbiased MIC, so the maximal eigen-
value of S is always 1/d. Furthermore, because the diagonal entries of an unbiased MIC’s
Gram matrix are bounded above by 1/d2, we also know that trS ≤ 1. It is then straight-
forward to perform a constrained optimization to see that the bounds in (5.38) achieve














Plugging this spectrum in to (5.38) gives the upper and lower bounds in (5.45). Such a
spectrum occurs iff the MIC is a SIC, a fact that is easy to derive from Lemma 1 in [3].
The Wigner bases (6.13) were identified by Zhu [20] for a different reason.5 Given a
Wigner basis, the ceiling negativity of a quantum state ρ is the magnitude of the most neg-
ative entry in the quasiprobability vector that represents ρ. Maximizing the ceiling nega-
tivity over all quantum states yields the ceiling negativity of the Wigner basis. Zhu proved
that the principal and shifted principal Wigner bases associated with a SIC provide, re-
spectively, the lower and upper bounds on the ceiling negativity over all unbiased Wigner
bases in dimension d. Our orthogonalization procedure sets Zhu’s result in a broader con-
ceptual context: Zhu’s Wigner bases are the output of applying to a SIC a procedure that
works for any MIC. Our quite general definition of a Wigner basis was partly inspired by
Zhu’s approach. His relaxation of the requirement of a discrete phase space interpretation
for his Wigner bases allowed him to propose quasiprobability representations extremizing
the computational resource of negativity beyond what would have been possible within
a narrower scope. We have similarly aimed to impose very few constraints at the outset
to see to what extent quantum theory, thus unrestrained, might offer replacements for our
presuppositions.
SICs are exceptional among MICs, so finding them in a Wigner equivalence class as
the closest member to the Wigner basis prompts us to postulate in general that the closest
MIC or MICs in an equivalence class to their principal Wigner basis may be a quantum
measurement of particular conceptual similarity to the Wigner basis. As we alluded ear-
lier, finding representationally significant refinements to the set of principal Wigner basis
5Zhu calls unbiased Wigner bases “NQPRs” and prefers to report the dual basis elements. In his nota-






preimages stands a chance of enriching our understanding of both Wigner function rep-
resentations and informationally complete measurements. With this program in mind, we
present some initial observations about a few Wigner bases and some candidate MICs
“behind” them.
The discrete Wigner functions most familiar from the literature are those introduced
by Wootters [27]. He constructs Wigner bases for prime dimensions and uses tensor prod-
ucts of these to form a Wigner basis for any composite dimension. As we noted in the
previous section, the same can be done with Wigner equivalent MICs in the component
dimensions to form Wigner equivalent MICs in any composite dimension. For d = 2,
all unbiased Wigner bases are equivalent up to an overall unitary transformation and per-
mutation; in particular, we may view any of them as the principal Wigner basis for some
qubit SIC. Thus, as Zhu notes, reproducing the Wootters–Wigner basis is a matter of
choosing the proper SIC — that is, picking a regular tetrahedron with the correct orien-
tation in the Bloch sphere [20]. Similarly, Wootters’ qutrit Wigner basis is exactly the
shifted principal Wigner basis for a special SIC in dimension 3, the Hesse SIC [20, 28].
More generally, MICs parallel to the remaining necessary Wootters–Wigner bases, those
in odd prime dimensions, were first constructed by Appleby [29]. The Appleby MIC can
be constructed in any odd dimension d. The elements {Ek,l} of this MIC are labeled by
ordered pairs of integers k, l ∈ {0, . . . , d − 1}, and each element has rank (d + 1)/2. To-
gether, the elements of the Appleby MIC comprise an orbit under the action of the Weyl–
Heisenberg group. Like a SIC, the Appleby MIC is equiangular. In dimension 3, the Ap-
pleby MIC is apparently the MIC antiparallel to the Hesse SIC with the minimal t value
in (5.34). Nice properties like equiangularity, relatively low rank elements, and the group
covariance suggest these MICs may be the most significant MICs Wigner equivalent with
Wootters–Wigner bases.
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Another example may be found in a discrete extension of the Cahill–Glauber formal-
ism [30]. The authors there define an orthogonal operator basis in odd dimensions which
takes operators to functions on a discrete phase space {µ, ν}. One can form an unbiased
Wigner basis from their notation via Fµ,ν = 1dT
(0)(µ, ν), where the unitary operators U
and V in their definition are the Weyl–Heisenberg “shift” and “phase” operators, respec-
tively. The parallel, equiangular MIC with largest t value may again be a good choice of
associated reference measurement, but this choice is not as compelling as in the Appleby
case because the rank of its effects is d− 1. Equiangularity may not be worth such a large
rank tradeoff. We speculate that there is a better association among the Wigner equivalent
MICs to this family of Wigner bases.
A case of particular interest for quantum computation is N -qubit systems. The Wootters–
Wigner basis for such a system is the N -fold tensor product of the qubit Wootters–Wigner
basis. Probably the most significant Wigner equivalent MIC to this Wigner basis would be
the N -fold tensor product of the appropriately oriented qubit SIC. Let {Ei : i = 1, . . . , 4}
be a qubit SIC. Up to the weighting factor, each effect is a rank-1 projector, and the set
of four such projectors can be portrayed as a regular tetrahedron inscribed in the Bloch
sphere [5]. A tensorhedron MIC [22] is a POVM whose elements are tensor products of
operators chosen from the qubit SIC {Ei}:
Ei1,...,iN = Ei1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ EiN . (5.47)
Up to an overall unitary conjugation, every qubit SIC is covariant under the Pauli group,
and so every tensorhedron MIC has an N -qubit Pauli symmetry. Perhaps thinking about
tensorhedron measurements in N -qubit computation scenarios will inspire insights that
didn’t come from their quasiprobability counterparts.
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The study of MICs may also suggest directions of research on the Wigner function
side. One of the mysteries of the SICs is that, in all known cases, the SICs are group co-
variant. The definition of a SIC does not mention group covariance anywhere — the only
symmetry in it is the equality of the inner products — and so the fact that the known SICs
are all group covariant might be a subtle consequence we do not yet understand, or it
might be an accident of convenience. We do know, thanks to Zhu, that in prime dimen-
sions, if a SIC is group covariant then it must be covariant under the Weyl–Heisenberg
group specifically [31, 32]. This leaves open the cases of dimensions that are higher prime
powers or products of distinct primes. And in dimension d = 8, there exists in addition to
the Weyl–Heisenberg SICs the class of Hoggar-type SICs, which are related to the octo-
nions and are covariant under the three-qubit Pauli group [33–37]. All of these SICs can
be converted to unbiased Wigner bases in the manner described above, and the resulting
Wigner bases will inherit the group-covariance properties of the original SICs. Therefore,
for a three-qubit system, the construction of principal Wigner bases from unbiased MICs
furnishes three inequivalent Wigner bases of interest: Wootters, Weyl–Heisenberg, and
Hoggar. The Wootters version is distinguished by particularly nice permutation symmetry
properties [16].
We conclude this section by noting an example of a measure basis property which
may be studied for both MICs and Wigner bases in light of the principal Wigner basis
concept. In order to study time evolution, Wootters [27] explores the triple products of his




These can of course be defined for any Wigner basis. Of particular note is the case where
the Wigner basis is the principal Wigner basis of a SIC, because the SIC triple products
tr ΠjΠkΠl are remarkable numbers [12, 38–41]. We have that
d3tr (FjFkFl) = ±(d+ 1)3/2 tr (ΠjΠkΠl)
+ (1−
√












For Wootters’ definition of the discrete Wigner basis, the triple products can be found us-
ing the geometry of the finite affine plane on d2 points. Essentially, one takes the triangle
formed by three points in that phase space, and the triple product depends upon the “area”












This leads naturally to an interpretation of the triple products in terms of geometric phases.
The larger the enclosed area, the greater the geometric phase. The SIC triple products,
and thus by extension those of their associated Wigner bases, have rich number- and group-
theoretic properties [36–41]. What these properties imply for the Wigner bases derived
from SICs is largely an open question. For early results in this vein, see Theorems 6 and
13 of [12] and also [42].
5.7 Discussion
A MIC is a basis for the operator space L(Hd), or in other words, a coordinate sys-
tem for doing quantum mechanics. Because MIC elements are required to be positive
semidefinite, no MIC can ever be an orthogonal basis; the closest that a MIC can come to
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orthogonality is by being a SIC [11]. Prior work has shown that this expresses how much
of the oddity of quantum theory is an artifact of coordinates, versus what is the unavoid-
able residuum of nonclassicality [3]. Other reference measurements may be optimally
suited for other purposes, say, potentially, for algorithm design or to account for experi-
mental specifics. If one abandons direct operational meaning in terms of probabilities, one
can push basis elements outside of the positive semidefinite cone and achieve orthogonal-
ity. In this paper, we have shown well-defined procedures for doing so, and we have quan-
tified how far an orthogonalized basis — a Wigner basis — can deviate from the original
MIC in the unbiased case.
In exploring the consequences of the principal Wigner basis definition, we have found
ourselves with a number of thus far unresolved questions. Several pertain to what we be-
lieve will be a fruitful direction for further research, namely the disambiguation of Wigner
equivalent MICs: When is there a rank-1 MIC in an equivalence class? How is the rank of
the MIC related to its distance to the principal Wigner basis? Does the principal Wigner
basis suggest anything about the operational significance of a Weyl–Heisenberg covari-
ant reference measurement? While negative quasiprobabilities do not have direct oper-
ational meaning as probabilities do, they can be made meaningful in combination with
additional data. Of particular relevance is the discovery that negativity can be a resource
for quantum computation [14, 15]. With a suitable Wigner equivalent MIC, the analog of
negativity may be studied in reference probabilities. In the other direction, perhaps one
could explore how useful statistical properties which are easily displayed by probabilis-
tic representations are reflected in the principal Wigner function. In pursuing this inverse
problem, one potential place to turn is to resource theory, especially in light of a majoriza-
tion lemma concerning Born matrices we proved in a previous paper [3]. Grasping the
variety of Wigner functions, and how they relate to the most economical of probabilistic
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The mathematical machinery of quantum theory has persisted without substantial
modification for nearly a century, but we are still waiting for a compelling set of physi-
cal principles upon which to hang the theory’s predictions. It is the hope of some quantum
foundations researchers that looking at standard quantum theory re-represented in an ap-
propriate fashion will help suggest these principles [1].
Probabilities are central objects in canonical quantum theory; at the end of a quan-
tum mechanical calculation, we are left with a probability distribution or a simple con-
sequence of one. It is tempting, therefore, to behave as though quantum theory gives us
a probability distribution—the probabilities for a set of outcomes. Careful considera-
tion reveals, however, that given a quantum state, quantum theory allows us to calculate
a probability distribution. But where does the quantum state come from in the first place?
The apparatus of quantum theory is unable to say. In practice, an experimenter eventually
settles on a quantum state for her preparation procedure after a suite of tests and calibra-
tions, and, ultimately, statistical methods go into the state determination itself. That is, we
have probabilities at the beginning and probabilities at the end with the formal apparatus
of quantum theory gluing it all together. It is possible that what goes on in between these
ends stands alone, but such a circumstance is far from guaranteed. The proper understand-
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ing of quantum theory may depend upon conceiving of probability theory in the proper
way.
In fact, revisiting and deciding on the proper understanding of probability theory is
the starting point of QBism [2–4]. QBists take a strict personalist Bayesian [5–7] stance
on probability theory. A probability is a valuation an agent places on his or her degree of
belief in a possible outcome, nothing more and nothing less. As a consequence, probabil-
ities are not empirically determinable quantities because they do not independently exist
outside of an agent’s mind.
As an example, consider repeated flips of a coin. A frequentist conception of proba-
bility asserts that the probability of heads for the coin is the long-run ratio of number of
heads to number of flips. The Bayesian first points out that to regard the coin flipped at
different times as an “equivalent” or “exchangeable” process amounts to a belief the ex-
perimenter has about the situation—perhaps nothing is wrong with this belief, but she
should be cognizant of its influence on the conclusions of the experiment. Secondly, the
Bayesian asks just how many times the experimenter plans to actually flip the coin be-
fore she decides that the relative frequency is the probability of heads for that coin. If she
flips it a finite number of times, by her own admission, any frequency is technically pos-
sible (although she believes some are unlikely). The usual answer to such a question is
that she plans to flip it until the deviations in the ratio with further experimentation are
small enough so as to be negligible. In other words, in order to define the likelihood of an
outcome, she asserts that the ratio obtained by a finite series of experiments is likely to be
close to the “true probability”. The circularity of such an argument should be evident and
worrying to anyone espousing the frequentist paradigm. Properly understood, then, proba-
bilities are single-case; no probability is meaningfully right or wrong by any external cri-
terion. The knee-jerk reaction to this statement is to exasperatedly throw up one’s hands
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and exclaim that Bayesianism is just the claim that probability theory is useless! Nothing
could be further from the truth: Although a probability is not subject to objective exter-
nal validation or invalidation, it commands the same sway over our lives that it would if
it were; if an agent wishes to avoid sure loss—to avoid being demonstrably stupid—she
must take steps to ensure that she never assigns probabilities which mutually contradict
each other. When a theory tells us what we “should” do or “strive for”, it is a normative
theory. In other words, the personalist Bayesian view is that probability theory is a norma-
tive theory. In this community, compatible probabilities are called coherent. Remarkably,
nearly all of the standard rules of probability theory are consequences of coherence [6].





The LTP describes a scenario where two actions are taken, one after another. p(i) rep-
resents the probability we ascribe to getting outcome i from the first action, r(j|i) is the
probability we ascribe to getting outcome j from the second action conditioned on out-
come i for the first action, and q(j) is the probability we ascribe to outcome j for the sec-
ond action, not conditioned on anything other than the operational procedure we have laid
out. The commitment to coherence alone (and independent from any possible nature of
reality) requires that our probabilities assigned at any given moment should hold together
in accordance with (6.1).
As we explain below, it is possible to represent any quantum state as a single proba-
bility distribution over the possible outcomes of an appropriately chosen measurement. If
we take this fact seriously, a quantum state is conceptually nothing more than a probabil-
ity distribution. In QBism, all of the personalist Bayesian properties of probability theory
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carry over to quantum states; that is, quantum states, like probabilities, are valuations of
belief for future experiences. However, application of the rules of quantum theory reveal
that not all of the probability distributions in the probability simplex correspond to a valid
quantum state. Just as in probability theory where an agent strives to be consistent with
herself in her probability assignments, an agent should not ascribe a probability distri-
bution she knows to be in conflict with the quantum mechanical formalism. In this way
we arrive at an understanding that quantum theory is an empirically-motivated normative
addition to probability theory.
If the functional form of the additions to probability calculus are cumbersome, then
there may be no reason to adopt it for everyday use—furthermore, it may not shed any
light on the “nature of reality.” What would constitute a nice looking addition to proba-
bility theory? One possibility would be if the normative rules of quantum theory could be
made to mirror those of probability theory in a suggestive way. It turns out that just this
sort of situation can be made to occur.
An informationally complete quantum measurement (IC-POVM) for a Hilbert space
Hd is a set of at least d2 positive semi-definite operators Ei which span L(Hd), the vector
space of linear operators onHd, and satisfy
∑
iEi = I. When such a measurement con-
sists of exactly d2 elements, density matrices ρ and the Born rule probabilities p(i) =
Tr(ρEi) are in bijective correspondence because the Ei form a basis for L(Hd). Such
minimal IC-POVMs are known to exist in all dimensions [8]. Which one we choose for
a representation, however, stands a chance of revealing or obscuring the properties which
probability distributions equivalent to quantum states must have. Very often in mathe-
matics and physics, a hard problem becomes easy when we choose the right basis. For
example, the Eddington–Finkelstein coordinates revealed that the event horizon of a non-
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rotating black hole is not a physical singularity. Is there a best or particularly nice IC-
POVM which will reveal hidden properties of quantum theory?
It is not possible for an IC-POVM to be an orthonormal basis [9–11], so perhaps our
first hope is ruled out. If the elements of an IC-POVM cannot be orthogonal, can they at
least be equiangular? It turns out that they can [12]. That is, we can find a set of Ei which
satisfy Tr(EiEj) = c for i 6= j. Can such a POVM consist of only rank-one matrices?
Remarkably for such a simply-stated question, it is not generally known. A set of d2 rank-





defines an IC-POVM Ei = 1dΠi called a Symmetric IC-POVM (SIC) [13–15]. High-
precision numerical SICs have been found in all dimensions 2–151 [16, 17] and in a few
sporadic higher dimensions. In many cases, exact SICs have been constructed among
these dimensions as well [18]. All indications are that SICs exist in all dimensions, but
the proof continues to evade us.
If a SIC exists in dimension d, it is possible to rewrite the Born rule in a uniquely sim-
ple form analogous to the LTP, an equation called the urgleichung [3, 4], German for “pri-









where q(j) is the probability for obtaining outcome j of a general quantum measurement,
p(i) is the probability an agent ascribes to obtaining outcome i in the imagined scenario
where a SIC measurement is performed on the system instead, and r(j|i) is the proba-
bility for obtaining the equivalent outcome j conditional on obtaining outcome i that the
agent ascribes in the imagined scenario (See [2] for a detailed exposition). It is essen-
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tial to recognize the operational difference between the urgleichung and the LTP: the ur-
gleichung describes a scenario where the first measurement is not actually made—just
imagined. If we actually planned to implement the first measurement, our probabilities
must hold together according to the familiar LTP. We take equation (6.3) very seriously.
In fact, it motivated the most recent development in QBism—a reconstruction of quantum
theory featuring a generalization of the urgleichung as the key assumption [19]. See refer-
ences [20] and [21] for critical review and discussion of the urgleichung in QBism as well
as comparison to other contexts.
Probability theory itself has no tether to physical reality—rather it is a tool that any-
one, anywhere, can use to manage their expectations for further experiences. Those ex-
pectations will certainly be influenced by deeply-held convictions that the agent has about
the nature of reality around them, but the way those probabilities must hang together if
the agent is to be coherent is unaffected. Quantum mechanics, on the other hand, although
evidently a normative theory like probability theory, is tethered to physical reality. A re-
formulation of quantum theory which brings to the forefront this normative structure al-
lows us to examine the threads of this tether without confusing the subjective and the ob-
jective. This way, we may hopefully more readily determine the aspects of reality which
forced quantum theory to be the way that it is. The LTP is a direct consequence of coher-
ence in one’s probability assignments. Is the urgleichung, which presents as an almost
trivial modification of the LTP, on the right track for expressing the conditions for a kind
of quantum coherence that an agent should strive for by virtue of being in our universe?
We would like to accumulate as much evidence as possible that it is. Often one can gather
more evidence for a sentiment simply by looking where it’s least expected. In this case,
Huangjun Zhu recently demonstrated additional evidence for this line of reasoning by in-
stead departing from probability theory [22].
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If we formally relax the positivity condition for minimal IC-POVMs (keeping the fact
that they sum to the identity), we are dealing with the larger space of Hermitian opera-
tor bases. Denoting such an operator Fi, if we also keep the form of the Born rule for a
quantum state ρ, we obtain a set of real numbers p(i) = Tr(ρFi), some of which may
be negative, such that
∑
i p(i) = 1. This set of numbers is referred to as a quasiproba-
bility vector (we will always denote quasiprobability vectors with fraktur script) and a
quasiprobability vector obtained in this way from a quantum state is called a quasiproba-
bility representation of the state.
Quantum opticians have benefited from the ease of plotting quasiprobability distribu-
tions over phase space [23], so there is some utility in their use, but what is a quasiproba-
bility? If a probability is a valuation of belief, what meaning can we attach to a quasiprob-
ability? There does not appear to be a simple meaning—some attempts at attaching op-
erational substance to quasiprobabilities have been made, for example, see references
[24–28], but if these solutions get us no closer to understanding why quantum theory is
the normative probability calculus an agent of our universe should use to productively
navigate, then they amount to duct tape over a structural weakness. However unsatisfy-
ing a quasiprobability may be on principled grounds, it turns out that permitting them for
the time being gets us something desirable in return: the Born rule obtains an even closer
functional analogy to the LTP.
Consider a Hermitian operator basis {Fi} such that
∑
i Fi = I and a dual basis1 {Qj}
constrained to satisfy Tr(Qj) = 1. From a state ρ and an arbitrary POVM {Gj} we form
the quasiprobabilities p(i) = Tr(ρFi) and the conditional quasiprobabilities r(j|i) =
1A dual basis is one for which the bases considered together are biorthogonal, TrFiQj = δij .
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Tr(QiGj). Using the identity
∑
j
Tr(BFj)Tr(QjC) = Tr(BC), (6.4)
we can rewrite the Born rule as




Like the urgleichung, (6.5) looks very much like the LTP. In fact, (6.5) is functionally
identical to the LTP. The difference is that this equation is written in terms of quasiprob-
abilities instead of probabilities. Negativity must pop up somewhere, for it is known that
negativity must2 appear in quasiprobability representations of quantum theory [10, 29].
Another advantage when we are not burdened with positivity is that we may choose
the Fi to form an orthogonal basis for operator space. If a basis is orthogonal, it is pro-
portional to its dual basis and called self-dual. In this case, the sum constraint on the basis
automatically fixes Tr(Qj) = 1 and the constant of proportionality Fj = 1dQj . Here
we depart from Zhu’s terminology and refer to a quasiprobability representation obtained
from this sort of self-dual basis as a Q-rep. Q-reps account for most of the quasiprobabil-
ity representations considered in the literature [30–33]. Importantly, however, Q-reps do
not account for all finite dimensional quasiprobability representations; any nonorthogonal
basis provides an example outside of this set. We can identify a Q-rep with the dual ba-
sis, {Qi}, which defines it. We will reserve q for quasiprobability representations of states
with respect to a Q-rep {Qj} (when there is no index, we are referring to the full vector).
2That is, it is impossible to represent quantum theory in a way which eliminates the appearance of neg-
ativity in both p and r in (6.5) for all quantum states and POVMs. It is possible, in general, to eliminate the
negativity appearing in one or the other.
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Mathematically speaking, a probability is a type of quasiprobability; that is, the kind
without any negative entries. If we believe that the urgleichung differing from the LTP
captures some aspect of the essential difference between quantum and classical, then
some of this essential difference is also contained in the difference between the LTP and
(6.5), that is, in the appearance of negativity in quasiprobability representations of quan-
tum theory. Indeed, Spekkens showed that the presence of negative elements in quasiprob-
ability representations of quantum theory and the impossibility of noncontextual hid-
den variable models are equivalent notions of nonclassicality [9]. Therefore, insofar as
we think contextuality is an important ingredient in the quantum–classical distinction,
we should be interested in negativity as well. Investigating the negativity in Q-reps also
seems to be a promising approach to identifying exactly what advantages quantum com-
putation affords us over classical computation, for example, Veitch et al. showed that neg-
ativity is a resource for quantum computation [34] and Howard et al. recently showed that
contextuality enables universal quantum computation via ‘magic state’ distillation [35].
Additionally, and, as we will see, of particular note for this paper, Pashayan et al. have
shown that a value related to the sum of the negative entries in a quasiprobability repre-
sentation may be thought of as a measure that bounds the efficiency of a classical estima-
tion of probabilities [36]. In light of these facts, Zhu’s recent result is especially exciting.
In his paper, Zhu developed a natural measure of negativity for Q-reps and established
strict upper and lower bounds for this measure in one-to-one correspondence with SICs
in each dimension. SICs are related to the bounds of this measure of negativity and the
appearance of negativity in quasiprobability representations of quantum theory seems
to contain some hints toward what “quantum” really means. Are there more hints to be
found? Motivated to answer this question, we investigate how robust Zhu’s result is to
modifications in the negativity measure.
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In Section 6.2 we motivate and define a general negativity measure for quasiprobabil-
ity representations which includes Zhu’s measure and the measure of principle interest in
this paper, called sum negativity, as special cases and state Zhu’s theorem that the bounds
on his measure of negativity are achieved by Q-reps in one-to-one correspondence with
SICs. In Section 6.3 we address the sum negativity for the SIC Q-reps in the first few di-
mensions. In Section 6.4 we argue that Weyl-Heisenberg covariant Q-reps are a natural
subset to consider while looking for counterexamples to Zhu’s theorem and establish the
explicit conditions for a Weyl-Heisenberg covariant Q-rep in dimension 3. Section 6.5
contains the main results: we explicitly demonstrate that Zhu’s theorem does not gener-
ally extend to sum negativity in either bound, we prove a general sufficiency theorem for
a Q-rep being a local maximum for sum negativity, use this theorem to prove the exact
upper bound for sum negativity among Q-reps in dimension 3, and state a conjecture re-
garding the lower bound among Weyl-Heisenberg Q-reps. In Section 6.6 we again apply
our theorem to prove that, although not generally the case, one of the SIC Q-reps achieves
the exact upper bound for sum negativity in dimension 4. We also briefly discuss the sum
negativity for one of the Hoggar SIC Q-reps in dimension 8. In Section 6.7 we discuss
further questions and directions.
6.2 Negativity and Sum Negativity
Setting aside Q-rep vectors for a moment, we start by proposing a family of negativity
measures for general quasiprobability vectors. Qualitatively speaking, we want a measure
of the “amount” of negativity that appears in a vector with entries which sum to 1. A few
candidates immediately stand out as especially natural measures: Perhaps a measure pro-
portional to the sum of the negative elements or to the most negative element appearing
in the quasiprobability vector—indeed, as we will see, the latter choice is taken by Zhu
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in [22]. We want a family of measures of negativity to meaningfully capture the deviation
or “distance” from quasiprobabilities which have no negative elements. So we are faced
with the task of measuring something we might understand as a distance for elements in
a finite dimensional vector space (constrained by the normalization condition, of course).
From this vantage point, the Lp-norms offer a very compelling family of generalized dis-









and the limiting expression for p→∞,
||x||∞ = max {|x1|, |x2|, . . . , |xn|}. (6.7)
We might hope that the Lp-norm of a quasiprobability vector will itself be a useful quan-
tity which is immediately related to the negativity present in the vector. If p = 1, for
example, we can see that if there are any negative elements in the quasiprobability vector
p then ||p||1 > 1, so perhaps we could associate the amount by which the Lp-norm is larger
than 1 with the negativity of p. However, ||p||p ≤ ||p||q when p > q and, in fact, ||p||p need
not be greater than 1 even when negativity is present. So what we really want is to mea-
sure the deviation of only the negative part of the quasiprobability vector from the zero
vector, disregarding all positive entries entirely. With this in mind, define the negative






which replaces the positive elements of p with zero and the negative elements with their
absolute value. This definition makes it easy to isolate properties of the negative elements
of a quasiprobability vector. Now that we have done away with the positive entries in our
quasiprobability vector, we define the Np negativity of a quasiprobability vector p to be





We will refer to the special cases N1 and N∞, which we see are equivalent to the two nat-
ural candidates proposed above, as the sum negativity3 and the ceiling negativity respec-
tively.
Zhu defines the negativity of a quantum state ρ with respect to a Q-rep {Qj} to be d
times the magnitude of most negative element appearing in the quasiprobability represen-
tation q(j) = Tr(ρFj). In our framework, this corresponds to d times N∞(q). He then
defines the negativity of a Q-rep itself to be the maximum of this value over all of quan-
tum state space. In our framework, this corresponds to d times maxρN∞(q). Thus, in the
general case, we define the Np negativity4 of a quantum state ρ with respect to a Q-rep
{Qj} to be
Np(ρ, {Qj}) := Np(q), (6.10)
3Veitch et al. use the term sum negativity specifically for the sum of the negative elements of the dis-
crete Wigner function for a quantum state [37] whereas we will be considering the equivalent notion with
respect to any Q-rep.
4We have chosen to omit multiplication by d in our negativity definitions so that the negativity can
more immediately be associated with the negative values in a quasiprobability vector. As the dual basis
is calculationally easier to work with, a downside of our convention is that factors of 1/d crop up more
frequently.
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Since Lp-norms are convex and nondecreasing for p ≥ 1 on the positive reals [38] and
the negative part map (6.8) is a convex function, the composition (6.10) is also convex
[39]. This means the maximum occurs on the boundary of the domain so we may take the
maximum in (6.11) to be over pure states in these cases.
As it will be useful later, note that the L2 norm of a Q-rep vector corresponding to a
pure state always equals
√
1/d. To see this, let B = C = ρ and Tr(ρ2) = 1 in (6.4).
This is another reason why the Lp norms are not a good choice for a family of negativity
measures.






where λmin(Qj) is the minimal eigenvalue of Qj .
If a SIC, denoted {Πj}, exists in dimension d, we may construct two Q-reps {Q+j }














which have ceiling negativities











We introduce these Q-reps because of the following theorem.
Theorem 18 (Zhu). Every Q-rep {Qj} in dimension d satisfies N− ≤ N∞({Qj}) ≤ N+.
The lower bound is saturated if and only if {Qj} has the form {Q−j } where Πj is a SIC.
If {Qj} is group covariant, then the upper bound is saturated if and only if {Qj} has the
form {Q+j }.
Zhu’s theorem identifies SICs as centrally important to the study of Q-reps and more
broadly for quantum theory because the Q-reps which achieve both bounds on ceiling
negativity in any dimension are related to SICs by a simple affine transformation. Is the
ceiling negativity unique in this way? If so, it would be interesting to understand why. If
not, where does it fail?
We will address this question for the sum negativity. Like ceiling negativity, there is a
more manageable expression for the sum negativity of a Q-rep. The following argument is
due to Appleby and Zhu.






λ{1}, λ{2}, . . . , λ{2d2−1}
}
, (6.15)
where λ{i} is the minimal eigenvalue of the ith partial sum matrix of the {Qj} matrices.
Proof. For a quasiprobability representation q of a state ρ with respect to Q-rep {Qj}, if











As in (6.12), the minimal value of the expression Tr(ρF ) over quantum state space is the
minimal eigenvalue of F and the state ρ which minimizes the expression is the corre-
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sponding eigenvector. Thus, for a fixed subset G of the {Qj} matrices, the state which
minimizes Tr(ρ
∑
i∈G Qi) is the minimal eigenvector of the matrix
∑
i∈G Qi. Via the def-
inition above, for each ρ there is a subset S; in particular, there is a subset S ′ for a state
whose quasiprobability representation has the sum negativity value N1({Qj}) and, fur-
thermore, the magnitude of the minimal eigenvalue of the matrix
∑
i∈S′ Qi is equal to d
times N1({Qj}). Thus determining the sum negativity is equivalent to looking for the
minimal eigenvalue over all partial sum matrices of {Qj}. There are 2d
2 − 1 entries to
minimize over because we ignore the partial sum corresponding to the empty subset.
Does Theorem 18 extend to sum negativity? In Section 6.5, we will demonstrate that
it generally does not with explicit counterexamples in the first nontrivial dimension, d =
3.
6.3 Sum Negativities of {Q+j } and {Q−j }
Sum negativity is notably harder to work with than ceiling negativity, both analytically
and numerically. As such, using the method described in Lemma 7, analytic results for
the sum negativity of {Q+j } and {Q−j } have only so far been obtained for dimensions 2, 3,
and 4. Numerically exact results have also been obtained for d = 5.
For d = 2, sum negativity and ceiling negativity are equivalent measures because a
d = 2 Q-rep vector cannot contain more than one negative element. This property can
be proven easily with equation (6.4) and the fact quasiprobabilities are normalized. In
addition, the ceiling negativities for {Q+} and {Q−} are equivalent. Thus,






In fact, all Np negativities for the SIC Q-reps are equal in dimension 2. This is a reflec-
tion of the fact that all Q-reps are equivalent to the Wootters discrete Wigner function in
this dimension [22].
There is a continuous one-parameter family of SICs in dimension 3 [40]. For any of
them, we may construct the SIC Q-reps. In Zhu’s paper we easily see that ceiling nega-
tivity is insensitive to the SIC chosen—all that matters is that the defining property of a
SIC is satisfied. This turns out to also be true for sum negativity5. What’s more, the sum





Recall that Theorem 18 establishes that the upper and lower bounds for ceiling negativity
over all Q-reps are achieved by the SIC Q-reps. We see now that in dimension 3, the sum
negativities of {Q+j } and {Q−j } are equal. This tells us that if any d = 3 Q-rep has a sum
negativity other than 1/3, the analog of Theorem 18 does not hold for sum negativity in
dimension 3.





5We won’t explore it further here, but the situation is more interesting. Although the sum negativity is
insensitive to the value of the parameter t which defines the inequivalent SIC Q-reps, the quantum states
whose quasiprobability representations achieve these sum negativity values do depend on the parameter. It
turns out that the sum negativity for {Q−j } constructed from the Hesse SIC (t = 0 in [40]) is achieved by a
complete set of mutually unbiased bases [41], that is, 12 (= d(d + 1)) vectors which form four orthogonal
bases such that any vector from one basis has an equal overlap with any vector from another basis. For all
the other SICs in dimension 3, the states which achieve the sum negativity of {Q−} form a single basis
instead. The complete set of mutually unbiased bases also turns out to be the set of states which minimize
the Shannon entropy in the Hesse SIC representation [42, 43].
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and
N1({Q−j }) = −
1
16












Value (6.19) is surprisingly nice. We will comment briefly on this in Section 6.6. Value
(6.20) is shocking. However, in light of recent results relating the SIC problem to al-
gebraic number theory ( [44], see the contributions of Appleby et. al [45] and Bengts-
son [46] to this volume for a review), it is worth mentioning a few possibly relevant facts
about this number and how it arose.
The sum negativity for the d = 4 SIC Q-rep is (1/4 times) the minimal eigenvalue of
certain 7-element partial sums of the SIC Q-rep matrices. The characteristic polynomial
which has this eigenvalue as a root is:











































The factor multiplying −1/16 in (6.20) is an algebraic integer, but not an algebraic unit.
Finally, the minimal polynomial for (6.20) is degree 8.
For d = 5, N1({Q+}) ≈ 0.584277 and N1({Q−}) ≈ 0.501957. These answers are
numerically correct, but do not lend themselves readily to conversion to exact values.
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6.4 Weyl-Heisenberg Q-reps in d = 3
We say that a set of vectors is group covariant if it is the orbit of some group action
on an initial vector, which we call the fiducial. All known SICs are group covariant and
all but one of those are covariant with respect to the Weyl-Heisenberg (WH) group. In di-
mension d, let ωd = e2πi/d be a dth root of unity, and define the shift and phase operators
X|j〉 = |j + 1〉, Z|j〉 = ωjd|j〉, (6.22)
where the shift is modulo d. Products of powers of X and Z and powers of ωd define
the WH group. The order of the WH group in dimension d is d3, but for the purposes of
constructing a measurement operator or Q-rep, we can neglect the phase factors. In other




The only known exception to WH covariance for SICs is the Hoggar SIC in dimension 8,
but even this outlier is group covariant with respect to the tensor product of three d = 2
WH groups. What about Q-reps? By their construction, the non-Hoggar SIC Q-reps are
WH covariant and these Q-reps achieve the bounds for ceiling negativity in all dimensions
(provided a SIC exists in that dimension). Thus, if we were to consider any subset of the
full space of Q-reps for computational study, the set of WH covariant Q-reps (WH Q-
reps) is likely the best starting point. In any case, due to the ubiquity of the WH group in
quantum information theory, the bounds of sum negativity within WH Q-reps may be of
independent interest.
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A Q-rep is associated with an orthogonal basis of operators {Qj} with norm 3, that is,
Tr(QiQj) = 3δij. (6.24)
Therefore, the general conditions for a WH Q-rep may be obtained by requiring that the




x∗ v∗ 1− z − w
 (6.25)
satisfy equation (6.24). Imposing this condition results in a number of equations which
can be algebraically simplified to the following three:
z2 + zw + w2 = z + w,
|y|2 + |x|2 + |v|2 = 1,
xy + y∗v + v∗x∗ = 0.
(6.26)
In terms of real variables, an arbitrary unit-trace Hermitian matrix

a b+ ic d+ ie
b− ic f g + ih
d− ie g − ih 1− a− f
 (6.27)
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is a WH Q-rep fiducial if
a2 + af + f 2 = a+ f,
b2 + c2 + d2 + e2 + g2 + h2 = 1,
dg + bd+ bg + ch = ec+ eh,
cd+ be+ bh = cg + dh+ eg.
(6.28)
From (6.26) or (6.28) we can see that d = 3 WH Q-rep fiducials define a 4 dimen-
sional subspace of the 8 dimensional space of 3 × 3 unit-trace Hermitian matrices. The
main diagonal elements are independent of the off-diagonal elements and satisfy the equa-
tion of an ellipse (the first equation in (6.26) or (6.28)). The magnitude of the off-diagonal
elements in (6.25) lie on the unit 2-sphere, but their exact values only lie at points where
the expression xy + y∗v + v∗x∗ vanishes.






























































































In the following section we will see why they are presented with the designations “max”
and “min”.
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6.5 Sum Negativity Bounds in d = 3
The WH Q-reps generated by (6.29) and (6.30) will be denoted {Qminj } and {Qmaxj }



















Recall from Section 6.3 that the sum negativities of both SIC Q-reps is 1/3, so {Qminj }
and {Qmaxj } are explicit counterexamples to Zhu’s theorem for sum negativity. It turns out
that (6.32) is a strict upper bound on the sum negativity, not only of WH Q-reps, but of all
Q-reps in dimension 3. We start with two lemmas.
Lemma 8. For quasiprobability vectors with d2 elements lying in the sphere of radius√
1/d, the stationary points for sum negativity are:
1. Those vectors whose entries consist only of two distinct values.
2. Those vectors whose entries consist only of three distinct values including zero.
Proof. Quasiprobability vectors in the sphere of radius
√











The definition of the sum negativity of a quasiprobability vector (6.34) gives us














From this it is clear that the stationary points of the sum negativity are exactly the station-
ary points of the sum of the absolute values. Absolute values are often difficult to deal
with in optimization problems, but it turns out that the function |x| may be approximated
efficiently by
√
x2 + c where c is taken to zero after any differentiation [47]. Thus, we




p(j)2 + c (6.35)
subject to constraints (6.33) in the small c limit. To do this we construct a Lagrangian
















where λ and µ are Lagrange multipliers. Varying this Lagrangian, we see that the station-
ary points must satisfy
p(j)√
p(j)2 + c
− λ− 2µp(j) = 0 (6.37)




or p(j) = 0. (6.38)
Consider the case where p(j) 6= 0 for all j. Now, in order for the constraints (6.33) to
hold, some number n of the entries are −1−λ
2µ




























It is easy to verify that 0 < n < d2. In this case the quasiprobability vector p consists of
two distinct values. If p(j) = 0 for m of the indices then d2−n−m of the entries are 1−λ
2µ
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and the appropriately modified form of (6.39) holds in which case the quasiprobability
vector p consists of three distinct values including zero.
A stationary point can be a local maximum, a local minimum, or a saddle point. Suffi-
cient conditions for maxima and minima in Lagrangian systems with equality constraints
are known. We will need the following tool (which can be found in chapter 2 of [48]):
Theorem 19 (Sufficient Conditions for Constrained Maxima). Consider a constrained
maximization problem for a twice-differentiable function of n variables y(x) with m





where λi are Lagrange multipliers. If there exist vectors x∗ and λ∗ such that ∂iL(x∗,λ∗) =
0, i = 1, . . . , n and fi(x∗) = 0, i = 1, . . . ,m and if
(−1)s
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣





∂1sL · · · ∂ssL ∂sf1 · · · ∂sfm





∂1fm · · · ∂sfm 0 · · · 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
> 0 (6.41)
for s = m + 1, . . . , n (∂ijL indicates a second partial derivative of L(x,λ) with re-
spect to xi and xj evaluated at x∗ and λ∗ and ∂ifj indicates the first partial derivative of
constraint function fj(x) with respect to xi evaluated at x∗), then y(x) has a strict local
maximum at x∗.
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A consequence of this is the following:
Lemma 9. The stationary points for sum negativity of quasiprobability vectors with d2
elements lying in the sphere of radius
√
1/d are all local maxima or global minima.
Proof. From Lemma 8 we know that the stationary points for sum negativity of quasiprob-
abilities lying on the sphere of radius
√
1/d are those consisting of exactly two distinct
elements or those consisting of three if one of them is zero. If there are two distinct el-
ements, they can either both be nonnegative or of opposite signs. If they are both non-
negative, the sum negativity is zero which is the global minimum sum negativity value.
If there are three distinct elements and they are all nonnegative, then it is also a global
minimum for sum negativity. We will now show that when the nonzero elements of a sta-
tionary point are of opposite signs, it is a local maximum.
Consider first the stationary points with two distinct elements. In terms of the La-
grange multipliers from the proof of Lemma 8, the stationary quasiprobability vectors
are comprised of opposite signed values when µ 6= 0 and −1 < λ < 1. Without loss of
generality we choose −1−λ
2µ
to be the negative value so that we may enumerate the number
of negative entries with index n as in (6.39). This amounts to the further restriction µ > 0.
Note that by substituting −1−λ
2µ
= a and 1−λ
2µ
= b in (6.39), we can solve for the positive
and negative entries in the quasiprobability vector in terms of the dimension d and num-


























Sum negativity is invariant to the ordering of the entries in a quasiprobability vector
so we need only prove that one ordering is a local maximum for each n. Without loss of
generality, we fix p(1) = a and demand that p(2) and p(3) are not both also equal to a.
Consider again the Lagrangian (6.40). Taking the relevant derivatives and c to zero, we
may construct the bordered Hessian matrix from (6.41) for our problem. Therefore, if ~p is
a stationary point and if
(−1)s
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−2µ · · · 0 1 2p(1)




0 · · · −2µ 1 2p(s)
1 · · · 1 0 0
2p(1) · · · 2p(s) 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
> 0 (6.44)
for s = 3, . . . , d2, then ~p is a local maximum in sum negativity.




∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ = |A||D − CA
−1B|. (6.45)
















p(i)p(j) > 0 (6.47)
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for all s. Let l denote the number of negative elements in the truncated quasiprobability








p(i)p(j) = s(la2+(s−l)b2)−(la+(s−l)b)2 = (a−b)2(s−l)l > 0. (6.48)
Thus the stationary points consisting of two distinct values, one negative and one positive,
are local maxima.
The values of a and b in the case with three distinct values are more complicated, but
may still be obtained. Otherwise the proof in this case carries through in the same way
as above with a slight modification in the last step. Let m denote the number of elements
equal to zero in the truncated quasiprobability vectors appearing in (6.44). Note that l +







p(i)p(j) = s(la2 + (s− l −m)b2)− (la+ (s− l −m)b)2 > 0, (6.49)
which completes the proof.
We may now return to the question of extremality among Q-reps. We say that a pure
state ρ achieves the sum negativity if it is an eigenvector with eigenvalue magnitude equal
to d times N1({Qj}) of one of the partial sum matrices of the Q-rep {Qj}.
Theorem 20. If the quasiprobability representation of a state which achieves the sum
negativity of a Q-rep {Qj} consists of two distinct elements or three including zero, then
N1({Qj}) is a local maximum among all Q-reps.
Proof. Recall that the quasiprobability representation of a pure state with respect to a Q-
rep lies in the sphere of radius
√
1/d. Also recall that the convexity of the sum negativity
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function implies that any state which achieves the sum negativity for a Q-rep {Qj} is a
pure state. Therefore, if, as we vary {Qj} over the space of Q-reps, the quasiprobability
representation of a pure state which achieves the sum negativity of {Qj} consists of two
distinct values or three distinct values including zero for some Q-rep {Q′j}, then by Lem-
mas 8 and 9, there is a local maximum or global minimum of the sum negativity function
at {Q′j}. As we know the appearance of negativity is inevitable, the global minimum pos-
sibility is avoided.






Proof. When d = 3, explicit calculation reveals that the sum negativity of a quasiproba-
bility vector lying in the sphere of radius
√
1/d constructed with n values equal to a < 0,
m values equal to 0, and 9 − n −m values equal to b > 0 is maximized when n = 2 and












Lemmas 8 and 9 and the fact that our domain has no boundary (lying on the sphere of
radius
√
1/d and quasiprobability normalization together define a (d2 − 2)–sphere) imply
that the sum negativity of this quasiprobability vector is the global maximum value over
this domain. The quasiprobability representations of the states which achieve (6.32) with
respect to the Q-rep {Qmaxj } consist of these values, and so, by Theorem 20, 29(
√
7 − 1) is
the maximum value for sum negativity over all Q-reps in dimension 3.
It is important to note that while Theorem 21 shows that (6.32) is the strict upper
bound for sum negativity among all Q-reps, it does not imply that {Qmaxj } is the unique
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Q-rep which achieves this bound. Numerical searching suggests that, for the fiducial main
diagonal {0, 1, 0}, the WH orbit of (6.30) is the unique Q-rep which achieves the sum
negativity (6.32), but that there is at least one other fiducial main diagonal which achieves
this bound, namely the main diagonal corresponding to the major axis vertices of the el-










}. Unfortunately, for this
fiducial, we were unable to convert the numerical result to exact values.
What can be said about the lower bound for sum negativity in dimension 3? So far,
less is known, but we present the following numerically motivated conjecture:








This statement resisted our attempts to prove it in a fashion similar to Theorem 21 be-
cause for every Q-rep there exist states with zero negative elements in their quasiproba-
bility representation (for example, the maximally mixed state). The Q-rep vector corre-
sponding to the minimal eigenstate over all partial sums of {Qminj } consists of three dis-
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The values in (6.51) may not have significance as deep as those in the upper bound quasiprob-
ability vector, however, as numerical searching has revealed that (6.31) is achieved by a
WH Q-rep for every valid main diagonal. The off-diagonal elements in other cases were
too difficult to convert to exact values. The fact that there seems to be a WH Q-rep which
achieves (6.31) for any main diagonal satisfying the first equation in (6.26) suggests the
lower bound among Q-reps may not be saturated by WH Q-reps. Additionally, the ex-




do not come to our aid when we try to find the lower bound because there is no obvious
reason to hope that the process of maximizing over quantum state space (in the defini-
tion of a Q-rep sum negativity) followed by minimizing over all Q-reps (to find the lower
bound for sum negativity) should result in one of the local maxima for general quasiprob-
ability vectors on the sphere of radius
√
1/d (recall, of course, that it cannot result in the
global minimum of zero negativity on this sphere because we know that the appearance
of negativity is inevitable). Before, we were maximizing over both; in some sense we got
lucky that the global maximum sum negativity for a quasiprobability vector on this sphere
was achieved by a Q-rep vector.
6.6 Further Observations about SIC Q-reps
In Section 6.3, we noted the appearance of a rational value for the sum negativity of
{Q+j } in dimension 4. The quasiprobability vectors which achieve the sum negativity of
{Q+j } are of a special and familiar form; they consist of only the values −1/8 and 1/8.
We know from Theorem 20, therefore, that this Q-rep is a local maximum for sum neg-
ativity among Q-reps in dimension 4. In fact, following the exact same procedure as in
Theorem 21, we see that N1({Q+j }) = 1/2 is the exact upper bound over all Q-reps!
In footnote 5, we mentioned that the states which achieve the sum negativity of {Q−j }
for the Hesse SIC in dimension 3 form a complete set of mutually unbiased bases. The
states which achieve the sum negativity for {Q−j } in dimension 4 also form a structure of
possible interest. They consist of a set of 16 vectors which have two nontrivial squared
overlaps. In the terminology of reference [13], these states form a quantum design of de-
gree 2.
Although dimension 5 was the last in which we were able to explicitly calculate the
sum negativity for the SIC Q-reps by exhaustive combinatorial searching, we suspect that
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we have found the correct sum negativity for {Q−j } constructed with the Hoggar SIC in
dimension 8. Rather than calculating the eigenvalues of every partial sum matrix (since
this is infeasible for 264, 8 × 8 matrices), we used a numerical local maximization pro-
cedure and around 106 random pure state seeds. The overall maximum value we found,
7/8, occurred frequently in our data and is significantly larger than all of the smaller lo-
cal maxima. Of course, we could still be falling short of the global maximum value if it
occurs at very hard to access positions. The states whose quasiprobability representations
achieve the sum negativity of 7/8 consist of 28 copies of value −1/32 and 36 copies of
value 5/96. Therefore, by Theorem 20, if these states achieve the actual sum negativity,
then {Q−j } constructed with the Hoggar SIC is a local maxima among all Q-reps in di-
mension 8. Surprisingly, these quantum states also minimize the Shannon entropy of their
Hoggar SIC representations and thus compose the “twin” Hoggar SIC [43, 49]. This re-
sult and the one for {Q−j } in dimension 4 in the previous paragraph parallel the one men-
tioned in footnote 5.
6.7 Discussion
In QBism, quantum states are probability distributions over a set of possible outcomes
for an appropriately chosen measurement. With the understanding that quantum theory
is an addition to coherence which rational agents should use to help inform their expec-
tations for future experiences in terms of their past ones, QBists hope that the structure
of quantum theory, and in particular its boundaries, can be made to suggest nature’s mo-
tives. A century of quantum foundational debate should by now have convinced us that
these motives will not conform to our prejudices about reality. Although the weirdness of
quantum theory has convinced some that we can no longer pretend physics is more than
174
an exercise in instrumentalism, QBists are optimistic that there are ubiquitous and recog-
nizably physical statements about nature yet to be made.
Prior to Zhu’s paper, we had focused on characterizing the bounds of quantum theory
only from within probability theory. His results reveal this approach was nearsighted. In
the initial stages of this project, we had hoped to find further evidence for the centrality of
SICs in quantum theory by showing that Zhu’s theorem extends to another natural mea-
sure of negativity for quasiprobability representations. Indeed, it is interesting to find that
the SICs do not generally play the same role in this alternate context. Why do they not?
Do they still always play some role which is not immediately apparent? Maybe there are
other families of Q-reps constructed from SICs or another structure which naturally play
the same role for sum negativity. {Q+j } in dimension 4 did achieve the upper bound for
sum negativity. Does this happen again? Although we cannot calculate it exactly, we have
some numerical evidence that the sum negativities for the Hoggar SIC Q-reps differ from
the non-Hoggar SIC Q-reps in dimension 8. This suggests that there might be an essential
relation between sum negativity and group covariance. Furthermore, the appearance of
the complete set of mutually unbiased bases in dimension 3 (mentioned in footnote 5) and
the “twin” Hoggar SIC in dimension 8 suggest a deep connection between sum negativity
and minimizing Shannon entropy which warrants further exploration.
Due to the connection to contextuality, the bounds on sum negativity and Np negativ-
ity in general are likely to be of interest to the quantum computation community. A natu-
ral further direction for this research is the consideration of negativities other than ceiling
and sum negativity. Perhaps the next to consider is the only non-convex integral negativ-
ity, N0, which tells us the maximum number of negative elements which can appear in a
Q-rep vector. On the other hand, N2 negativity makes use of the most familiar distance
function, and, as such, may warrant special attention. In Section 6.4 we established the
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general conditions for a d = 3 WH Q-rep. This result and any analogous results in higher
dimensions6 may be of independent interest. Likewise, in order to pursue the exact lower
bound for sum negativity in dimension 3, we need strategies to construct non-WH Q-reps.
Towards this, the general structure and symmetries inherent in Q-reps warrants explo-
ration. It may further be interesting to consider what can be said about quasiprobability
representations obtained from non-orthogonal bases or even redundant operator frames in
the negativity context.
6And in dimension 8, it may be interesting to look at general WH⊗WH⊗WH covariant Q-reps.
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Wigner’s famous thought experiment [1] is a tale of two agents. One agent, Wigner’s
friend, performs a quantum measurement in a lab and obtains an outcome. The other
agent, Wigner, treats the lab containing his friend and the friend’s experimental setup as
one large quantum system and writes down a joint quantum state which evolves continu-
ously in time. Thus for Wigner there is no measurement outcome. Who is right, Wigner
or his friend? There is a difficulty here if one thinks of a measurement outcome as some-
thing objective in the sense that it can be verified in principle by anybody.
The lesson QBism [2–4] draws from Wigner’s thought experiment is that, for con-
sistency’s sake, measurement outcomes must be regarded as personal to the agent who
makes the measurement. This idea first appeared in 2006 in Ref. [5], where the phrase
“facts for the agent” was coined. Its connection with Wigner’s friend was eventually
spelled out fully in 2010 with Ref. [2], and the personal nature of an agent’s measure-
ment outcomes was further emphasized in Ref. [4], where outcomes were identified with
the “experiences” of the agent doing the measurement. As emphasized, e.g., by Pusey [6],
Wigner’s friend thought experiments thus pose no problem for QBism. In fact, Wigner’s
friend was central to the development of QBist thinking [7].
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Recently, variations of Wigner’s original thought experiment were introduced by
Brukner [8, 9], Frauchiger and Renner (FR) [10], and Baumann and Brukner (BB) [11].1
In Brukner’s thought experiment, first described in 2015 [8] and thoroughly analyzed in
Ref. [9], the assumption that measurement outcomes are objective leads to a Bell inequal-
ity and thus to a conflict with the predictions of quantum mechanics. Brukner concludes
from this that measurement outcomes should be regarded as “facts relative to the ob-
server,” the same conclusion QBism reached by considering the original Wigner’s friend
thought experiment.
The main innovation in the very interesting FR scenario is that both Wigner and a
friend make predictions about the outcome of one and the same measurement, which is
performed by Wigner. A seemingly straightforward application of the quantum formalism
then appears to show that the predictions of Wigner and friend are mutually contradictory.
Frauchiger and Renner turn this into a formal contradiction by postulating a small number
of what they believe to be intuitive assumptions. They conclude that any interpretation of
quantum mechanics has to abandon at least one of these assumptions.
From a QBist perspective, however, there is a fundamental problem with Frauchiger
and Renner’s analysis. In their thought experiment, both Wigner and the friend are agents
applying the quantum formalism, but Frauchiger and Renner treat them in an asymmetric
way. Because Wigner is outside the lab that contains the friend, this asymmetry seems to
be inherent in the very setup of the experiment. We will show that this is not so. QBism
both requires and makes possible a fully symmetric treatment of Wigner and his friend.
Wigner’s action on his friend then becomes, from the friend’s perspective, an action the
1There are too many responses to these papers to cite here, but a sampling of those which attempt to
analyse QBism’s relation to the thought experiments can be found in Refs. [12–20]. Though Refs. [19, 20]
are both very relevant to QBist interests, neither of these get at the heart of the argument made here.
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Figure 7.1: (a) In usual descriptions of various Wigner’s-friend thought experiments,
there is an urge to portray everything from a God’s eye view. Here, we depict the BB
thought experiment, where Wigner, his friend, and a spin-1/2 particle interact, and we
symbolize QBism’s disapproval of such portrayals with a big red X. In QBism, the quan-
tum formalism is only used by agents who stand within the world; there is no God’s-eye
view. (b) Instead, in QBism, to make predictions, Wigner treats his friend, the particle,
and the laboratory surrounding her (all shaded in green) as a physical system external to
himself. While (c) to make her own predictions, the friend must reciprocally treat Wigner,
the particle, and her surrounding laboratory (all shaded in green) as a physical system ex-
ternal to herself. It matters not that the laboratory spatially surrounds the friend; it, like
the rest of the universe, is external to her agency, and that is what counts.
friend takes on Wigner. Once this is taken into account, the paradoxical features of the FR
thought experiment disappear.
The more recent BB scenario is similar to the FR thought experiment in that, again,
both Wigner and friend make predictions about the outcome of Wigner’s measurement.
Baumann and Brukner appear to show that applying the standard quantum formalism
leads the friend to make a bad prediction. As in the FR case, the problem with Baumann
and Brukner’s analysis is that they fail to treat the friend as an agent on the same foot-
ing as Wigner. If, instead, Wigner and his friend are treated symmetrically, the BB sce-
nario loses its seemingly paradoxical character. Because the BB scenario is much simpler
than the FR scenario, we will discuss it first. Indeed it was through thinking about the BB
thought experiment that we finally arrived at our present understanding of the more intri-
cate FR thought experiment.
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Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 7.2 we summarize the main QBist prin-
ciples. We spell out what we mean by a user of the quantum formalism, and how quantum
states and quantum measurements are thought of as personal judgments in our framework.
We further explain how Asher Peres’s dictum that unperformed experiments have no re-
sults remains true even when an agent is certain of what he will find. In Section 7.3 we
review Wigner’s original thought experiment and explain what it means for one agent to
be a physical system for another agent, distinguishing our notion from Wigner’s original
where he argued that the friend must be described as in a “suspended animation” unless
the laws of physics are changed. Section 7.4 contains the main argument of the paper. It
shows that the BB thought experiment can be understood fully within the standard quan-
tum formalism if Wigner and his friend are treated in a fully symmetric fashion. We turn
to the FR thought experiment in Section 7.5. We show that, exactly as in the BB case, the
apparent contradiction derived by Frauchiger and Renner is due to a failure to treat one
of the participants in the thought experiment as an agent in the full sense of the word. Fi-
nally we clarify the circumstances in which one agent may adopt another agent’s quantum
state assignments and thereby address a challenge posed by Frauchiger and Renner [10] in
their subsection titled “Analysis within QBism.”
7.2 Agents and QBism
As there exist several authoritative accounts of QBism [21–23], this section focuses
on those aspects of QBism that are important for our argument about agents and Wigner’s
friend. We start by defining the terms “agent” and “user of quantum mechanics” and dis-
cuss some key tenets of QBism. We then give an account of the elementary double-slit
experiment in QBist terms, in order to set the scene for the discussion of Wigner’s friend
in the next section.
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7.2.1 Agents and users of quantum mechanics
According to QBism, the quantum formalism is a tool decision-making agents can
adopt to better guide their decisions when faced with the inevitable uncertainties of the
quantum world. Particularly, the theory guides its users in how to gamble on the personal
consequences of their measurement actions. Thus for QBism, the quantum formalism
plays a normative role for its users, not a descriptive role for exactly how the world is: It
suggests how a user should gamble.
Users of the theory are thus at the center of the QBist approach. It is therefore impor-
tant to spell out what we mean by the term. In the following, we will make a distinction
between agents and users of quantum mechanics:
• Agents are entities that can take actions freely on parts of the world external to
themselves, so that the consequences of their actions matter for them.
• A user of quantum mechanics is an agent that is capable of applying the quantum
formalism normatively.
While our definition of a user is narrow, our definition of an agent is broad: It does not
rule out attributing agency to dogs, euglenas, or artificial life. However, it does exclude
a computer program that deterministically “chooses” an action from a look-up table. On
the other hand, as Khrennikov emphasizes in Ref. [24], “The idea is that QM is something
used only by a privileged class of people. Those educated in the methods of QM are able
to make better decisions (because of certain basic features of nature) than those not ed-
ucated in the methods of QM.” This notion of a user of the theory is sufficiently open to
allow for additional details in the future, but it is also precise enough for the purposes of
this paper.
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There exists a range of definitions of agency in the philosophical literature that over-
lap with our definition to different degrees [25, 26]. According to the above definitions,
a team of scientists sharing notebooks, calculations, observations, etc., can act as a single
agent and even a user of quantum mechanics [27].
7.2.2 Some tenets of QBism
The previous subsection started with a one-paragraph summary of QBism. The fol-
lowing five tenets provide more detail. Taken together they ensure QBism’s consistency.
What is a measurement?
A measurement is an action of an agent on its external world, where the consequences
of the action, or its outcomes, matter to the agent.
Like our definition of agent before, this definition of measurement is very broad. Ba-
sically anything an agent can do to its external world—from opening a box of cookies,
to crossing a street, to performing a sophisticated quantum optics experiment—counts as
a measurement in our sense. The only thing that sets quantum measurement as normally
construed apart from the more mundane examples given above is whether it is fruitful or
worth one’s while to apply the quantum formalism to guide one’s actions. But, in princi-
ple a user of quantum mechanics could use the formalism to make decisions in any mea-
surement situation, including measurements on living systems as in the Wigner’s friend
thought experiment that are of concern here.
By applying the term measurement only to actions on the agent’s external world, we
exclude the case where an agent, directly or indirectly, acts on him or herself. We thus re-
quire a strict separation between the agent performing the measurement and the measured
system.
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Measurement outcomes are personal
When an agent performs a measurement—that is, takes an action on its external world—
the “outcome” of the measurement is the consequence of this action for the agent. A mea-
surement outcome is personal to the agent doing the measurement. Thus two agents can-
not experience the same outcome. Different agents may inform each other of their out-
comes and thus agree upon the consequences of a measurement, but a measurement out-
come should not be viewed as an agent-independent fact which is available for anyone to
see [5].
This tenet has led some commentators to claim mistakenly that QBism is a form of
solipsism. This claim has been thoroughly refuted (see, e.g., Ref. [2, 28–31]). That QBism
is not solipsism follows immediately from the premise that a measurement is an action on
the world external to the agent. A QBist assumes the existence of an external world from
the outset. Furthermore, the consequences of measurement actions are beyond the agent’s
control—the world can surprise the agent. The world is thus capable of genuine novelty
complementary to the agent’s actions—the world and the agent cannot be identified with
each other. (See Refs. [30, pp. 6–10] and [22, pp. 19–20], arXiv versions.)
A quantum state is an agent’s personal judgment
In QBism, the only purpose of the quantum formalism is to help an agent make bet-
ter decisions. Rigorous use of the formalism enables an agent to make more successful
gambles. The term “gamble” evokes games of luck, but here it is meant to encompass any
action by an agent where the consequences matter to the agent. Any physics experiment is
thus a gamble in this sense.
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As we will explain in more detail in the next subsection, the quantum formalism can
be viewed as an addition to classical decision theory [3, 22]. Following the approach to
decision theory pioneered by Savage [32, 33], QBism takes all probabilities, including
those equal to zero and one, to be an agent’s personal degrees of belief concerning future
measurement outcomes. Personalist probabilities [34, 35] acquire an operational meaning
by their use in decision making. A key consequence of this theory is that, to avoid sure
loss, an agent’s gambles must be constrained by the rules of probability theory.
In QBism, a quantum state is also an agent’s personal judgment, reflecting the agent’s
degrees of belief in the outcomes of all possible measurements he or she might perform.
A quantum state, rather than being a property of a quantum system, thus encodes an agent’s
expectations regarding the outcomes of future measurements.
The quantum formalism is normative rather than descriptive
We will see below that the quantum-mechanical Born rule can be viewed as placing
additional constraints on an agent’s probability assignments to the outcomes of different
measurements [5] in situations where pure probability theory is simply silent. In line with
the central place that QBism gives to measurement, QBism treats the Born rule as funda-
mental: To understand the quantum formalism, one has to understand the Born rule first.
For a measurement with outcomes labeled j = 1, . . . , n, the Born rule is usually given
in the form pj = tr(ρEj), where Ej is a measurement operator or effect corresponding
to outcome j (for a von Neumann measurement this will be a projection operator), ρ is
the density operator for the measured system, and pj is the probability for outcome j. In
QBism, ρ represents the agent’s belief about the system, and the list of effects (or POVM)
{E1, . . . , En} represents the agent’s belief about the measurement.
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In contrast to the usual reading of the Born rule as a formula for computing pj given ρ
and Ej , in QBism the Born rule functions as a consistency requirement [2, 3]. If an agent
has beliefs pj , ρ and Ej that do not satisfy the Born rule, he or she should modify at least
one of these beliefs. The formalism does not prescribe which one to modify or how to
modify it.2
In QBism the Born rule is thus a consistency criterion that an agent should strive to
satisfy in its probability and quantum state assignments. It is a single-agent criterion; it
says nothing about consistency between the probability and quantum state assignments
of different agents. It is entirely about internal consistency of an agent’s expectations.
This is what is meant by saying that the Born rule, and thus the quantum formalism, is
normative rather than descriptive.
This tenet has led some commentators to claim mistakenly that QBism is a form of
instrumentalism. This, as with the claim of solipsism, is also easily refuted; see, e.g.,
Refs. [30, 37]. Indeed from its earliest days, the very goal of QBist research has been
to distill a statement about the character of the world from the fact that gambling agents
should use the quantum formalism [38]. Even though this remains an ongoing project, it
has already led to a number of strong ontological claims on the part of QBism—from the
world being capable of genuine novelty and being in constant creation, to the Born rule
expressing a novel form of structural realism [22, 30].
2It is easier to see how pj , ρ, and Ej are on an equal footing if ρ and Ej are expressed as probabilities.
That this can be done is well known: with respect to an appropriately chosen informationally complete mea-
surement, any density operator is equivalent to a vector of probabilities [36], and any POVM {E1, . . . , En}
is characterized by a stochastic matrix of conditional probabilities [3].
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Probability-1 assignments are judgments
QBism regards even probability-1 (and probability-0) assignments as an agent’s per-
sonal judgments. Assigning probability-1 to an outcome expresses the agent’s supreme
confidence that the outcome will occur, but does not imply that anything in nature guaran-
tees that the outcome will occur.
Similarly, QBism regards both pure and mixed quantum states as an agent’s personal
judgments. This implies in particular that even a statement such as “this outcome is cer-
tain to occur” reflects an agent’s judgment rather than a fact of nature. In other words,
nothing in nature guarantees that an outcome to which an agent has assigned proobability-
1 will in fact occur.
7.2.3 Unperformed measurements have no outcomes, even when an agent is certain what
the outcome will be
In his 1964 Lectures on Physics, Richard Feynman famously stated that the double-slit
experiment exhibits “the basic peculiarities of all quantum mechanics”. “In reality, it con-
tains the only mystery,” he said. This idea seems to overlook the importance of quantum-
foundational results such as Bell inequalities, Kochen-Specker style noncolorability theo-
rems, or contextuality inequalities. Yet, in the end QBism believes Feynman was on the
right track. Not only does the double-slit experiment exhibit the basic peculiarities of
quantum mechanics, it points to the solution of the Wigner’s friend conundrum as well.
The double-slit experiment consists of a particle source, a screen with two slits, and
a second screen farther away from the source where the particle position is recorded. As-
sume an agent has made assignments P (H0) and P (H1) for the probability that the parti-
cle passes through the left or right slit, respectively, and P (Dj|H0) and P (Dj|H1) that the
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particle is detected at position Dj given that it passes through the left or right slit, respec-
tively. We assume P (H0) + P (H1) = 1 and
∑
j P (Dj|H0) =
∑
j P (Dj|H1) = 1, as must
be the case for probabilities and conditional probabilities. As explained above, for these
probabilities to have operational, decision-theoretic, meaning they have to refer to actual
outcomes for the agent. Spelled out, this means P (H0) is the probability that the agent
sees the particle pass through the left slit, allowing the agent to gamble on this outcome,
and P (Dj|H0) is the probability that the agent detects the particle at Dj given that he or
she has seen it pass through the left slit, allowing the agent to make the corresponding
conditional gamble. (The same applies, of course, to the right slit.)
In the uncontroversial case where the agent actually intends to check which slit the
particle passes through before it hits the second screen, the agent’s probability P (Dj) for
finding the particle at Dj is given by
P (Dj) = P (H0)P (Dj|H0) + P (H1)P (Dj|H1) . (7.1)
This follows from probability theory alone.
But what if the agent does not intend to check which slit the particle passes through?
In this case we are dealing with a different experiment for which probability theory alone
does not constrain the agent’s probabilities. The classical intuition in this situation is to
continue to use Eq. (7.1) for the probability of detecting the particle at Dj , which amounts
to the physical postulate that as far as this probability is concerned, it does not matter
whether the agent does or does not check which slit the particle goes through.
This classical intuition has to be abandoned in quantum mechanics. Whether a mea-
surement is performed or not matters profoundly. Asher Peres expressed this in his fa-
mous slogan “Unperformed experiments have no results.” [39]
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Crucially, in a quantum analysis of the double-slit experiment, there is no change
in either the values or the meaning of the probabilities P (H0), P (H1), P (Dj|H0), and
P (Dj|H1). For instance, P (Dj|H0) is still the agent’s probability to detect the particle
at Dj given that the agent saw it pass through the left slit. In his paper “The Concept of
Probability in Quantum Mechanics” [40], Feynman makes a similar point and then goes
on to write that “[w]hat is changed, and changed radically, is the method of calculating
probabilities.”
Here QBism departs from Feynman’s view in one significant way. In the uncontro-
versial case that the agent intends to do an intermediate measurement to check which
slit the particle goes through, the quantum rules do not lead to a change of the probabil-
ities P (Dj) as given in Eq. (7.1). If the agent does not intend to do the intermediate mea-
surement, however, Eq. (7.1) no longer applies because the probabilities P (H0), P (H1),
P (Dj|H0), and P (Dj|H1) now refer to a hypothetical intermediate measurement. Thus
probability theory alone no longer gives a formula for the probability of finding the par-
ticle at Dj . The “radically” new quantum method of calculating probabilities in this case
should therefore not be viewed as a change of, but as an addition to, existing methods.
Probability theory remains fully valid in the quantum realm.
As we stated in Section 7.2.2, QBism takes the stand that even when an agent assigns
probability-1 to one of the possible outcomes of a measurement, there is nothing in the
agent’s external world that metaphysically ensures it will necessarily come about. For
“unperformed measurements have no outcomes” is a statement about the assumed char-
acter of the world, whereas a probability-1 assignment is only a belief (supremely strong,
but nonetheless a belief) that someone happens to have in the moment. That unperformed
measurements have no results is, for QBism, the great lesson of all the Bell-inequality and
Kochen-Specker-theorem results of the last half century, more recently reinforced by the
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“no-go theorems” of Pusey, Barrett, and Rudolph [41] and Colbeck and Renner [42]. It
plays a central role in the QBist approach to Wigner’s friend.
7.3 Wigner’s Friend
Wigner described his thought experiment in a 1961 paper entitled “Remarks on the
Mind-Body Question” [1]. Below we use a slightly modernized version of Wigner’s no-
tation. The friend (who prefers the pronouns “she” and “her”) performs a two-outcome
measurement on a quantum system, where the outcomes correspond to the states |ψ1〉 and
|ψ2〉, respectively. In order to be consistent with the BB scenario discussed in Section 7.4
below, we assume that |ψ1〉 and |ψ2〉 are states of a spin-1/2 particle corresponding to
“spin up” and “spin down”, respectively. After the friend’s measurement, Wigner con-
templates a simple measurement on her, consisting of the question: what was the result of
your spin measurement?
The assumption is now that Wigner assigns a quantum state to the joint system con-
sisting of particle and his friend, and treats it as a closed quantum system. After the friend
has measured the spin, Wigner’s joint state becomes
|Φ〉 = α|ψ1〉|χ1〉+ β|ψ2〉|χ2〉 , (7.2)
where |χ1〉 and |χ2〉 are Wigner’s states for his friend and correspond to her responding
to the question “what was the result of your spin measurement” with “up” and “down”,
respectively.
In his 1961 paper, Wigner argued that the question of whether the friend saw “up” or
“down” was already decided in her mind, before Wigner asked her. Here is what Wigner
concludes from this, in his own words (excepting our modernized notation):
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If we accept this, we are driven to the conclusion that the proper wave
function immediately after the interaction of friend and object was already ei-
ther |ψ1〉|χ1〉 or |ψ2〉|χ2〉 and not the linear combination α|ψ1〉|χ1〉+β|ψ2〉|χ2〉.
This is a contradiction, because the state described by the wave function
α|ψ1〉|χ1〉 + β|ψ2〉|χ2〉 describes a state that has properties which neither
|ψ1〉|χ1〉 nor |ψ2〉|χ2〉 has. If we substitute for “friend” some simple phys-
ical apparatus, such as an atom [. . . ], this difference has observable effects
and there is no doubt that α|ψ1〉|χ1〉 + β|ψ2〉|χ2〉 describes the properties
of the joint system correctly, the assumption that the wave function is either
|ψ1〉|χ1〉 or |ψ2〉|χ2〉 does not [Wigner’s italics]. If the atom is replaced by a
conscious being, the wave function α|ψ1〉|χ1〉 + β|ψ2〉|χ2〉 (which also fol-
lows from the linearity of the equations) appears absurd because it implies
that my friend was in a state of suspended animation before [she] answered
my question.
It follows that the being with a consciousness must have a different role
in quantum mechanics than the inanimate measuring device: the atom con-
sidered above. In particular, the quantum mechanical equations of motion
cannot be linear if the preceding argument is accepted. This argument implies
that “my friend” has the same types of impressions and sensations as I—in
particular, that, after interacting with the object, [she] is not in that state of
suspended animation which corresponds to the wave function α|ψ1〉|χ1〉 +
β|ψ2〉|χ2〉.
QBism, along with most other current interpretations of quantum mechanics, does
not restrict the applicability of quantum mechanics to inanimate devices. An agent can
apply the normative quantum calculus to any part of the world external to him or herself,
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including conscious beings and other agents. So how does QBism escape the conclusions
that Wigner draws from his thought experiment?
Part of the answer is straightforward and follows directly from the QBist tenets. Wigner’s
quantum state |Φ〉 is not descriptive: it does not describe properties of the joint system to
which it refers. The exclusive role of |Φ〉 is to help Wigner quantify his expectations re-
garding the consequences of his future actions on friend and particle. In the same way,
the friend’s state assignments refer to her expectations regarding the consequences of her
future actions. There is simply no conflict between these two perspectives. In particular,
Wigner’s state assignment has no bearing on whether the friend is or is not in a “state of
suspended animation”.
This straightforward resolution of Wigner’s paradox has profound implications for the
QBist worldview. A few lines below the quoted passage, Wigner points out that insisting
on the superposition state |Φ〉 for particle and friend, though not necessarily a contradic-
tion, amounts to denying “the existence of the consciousness of a friend” to an intolerable
extent. In QBism, a quantum state assignment has no bearing on the existence of the con-
sciousness of a friend. It follows that a QBist can simultaneously assign the state |Φ〉 and
grant his friend a conscious experience of having seen either “up” or “down”.
This claim requires some elaboration. The scenario of Wigner’s friend can be under-
stood as a version of the double-slit experiment, in line with Feynman’s dictum that the
latter contains the basic peculiarities of all quantum mechanics. As in our analysis of the
double-slit experiment, none of the probabilities considered in Wigner’s paper change
their value or their meaning when Wigner writes down his quantum state |Φ〉. The only
implications of Wigner assigning a quantum state to the friend are that, (i) as far his prob-
abilities for the outcomes of some future quantum measurement on the friend are con-
cerned, it matters whether or not he first asks her whether she saw up or down, and (ii)
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that he should use the Born rule to compute these probabilities. There is no reason why
Wigner cannot assign a quantum state that respects all of his beliefs about the friend’s in-
ner life, conscious experiences, or agenthood.
The parallel with the double-slit experiment is somewhat hidden in Wigner’s origi-
nal argument, because he only considers measurements on the friend that, in the double-
slit experiment, correspond to determining which slit the particle went through. But, as
Wigner makes clear when he writes that “there is no doubt that [|Φ〉] describes the prop-
erties of the joint system correctly”, assigning the state |Φ〉 amounts to committing to pre-
dictions for the outcomes of a wide range of quantum measurements on the friend, includ-
ing those for which the predictions depend on whether or not the friend is first asked what
she saw. In the context of the Wigner’s friend scenario, such measurements were first con-
sidered by David Deutsch [43]. They are crucial for the BB thought experiment, to which
we will now turn.
7.4 The Friend’s Perspective: Response to Baumann & Brukner
Baumann and Brukner’s thought experiment [11] is a simple modification of Wigner’s
original scenario. After the friend has made her measurement, Wigner’s joint state of par-
ticle and friend is again given by Eq. (7.2), where it is now assumed that α = β = 1/
√
2,







Whereas in Wigner’s paper, Wigner contemplates a simple measurement on the friend
consisting of asking her about the result of her spin measurement, Baumann and Brukner
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let Wigner do the measurement
MW : {|Φ〉〈Φ|, 1− |Φ〉〈Φ|} . (7.4)
Such a measurement is far beyond any current and probably future experimental possi-
bilities, but if we allow Wigner to write down the state |Φ〉, we must also allow him to
contemplate the measurement MW . Clearly, Wigner has a probability p = 1 of obtaining
the outcome corresponding to |Φ〉〈Φ|, which is labeled “+” in Ref. [11].
Baumann and Brukner’s main claim concerns the friend’s prediction for the “+” out-
come. They argue that, if in her spin measurement the friend obtains “up”, her probabil-
ity of “+” is given by applying MW to the state |ψ1〉|χ1〉, and if she obtains “down”, she
should apply MW to the state |ψ2〉|χ2〉. In both cases, her probability for “+” is 1/2. Since
this probability is the same for “up” and “down”, she can communicate her prediction to
Wigner without affecting the rest of the experiment. Baumann and Brukner’s claim thus
leads to the troubling conclusion that two different ways of applying the rules of quantum
mechanics give contradictory numbers for the probability of “+”. 3
In the above account it might appear problematic that, in QBism, the outcome of the
measurement MW is personal to Wigner. But Baumann and Brukner show a valid way
around this problem by stipulating that Wigner record the outcome of his measurement on
a piece of paper. The friend’s probability assignment can then be regarded as referring to
her finding “+” upon checking the piece of paper.
The real problem with the BB analysis is that for the friend to base her prediction on
the state |ψ1〉|χ1〉 (or |ψ2〉|χ2〉) amounts to assigning a quantum state to herself, which vi-
3Baumann and Brukner assume the experiment is repeated many times, so that the alleged contradiction
can be phrased in frequentist terms. From a QBist perspective, the full force of the contradiction arises
already in the single-case analysis given here.
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olates the QBist tenet that there must be a clear separation between agent and measured
system. It is easy to see why this leads to a serious difficulty. Assume for the moment
that the friend writes down |ψ1〉|χ1〉 for the joint system of particle and herself and uses it
to compute her probability for what she will see on the piece of paper. This state assign-
ment would not just commit her to a probability for outcome “+”. It would commit her
to probabilities for any measurement that she could perform on the particle and herself.
For instance, according to our discussion in Section 7.3, the state |χ1〉 corresponds to her
responding with “up” to the question “what was the result of your spin measurement”.
But since she is a free agent, she has control over the answer to this question. It is up to
her whether she replies “up”, “down”, or by sticking her tongue out. Since she has at least
partial control over these measurement outcomes, the above quantum-state assignment
cannot form a reliable basis for guiding her actions.
So what should the friend do instead? The answer has already been given in the In-
troduction and Figure 1. Rather than adopting Wigner’s viewpoint, she needs to analyze
the experiment as an action that she takes on the particle, the lab, Wigner, and the piece
of paper on which Wigner records his outcome. In particular, this requires her reversing
roles and treating Wigner as a physical system. That this would be an enormously com-
plex and practically infeasible task is hardly a valid objection given the assumption that
Wigner is able to write down a quantum state for her. Indeed, an even-handed analysis of
the thought experiment clearly requires the assumption that the friend is as skillful a user
of quantum mechanics as Wigner himself.
What probability should the friend assign to her finding “+” on the piece of paper?
This depends on her prior states, unitaries, and POVMs regarding the lab and Wigner.
The only constraint on her probability for “+” is that it should be consistent with her prior
quantum assignments in the sense given in Section 7.2.2, i.e., it should be consistent with
198
the Born rule. This implies that the friend’s probability for “+” cannot be derived from the
details provided in the BB thought experiment. Furthermore, if the experiment is repeated
many times as envisaged by Baumann and Brukner, the formalism will typically lead her
to update her assignments after each repetition. Her probabilities will thus reflect what
she learned in previous runs of the experiment.
Here is a summary of our argument. In the same way that Wigner does not take the
friend’s viewpoint into account when he computes his probability of “+”, the friend need
not take Wigner’s viewpoint into account when she computes her probability of “+”.
This puts Wigner and the friend on an equal footing. In particular, the friend’s quantum
state assignments is not a function of Wigner’s quantum states |χ1〉 and |χ2〉. We thus ex-
plicitly reject Baumann and Brukner’s claim that standard quantum theory requires the
friend to base her probability assignments on |χ1〉 and |χ2〉. In contrast to Baumann and
Brukner, who propose that the friend uses a modified Born rule incorporating Wigner’s
perspective, our symmetric QBist treatment of Wigner and his friend requires no such
modification.
7.5 Reasoning about Other Agents: Response to Frauchiger & Renner
Frauchiger and Renner’s thought experiment, which considers four agents, is some-
what intricate, but here only the following broad outline is needed. Two agents, F (the
friend) and F̄, are located in separate labs. The other two agents, W (Wigner) and W̄, are
on the outside and perform measurements on the labs. At time t = 0, agent F̄ prepares a
qubit in a given state, measures it, prepares a spin-1/2 particle in a state that depends on
the measurement outcome, and sends the particle to agent F’s (the friend’s) lab. At t = 1,
the friend measures the particle. At t = 2, agent W̄ measures F̄’s lab in a given basis.
Finally, at t = 3, Wigner measures the friend’s lab in a given basis.
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Wigner now uses two different methods to make predictions for the outcome of his
measurement. He is interested in the probability of one of the outcomes, labeled w=fail.
His first prediction uses the quantum formalism. For his second prediction, he reasons
about what predictions the other agents would have made at earlier stages of the experi-
ment, assuming all agents start from the same initial quantum state assignment. Frauchiger
and Renner argue that the two methods lead to mutually contradictory predictions.
When reasoning about other agents, Wigner, agent W̄, and the friend apply FR’s
Assumption (C): Suppose that agent A has established that “I am certain
that agent A′, upon reasoning within the same theory as the one I am using,
is certain that x = ξ at time t.” Then agent A can conclude that “I am certain
that x = ξ at time t.”
The FR argument starts with agent F̄ making, immediately after time t = 0, a predic-
tion about Wigner’s measurement outcome. Since the measured system is the friend’s lab,
agent F̄’s prediction is about a part of her external world. The next step is that the friend
applies Assumption (C) to make F̄’s prediction her own. Then W̄ applies Assumption (C)
to make the friend’s and thus F̄’s prediction his own. Finally Wigner applies Assumption
(C) to make W̄’s and thus also the friend’s and F̄’s prediction his own. These steps are
cleverly arranged in time so that they don’t clash with the different measurements.
Notice that all four agents’ predictions concern the same outcome, namely w=fail in
Wigner’s measurement of the lab containing the friend. This means in particular that the
FR argument depends on the friend making a prediction about Wigner’s measurement on
herself. In their table 3, Frauchiger and Renner make this explicit by stating the friend’s
conclusion as “I am certain that [Wigner] will observe w=fail at time [t = 3].”
But this means we are now in the same situation as in the previous section when we
analyzed the BB thought experiment. The friend can use the quantum formalism to make
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a prediction for Wigner’s outcome (more precisely, for what she will find when she checks
a record of Wigner’s outcome). But she is not required to base her prediction on agent
F̄’s or Wigner’s state assignments. She will have to analyze the experiment as an action
that she takes on the other lab and the other agents. Similar to the discussion of the BB
thought experiment, the contradiction derived by FR is resolved if the symmetry between
Wigner and his friend is recognized.
Frauchiger and Renner state correctly that Assumption (C) is rejected by QBism. This
does not mean that there is a prohibition in QBism for one agent to adopt another agent’s
probability or state assignments. A QBist agent will have to decide on a case by case ba-
sis whether or not to do so. A straightforward way of making use of other agents’ proba-
bilities in one’s decision making is simply to ask them what their probabilities are and to
treat the answers as data which they may or may not take into account in their own proba-
bilities.
The most common scenario in which scientists adopt each others’ probability and
state assignments is that of a team working jointly on a quantum experiment and acting
as a single agent and user of quantum mechanics. It follows from the definitions given in
Section 7.2.1 that scientists in such a team must have common probability and state as-
signments. The requirement of a strict separation between agent and measured system
now translates into a strict separation of team and measured system. For the FR thought
experiment this means that its four players cannot be thought of as acting as a single
agent, because they perform measurements on each other.
In a subsection of their paper, titled “Analysis within QBism”, Frauchiger and Ren-
ner write that “Nevertheless, there should be ways for agents to consistently reason about
each other.” In this paper we have provided such a way. For two users of quantum me-
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chanics who interact, it requires each of them to treat their interaction as an action he or
she takes freely on the other.
7.6 Conclusion
We have seen that the thought experiments described by Frauchiger and Renner and
by Baumann and Brukner have a key aspect in common. In each of them, an agent (the
friend) is using quantum mechanics to predict the consequences of an action performed
on her by another agent (Wigner). We have shown that the paradoxa found by these au-
thors disappear if the friend analyses the experiment as an action she performs on the
world outside herself, which includes Wigner. These thought experiments thus illustrate
what we have called a quantum Copernican principle: when two agents take actions on
each other, each agent has a dual role as a physical system for the other agent.
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As proponents of an interpretation of quantum mechanics, we are accustomed to en-
countering puzzlement. We know that this is an unusual, perhaps even disreputable ac-
tivity for professional physicists to engage in. One of the authors came to QBism from
quantum chemistry, and the other from nonequilibrium statistical physics. We are here
largely because we sought to apply the same habits to quantum foundations that we would
find virtuous in any other field of physics: separating principles from convenient conven-
tions, reformulating old mathematics in new ways to make a different set of questions
easy, maintaining a healthy disregard for philosophers’ judgments about what is impossi-
ble. Yet even a mostly ordinary upbringing can lead to a surprising place.
What follows is our attempt to take the questions we have encountered, select those
that have been posed in good faith, and provide responses that summarize QBist thinking
on those topics. We have tried to be serious without being dour. Finding quantum founda-
tions important at all may be controversial among physicists, potentially more so than any
specific choice of interpretation. More shocking still is the suggestion that the material be
approached with a sense of fun and adventure.
8.1 Why did you change from Quantum Bayesianism to QBism?
Originally, the Q stood for Quantum and the B for Bayesian. The former is still true.
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Back in the 1990s and early 2000s, the term “Quantum Bayesianism” was serviceable.
However, it had its issues. For one thing, nobody was consistent on whether to capitalize
the Q: Those who called themselves Quantum Bayesians preferred it uppercase, so that
neither half of the term had undue emphasis over the other, but try to convince a copy ed-
itor of that simple point! More importantly, there are many varieties of Bayesianism, and
plenty of self-declared Bayesians disagreed in fundamental ways with the particular vari-
ety that our school found necessary for quantum physics. For a while, N. David Mermin
joked that the B should stand for Bruno de Finetti [1], and Fuchs suggested that the QB
was like KFC, which once stood for “Kentucky Fried Chicken” but is now a stand-alone
trademark [2].
More recently, we found a way to expand the B that we had never anticipated — a
rolling, Lewis-Carroll-esque word: bettabilitarianism [3]. This word comes, of all places,
from the jurist Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. To quote Louis Menand’s history of American
pragmatism, The Metaphysical Club: A Story of Ideas in America:
‘The loss of certainty’ is a phrase many intellectual historians have used to
characterize the period in which Holmes lived. But the phrase has it back-
ward. It was not the loss of certainty that stimulated the late-nineteenth-century
thinkers with whom Holmes associated; it was the discovery of uncertainty.
Holmes was, in many respects, a materialist. He believed, as he put it, that
“the law of the grub . . . is also the law for man.” But he was not entirely a de-
terminist, because he did not think that the course of human events was fixed
. . . . Complete certainty was an illusion; of that he was certain. There were
only greater and lesser degrees of certainty, and that was enough. It was, in
fact, better than enough; for although we always want to reduce the degree
of uncertainty in our lives, we never want it to disappear entirely, since un-
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certainty is what puts the play in the joints. Imprecision, the sportiveness, as
it were, of the quantum, is what makes life interesting and change possible.
Holmes liked to call himself a “bettabilitarian”: we cannot know what conse-
quences the universe will attach to our choices, but we can bet on them, and
we do it every day.
A QBist declares, “I strive to be the very model of a Quantum Bettabilitarian!”
We have occasionally seen manglings like “QBian” and even “Qubian”. These spoil
the pun of QBism and are thus strongly deprecated.
8.2 Why do you call QBism “local”?
A journey of a thousand perspective shifts begins with a single step. In this case, the
first step is to realize why the scenarios trotted out to imply “quantum nonlocality” actu-
ally don’t [4]. The standard argument for “nonlocality” rests upon entanglement. Conjure
up a pair of qubits, for example, assign to them a maximally entangled state and ship one
of the pair off to Mars. Upon measuring the qubit left on Earth, “the state of the qubit on
Mars changes instantaneously”. But this is not a physical change of any property of a ma-
terial object! Compare this with classical electromagnetism: In that subject, if we could
toggle a quantity at a distance but only in ways that could not effect a transmission of in-
formation, we’d have no hesitation in calling that quantity unphysical — an artifact, we’d
say, of choosing a gauge that does not respect relativistic causality. QBism says that the
right way to interpret quantum theory is to take this helpful and uncontroversial move se-
riously. When Alice measures her Earth-bound qubit, what changes for its partner on the
red planet? Only Alice’s expectations for what might happen to Alice herself, if she were
to make the journey and intervene upon that qubit.
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The fact that nature violates Bell inequalities is reason to reject the hypothesis used to
derive those inequalities, “local realism”. But when we decide to adopt non-(local real-
ism), we have a choice of how to clear those parentheses. We can put the non- on either
half, and when we consider the highly specialized character of what is actually meant
by realism in this context, keeping the local turns out to be the natural move. Another
way of saying this is that adopting quantum theory does not force us to revise the no-
tions of “causal structure” developed in classical physics, such as the conceptual tool of
Minkowski spacetime.
8.3 What does it feel like to be in a quantum superposition?
A QBist affirms, “My quantum states are mine, your quantum states are yours. If
someone else considers a quantum system containing me and ascribes to that system a
quantum superposition state, so be it. That is their quantum state assignment. It doesn’t
make sense for me to assign myself a quantum state if a quantum state is an encoding
of my own beliefs for the outcomes of my freely chosen actions.” If something feels off
about this answer, consider whether you are assuming that there is a “correct” — i.e.,
purely physically mandated — quantum state in this scenario. For a QBist, there is never
such a quantum state just as in personalist probability theory there is never an ontologi-
cally “correct” probability distribution. The answer to the question “What does it feel like
to be in a quantum superposition?” is the same as the answer to the question “What does
it feel like to be in someone else’s probability distribution about me?”.
Incidentally, this is one problem with the no-go argument made by Frauchiger and
Renner, originally intended to rule out what they called “single-world interpretations” of
quantum theory [5]. This argument, as well as others closely related to it [6], all at some
point make an assumption that amounts to an agent putting herself into a quantum super-
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position. Ultimately, this makes no more sense than trying to crawl inside a probability
distribution and live there.
8.4 Isn’t it just solipsism?
On the issue of solipsism, QBism stands with Martin Gardner [7]:
The hypothesis that there is an external world, not dependent on human minds,
made of something, is so obviously useful and so strongly confirmed by expe-
rience down through the ages that we can say without exaggerating that it is
better confirmed than any other empirical hypothesis. So useful is the posit
that it is almost impossible for anyone except a madman or a professional
metaphysician to comprehend a reason for doubting it.
For a QBist, the basic subject matter of quantum theory is an agent’s interactions with the
outside world; the formalism of quantum theory makes no sense otherwise. Were there no
systems outside the QBist’s mind, there would be no interface between agent and world,
and quantum theory would have no subject matter. QBism is a full-throated rejection of
metaphysical solipsism.
Someone once asked us, “Where is the real world in such a view?” The real world is
exactly where it always has been. It is the world in which our species evolved. It is the
world in which we grow and strive and protest, where we learn by individual experience
— including our encounters with the words of others — the pain of heartbreak and the
utility of the Lorentz transform. It has conditioned our calculus of expectations, even as
those expectations themselves remain intensely personal.
To a QBist, “measurement” is that variety of interaction which physics understands
best, precisely because experiments are actions whose potential outcomes we can cata-
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logue. Measurements are to quantum physics what “model organisms” are to biology.
Why do developmental biologists know so much about zebrafish? Because their embryos
are transparent! But life flourishes on, unanalysed, beyond our microscopes. Far from be-
ing solipsistic, QBism recognises just how little of nature we have managed to touch.
It is true that QBists refuse to make an upfront definite claim about what the stuff of
the world is. How then, can they have a consistent doxastic interpretation?1 This is ac-
complished by being clear on what quantum information is actually information about: A
quantum state encodes a user’s beliefs about the experience they will have as a result of
taking an action on an external part of the world. Among several reasons that such a posi-
tion is defensible is the fact that any quantum state, pure or mixed, is equivalent to a prob-
ability distribution over the outcomes of an informationally complete measurement [8].
Accordingly, QBists say that a quantum state is conceptually no more than a probability
distribution. Okay, fine, but what is the stuff of the world? QBism is so far mostly silent
on this issue, but not because there is no stuff of the world. The character of the stuff is
simply not yet understood well enough. Answering this question is the goal, rather than
the premise.
Is this an unacceptable weakness of the interpretation? Well, that’s a matter of opin-
ion, but ours is that it is not. Must we demand that a complete ontology be laid out before
one’s ramblings graduate to the status of an “interpretation”? If taken to the extreme, this
is clearly unfair: One might claim that no one has a qualifying interpretation because we
don’t have a successful theory for quantum gravity and so every proposed ontology nec-
essarily fails. More practically, feeling pressured to commit to an ontology prematurely
may leave physicists unable to imagine one which departs sufficiently from classical intu-
1A brief note on useful terminology: epistemic refers to knowledge and information, doxastic to belief,
and ontic to brute elements of physical reality.
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itions. Why not see if the right ontology can be teased out from the formalism itself and
a principled stance on the meaning of its more familiar components (such as probability
distributions)?
In fact, QBism has had ontological aspirations ever since the beginning. (It’s hard
to have ontological aspirations for a theory if you think you’d have to be a solipsist to
hold it.) There are structural realist and neutral pluralist elements in QBism, and there
seems to be a process or event ontology underlying it all, somewhere in a spectrum of
things suggested by William James, Henri Bergson, Alfred North Whitehead, and John
Archibald Wheeler [9]. The stuff of the world is the becomings of the world. However, we
really don’t believe we’ll be able to say anything in proper detail until we get the quan-
tum formalism into a better shape. (That’s what all the SIC research described in §8.10 is
about.) So, from this perspective, QBism is a project.
Mermin [10] argues,
QBists are often charged with solipsism: a belief that the world exists only
in the mind of a single agent. This is wrong. Although I cannot enter your
mind to experience your own private perceptions, you can affect my percep-
tions through language. When I converse with you or read your books and
articles in Nature, I plausibly conclude that you are a perceiving being rather
like myself, and infer features of your experience. This is how we can arrive
at a common understanding of our external worlds, in spite of the privacy of
our individual experiences.
This leads us to an important topic: communication between agents. What does the
idea of agents comparing notes mean when we interpret quantum mechanics as a single-
user theory? Consider an agent Alice. She can use quantum mechanics as a “manual for
213
good living”, a way to organize her expectations while navigating an irreducibly unpre-
dictable world. Alice encounters a system which she designates as “Bob”. Alice can ask
Bob about his experiences and use quantum mechanics to predict his answer. If Alice so
chooses, she can incorporate Bob’s responses into her expectations. Nothing in the for-
malism of quantum theory forces her to do so, however.
8.5 Isn’t it just the Copenhagen intepretation?
This has been said a lot through the years, and we continue to hear it today. Some-
times, it’s said that QBism is trying to be more Copenhagen than the Copenhagen inter-
pretation itself. As if QBism had a fever, and the only prescription were more Copen-
hagen! But the idea that there ever was a unified “Copenhagen interpretation” — i.e., that
the definite article is remotely applicable — was a myth of the 1950s. Trying to exceed
“the” Copenhagen interpretation in any respect is to race against a phantom.
QBism does not have, for example, Bohr’s emphasis on “ordinary language” [11],
whatever that might mean. Nor does it have the quantum-classical cut of Heisenberg,
the classical laboratory equipment of Landau and Lifshitz [12], the public experimental
records of Pauli [13], the essentially ontic state vectors of early Bohm [14], or the fre-
quentism of early von Neumann [15]. Unlike van Kampen, QBism does not presume that
the vanishing of interference terms will solve all riddles [16]. Unlike Wheeler, QBism
does not posit that all observers should ideally have the same information about a system
and thus the same quantum state for it [13, footnote 9]. There simply is not a way to sum-
marize this overflow of differences by claiming that QBism is “more Copenhagen”.
At one point, the Wikipedia article on QBism claimed that it “is very similar to the
Copenhagen interpretation that is commonly taught in textbooks”. What does this even
mean? First, as we noted, there’s no such thing as “the” Copenhagen interpretation. In ad-
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dition, claiming that “the Copenhagen interpretation” is “commonly taught in textbooks”
conflates the early developers of quantum theory and the varied modern expositions of it
into a vague mishmash. Asher Peres’ textbook is more instrumentalist than the undergrad-
uate standards; the Feynman Lectures handle probability in a less frequentist way than
Peres. Are all common textbooks Copenhagen, or is Copenhagen that which is commonly
taught in all textbooks? Better to strike the term “Copenhagen interpretation” from our
lexicon going forward and instead be precise about what views we mean!
8.6 Why does the interpretation of probability theory matter?
E. T. Jaynes put the basic point rather well [17]:
[O]ur present QM formalism is not purely epistemological; it is a peculiar
mixture describing in part realities of Nature, in part incomplete human in-
formation about Nature — all scrambled up by Heisenberg and Bohr into an
omelette that nobody has seen how to unscramble. Yet we think that the un-
scrambling is a prerequisite for any further advance in basic physical theory.
For, if we cannot separate the subjective and objective aspects of the formal-
ism, we cannot know what we are talking about; it is just that simple.
According to Jaynes, the way to unscramble that Heisenberg–Bohr omelette will be “to
find a different formalism, isomorphic in some sense but based on different variables” [18].
The results of quantum-mechanical calculations are generally probabilities, or stand-
ins for them like rates and effective cross-sections, and so the question “what means prob-
ability?” must be addressed sooner or later. This question gains urgency when we realize
that the inputs to those calculations are just as probabilistic as the outputs. We can see this
concretely by focusing on the simplest possible quantum system, a single qubit. A quan-
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tum state for a qubit can be written as a linear combination of the Pauli matrices, where




(I + 〈x〉σx + 〈y〉σy + 〈z〉σz) . (8.1)
Because each Pauli measurement has only two possible outcomes, + and −, we can write
the expectation value 〈x〉 as
〈x〉 = p(+|x)− p(−|x) = 2p(+|x)− 1, (8.2)
and similarly for 〈y〉 and 〈z〉. Mathematically, any qubit state ρ, whether pure or mixed, is
nothing more than a convenient packaging of the three probabilities p(+|x), p(+|y) and
p(+|z). Thus, whatever status one grants to quantum states, one must grant that same sta-
tus to at least some probabilities. Conversely, if a particular interpretation of probability
theory turns out to be logically untenable, then that rules out a possible way of interpret-
ing quantum states, too.
Note that the fact that specifying a qubit quantum state requires three probability val-
ues is more fundamental than any choice of those values. To put it another way, when we
take our empirically successful theory of physics and find the simplest case where it ap-
plies, we see that the theory has three knobs, not one or two or five. This is a more primi-
tive, more basal statement about our theory than a choice of ρ is!
Modern quantum information theory provides an even deeper take: Any quantum
state can in fact be specified, not just as a compendium of probabilities for different ex-
periments, but as a probability distribution over the outcomes of a single experiment. For
more on the concept of a reference measurement, see §8.10.
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8.7 What is the meaning of the double-slit experiment in QBism?
For a QBist, the double-slit experiment is about the peculiarities that happen when an
agent tries to relate their expectations for one hypothetical scenario to their expectations
for another. Per tradition, we can call this agent Alice. She might compute her probabil-
ity for a detector click given that she will place the detector at position x and open slit #1
— call it P1(x). Likewise, she can compute the corresponding quantities for the config-
uration with only slit #2 open, P2(x); and for when both slits are open, P12(x). All of
these quantities are, by themselves, rather ordinary probabilities: None of them end up be-
ing negative, let alone complex. Nor is it surprising that P1(x) might be discrepant from
P2(x) or from P12(x). Different conditions, different probabilities! The puzzle is that
P12(x) 6= P1(x) + P2(x). (8.3)
The strangeness lies not in the curve for any particular scenario, but in how the scenarios
fit together.
Rob Spekkens likes to point out that the mere fact of interference is not a very deep
probe of quantum theory, because interference can arise in models based on local hid-
den variables [19, 20]. You just have to be careful and consistent when constructing your
model. In his toy theory, where states are probability distributions over discrete local hid-
den variables, we can build a test for double-slit-type oddities (a toy Mach–Zehnder inter-
ferometer), and indeed, interference occurs.
In order to test quantum theory more stringently, we have to find probes of nonclas-
sical expectation-meshing that resist easy emulation. This, from the QBist perspective,
is what Bell inequality violations are all about: Given any particular choice of detector
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settings, the outcome probabilities are just probabilities. The power and the mystery of
quantum theory reside in the relation between probabilities for different choices of detec-
tor settings.
Our research on SICs is also in this vein (see §8.10). Using a SIC as a reference mea-
surement is like considering a generalized interference experiment, where the outcomes
for the “which-way” measurement correspond to nonorthogonal quantum states. This
generalization takes us out of the realm of easy classical emulation, letting us investigate
the quantum formalism more deeply.
8.8 Doesn’t the PBR theorem prove QBism wrong?
The Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph (PBR) no-go theorem demonstrates, as the authors put
it, “that any model in which a quantum state represents mere information about an un-
derlying physical state of the system, and in which systems that are prepared indepen-
dently have independent physical states, must make predictions which contradict those
of quantum theory” [21]. In the years since its appearance, many have claimed that the
PBR theorem proves quantum states are ontic — that it rules out all epistemic and dox-
astic interpretations. One often hears that QBism, having itself a doxastic conception of
quantum states, should therefore be ruled out by the lack of any experimental violations
of quantum theory.
But one should not believe these rumors. The PBR theorem does no damage to QBism.
PBR say so themselves at the end of their paper. This is because what they demonstrate
is the inconsistency of the idea of holding epistemic quantum states at the same time as
holding that they are epistemic about ontic states. In QBism, quantum states represent
one’s beliefs, not about some ontic variable, but about one’s future personal experiences
which come in consequence of taking an action on the external world. I.e., they are epis-
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temic (or better, doxastic) about personal experiences. Technically, this means there are
no compelling reasons in QBism to adopt the very starting point of PBR — namely, try-
ing to use an integral over ontic states λ to get probabilities. The PBR theorem is a no-go
result for a direction in which we never wanted to go.
The foundational assumption of the PBR theorem is a rule for computing some quan-
tities p(k|Ψ(x1, . . . , xn)), probabilities for a measurement outcome k given preparation of
a product state Ψ(x1, . . . , xn). This rule is a statement about conditional probabilities:






p(k|λ1, . . . , λn)µx1(λ1) · · ·µxn(λn)dλ1 · · · dλn . (8.4)
Here, λi in a measure space Λ is a possible physical state that a system can be in, µxi(λi)
is a probability distribution over Λ for the ith system, and p(k|λ1, . . . , λn) is a probability
for obtaining outcome k given a set of physical states for each system. In other words, the
whole approach of PBR is trying to identify the Born Rule with an application of the Law
of Total Probability (LTP). It can’t be done, and they have rediscovered that in their own
way.2
The LTP is familiar and what one would use if there were underlying hidden variables.
One avenue of QBist technical research currently ongoing is to explore an alternative to
the LTP which expresses the fact that such hidden variables do not exist. The crucial idea
is a reference measurement, a procedure with the property that a probability distribution
over its outcomes can be used to compute the probabilities for all the outcomes of any
other measurement. Let P (Hi) be Alice’s probability for obtaining outcome Hi in an op-
timal reference measurement (many criteria for optimality turn out to be equivalent for
2We note that one philosopher of physics has declared, speaking of an assumption equivalent to
Eq. (8.4), “If you don’t believe that, you don’t believe in physics at all.” As best as we can tell, there is no
reason to accept such a claim, other than an underdeveloped imagination.
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this problem). Classical intuition suggests that the best possible reference measurement




P (Hi)P (Dj|Hi) , (8.5)
for any other measurement {Dj}. But in the quantum world, this does not apply, and the









P (Dj|Hi) . (8.6)
Q(Dj) now represents an agent’s probability for obtaining the experience Dj from a mea-
surement she represents with the POVM {Dj}, P (Hi) is her probability for obtaining
outcome Hi in a hypothetical reference measurement, and P (Dj|Hi) is her probability,
asserted now, for obtaining the experience Dj supposing she had previously made the ref-
erence measurement and obtained experience Hi. Note that the only difference from the
LTP is a constant shift and rescaling of P (Hi) for each i. In fact, this is the closest [8] the
two expressions can come, suggesting that this expression may provide insight into what
it is about the universe that makes it “quantum”.
So, in all, QBists say this about the PBR theorem (and similarly about Bell’s theo-
rem): Rather than denigrate the QBist conception of quantum theory, they actually help
compel it. There are so many arguments of analogy for epistemic quantum states (Rob
Spekkens’ toy model nails about 25 of them [19]), but what the PBR and Bell theorems
compel and the toy theories can’t is that, if quantum states are epistemic, they cannot
be epistemic about some ontic variables. The most the PBR theorem can do is rule out
a middle ground that we are not sure anyone actually occupied in the first place.
220
8.9 Is QBism about the Bayes rule?
Adopting a personalist Bayesian interpretation of probability does not mean treating
all changes of belief as applications of the Bayes rule. This is shocking to some people!
And distancing ourselves from the dogmatists who claim to follow that creed is one rea-
son why we prefer QBism over “Quantum Bayesianism”.
In the tradition of Ramsey, Savage and de Finetti, there are consistency conditions
that an agent’s probability assignments should meet at any given time, and then there
are guidelines for updating probability assignments in response to new experiences. Go-
ing from the former to the latter requires making extra assumptions — the two are not as
strongly coupled as many people think. The Bayes rule is not a condition on how an agent
must change her probabilities, but rather a condition for how she should expect that she
will modify her beliefs in the light of possible new experiences. For this observation, we
credit Hacking, Jeffrey and van Fraassen.
Fuchs and Schack go into more detail on this point in an article [22], and BCS wrote a
pedagogical treatment in a book [23, §5.1].
There is a common misconception afoot that being “Bayesian” fundamentally means
using the Bayes rule to update probabilities. For example, the Wikipedia page that lists
things named after Thomas Bayes says that “Bayesian” refers to “concepts and approaches
that are ultimately based on Bayes’ theorem”. This may be historically correct, but it is
not logically correct. In the personalist Bayesian school, we first start with the idea of
quantifying beliefs and expectations as gambling commitments. Then, we impose a con-
sistency condition, from which the familiar rules of probability theory follow. The idea of
updating probabilities over time in accord with the Bayes rule arrives rather late in this
development. One must first establish the standards for probabilities being consistent
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with each other at a particular time, before invoking further considerations to establish
a scheme for changing probabilities in response to new experiences. Bayes’ theorem is a
theorem, not an axiom.
The “collapse of the wavefunction” is analogous to, and an algebraic variant of, Bayesian
conditionalization [24]. Having recognized this, we can appreciate that it clears up a mys-
tery (or, perhaps better put, allows us to identify a pseudo-mystery for what it is). But the
recognition of the “quantum Bayes rule” was an early step on the path to QBism, and its
relevance in more recent years has if anything been rather peripheral.
8.10 What technical questions have been motivated by QBism?
The development of Quantum Bayesianism, and its progressive evolution into QBism,
is a story of feedback loops between technical and philosophical questions.
The quantum de Finetti theorem was sought and proved in order to show there could
be a meaning to the phrase “unknown quantum state” even from a subjectivist perspec-
tive [25]. The Quantum Bayesians thought that without such a theorem, a subjectivist
reading of probability in quantum theory wouldn’t be possible after all. This theorem
then outgrew its foundational origins, becoming a powerful tool for the practical prob-
lem of analyzing the security of quantum key distribution. A quantum de Finetti theo-
rem for “unknown processes” followed from the same motivation as that for “unknown
states” [26].
Asher Peres pointed out that quantum states are more analogous to probability dis-
tributions over phase space — that is, to Liouville density functions — than to points in
phase space. In 1995, Fuchs followed this lead and searched for examples within Liou-
ville mechanics that echoed quantum theory, including the aspects of quantum theory that
had been declared uniquely nonclassical. He found that the quantum no-cloning theo-
222
rem was just one such feature: A no-cloning theorem holds in Liouville mechanics, ex-
actly as in the quantum case. Trying to further refine the enquiry led to the quantum no-
broadcasting theorem [27].
In 2002, Caves, Fuchs and Schack took on the question of whether or not quantum
theory implied any kinds of compatibility conditions for disparate agents’ quantum state
assignments [28]. This is a natural question to ask, if quantum states are to be interpreted
doxastically. The work resulted in solid theorems — and, in a twist whose irony has gone
underappreciated, Pusey, Barrett, and Rudolph [21] used one of these notions to prove the
PBR theorem. (For QBism’s response to the PBR theorem, see §8.8.)
Another example came from trying to understand what it could mean for quantum
states to be “disturbed by measurement” if they are not ontic. Answering this led to [29]
and [30], which Fuchs later turned to the purpose of defining a threshold for successful
quantum teleportation in Jeff Kimble’s lab [31]. Discussion of this point can be found in
Fuchs and Jacobs [32].
More recently, at the creative interface between conceptual and technical matters,
Fuchs and Schack have made the case that the right way to think about decoherence is
with van Fraassen’s reflection principle [22]. We suspect that there are new theorems to
be proved in this area, in addition to the conceptual implications (such as putting a sharper
point on an old argument of Asher Peres about when black-hole evaporation should not be
modeled with a unitary evolution [33]).
The most active technical topic in contemporary QBism research is the project of re-
constructing quantum theory from physical principles. Central to this is our ongoing re-
search into symmetric informationally complete quantum measurements (SICs). A SIC







A uniform rescaling of these states defines a POVM which is uniquely suited to be a
“standard quantum measurement”.
Not everyone who works on SICs is devoted to QBism. Indeed, we gather from con-
versations in hotel bars that one of the prime movers in SIC-hunting doesn’t particu-
larly care about quantum mechanics; their appeal as geometrical objects is enough. (His-
torically speaking, one of the most closely studied SIC constructions originally flowed
from the pen of Coxeter, who just really liked polytopes [34]. But in a surprise twist,
this SIC arises in the study of quantum-state compatibility that Caves, Fuchs and Schack
initiated [35]!) Another SIC researcher is not a QBist, but came to the problem through
Fuchs’s advocacy and over the years has displayed many sympathies.
Going in the other direction, being a QBist doesn’t mean you have to live and breathe
SICs. Fuchs and BCS put it the following way [3]:
If all that you desire is a story that you can tell about the current quantum for-
malism, then all this business about SICs and probabilistic representations
might be of little moment. Of our fellow QBists, we know of one who likely
doesn’t care one way or the other about whether SICs exist. Another would
like to see a general proof come to pass, but is willing to believe that QBism
can just as well be developed without them — i.e., they are not part of the es-
sential philosophical ideas — and is always quick to make this point. On the
other hand, we two are inclined to believe that QBism will become stagnant
in the way of all other quantum foundations programs without a deliberate
effort to rebuild the formalism.
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We find that SICs cut to the heart of quantum theory in a way that other ideas for re-
building the formalism do not. This is a point we discuss elsewhere in this collection
(§8.7), and in earlier papers [3, 11, 36]. The representation of quantum theory that SICs
furnish has natural connections with the study of Wigner-function negativity, which is im-
portant for quantum computation [37]. In addition, the discovery of a connection between
SICs and algebraic number theory reshapes the boundary between physics and pure math-
ematics in a remarkable way [38, 39].
8.11 Isn’t quantum probability just classical probability but noncommutative?
There’s a Far Side cartoon that shows a man waking up in bed and staring at a giant
note he wrote for himself on the wall: “First pants, then shoes!” The lesson is that order
of operations matters in daily life, long before it matters in quantum physics. So, we have
to be careful what we mean by “noncommuting”, if we want it to have any meaningful
content. And when we do get appropriately mathematical about it, we find that it is not
the signature of the quantum. The Spekkens toy model, which has a simple statement in
terms of underlying local hidden variables, has observables that do not commute [19].
There is a common sentiment about that quantum mechanics is “a noncommutative
generalization of probability theory”: Instead of using vectors that sum to 1, one has ma-
trices whose trace is 1, and so forth. This is a fine approach for many applications, but
in physics, there is never a guarantee that a method which works for one set of problems
will do equally well with another. Taking one representation of the theory as defining its
essence can cloud your physical insight. In this case, the “we must generalize probability
to make it noncommutative” impulse obscures the fact that given a specific experimental
scenario, the probabilities of quantum physics are just probabilities — numbers that play
together in accord with Kolmogorov’s rules. As we noted in §8.7, it is the meshing of ex-
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pectations for one scenario with those of another which reveals the fundamental enigma
of quantum theory. Noncommutativity is a secondary property, and as the Spekkens toy
model teaches us, not a quintessentially quantum one at that.
BCS, who came to QBism from statistical physics, likes to point out that the Doi–
Peliti formalism for nonequilibrium stochastic dynamics has noncommuting operators,
and also complex numbers, Feynman diagrams, renormalization, Glauber states, the Heisen-
berg equation of motion, and even the Schwinger representation of su(N). Yet it is all a
fully classical theory [23, 40]. It borrows calculational devices from quantum mechanics,
but the stochasticity it considers is, at root, ignorance about pedestrian hidden variables.
8.12 Doesn’t decoherence solve quantum foundations?
The theory of decoherence is a set of calculations which enable one to write a den-
sity matrix that is nearly diagonal in some basis of interest. This does not tell you what a
density matrix means.
Max Schlosshauer, who wrote the canonical textbook on decoherence, recently sum-
marized the situation as follows [41]:
Decoherence, at its heart, is a technical result concerning the dynamics and
measurement statistics of open quantum systems. From this view, decoher-
ence merely addresses a consistency problem, by explaining how and when
the quantum probability distributions approach the classically expected distri-
butions. Since decoherence follows directly from an application of the quan-
tum formalism to interacting quantum systems, it is not tied to any particular
interpretation of quantum mechanics, nor does it supply such an interpreta-
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tion, nor does it amount to a theory that could make predictions beyond those
of standard quantum mechanics.
The predictively relevant part of decoherence theory relies on reduced
density matrices, whose formalism and interpretation presume the collapse
posultate and Born’s rule. If we understand the “quantum measurement prob-
lem” as the question of how to reconcile the linear, deterministic evolution
described by the Schrödinger equation with the occurrence of random mea-
surement outcomes, then decoherence has not solved this problem.
For a deeper dive into the QBist take on decoherence, see [22].
8.13 Is QBism like Rovelli’s “Relational Quantum Mechanics”?
Several people have made the comparison between QBism and Rovelli’s “Relational
Quantum Mechanics” [42], and it is not unjust. Some slogans of RQM can be carried over
to QBism with only a little modification, and the motivation for the research program that
Rovelli suggested in his original paper has certain affinities with our own. However, there
are important differences between QBism and RQM, and moreover, we find the state-
ments of RQM imprecise on key points.
Both QBism and Rovellian RQM reject the notion of a single quantum state for the
entire universe. In QBism, measurement outcomes are personal experiences for the agent
who elicits them, while in RQM, physical properties exist “relationally” between systems.
As the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy says, in RQM, “Quantum events only hap-
pen in interactions between systems, and the fact that a quantum event has happened is
only true with respect to the systems involved in the interaction” [43]. This motto is not
unlike what we have written about QBism. For example,
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Certainly QBism has creation going on all the time and everywhere; quan-
tum measurement is just about an agent hitching a ride and partaking in that
ubiquitous process.
But we can already start to see a divergence. Rovellian RQM downplays the idea of
agency: In RQM, a grain of sand can be an “observer” of another quantum system. Given
any two systems S1 and S2, there is a quantum state of S2 relative to S1, just as in Newto-
nian physics, S2 always has a velocity relative to S1.
Likewise, QBism and RQM differ on how to interpret probability. While we find the
foundational papers of RQM somewhat vague on this point, our overall impression is that
RQM leans more to a Jaynesian kind of Bayesianism, more objective and less personalist
than the Ramseyian/de Finettian school to which QBism adheres. This is tied to a point
emphasized in the technical side of QBism (§8.10). Mathematically speaking, a quantum
state is a probability distribution. Pick any informationally complete POVM, and you can
replace density operators with probability distributions over the outcomes of that POVM
(even when the density operators are rank-1 projectors, i.e., pure states). As best we can
tell from reading Rovelli et al., whenever an “observer” S1 coexists with another system
S2, there exists a unique, physically correct quantum state for S2 relative to the observer
S1. Therefore, there exists a unique, physically mandated set of probabilities concerning
S2, which happen to be relative to S1. We find this philosophy of probability ultimately
untenable [44, 45].
We must also admit, we’re not great fans of the word relational. This adjective nat-
urally carries the connotation of “just like in relativity theory”. But in relativity, we can
readily transform between reference frames. A statement like “the clocks C1 and C2 are
synchronized” is relational: Its truth or falsity depends on whether it is evaluated by Alice
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or by Bob. Yet if Alice knows Bob’s trajectory relative to herself, she can take what she
sees and Lorentz-transform her figures to compute what Bob must see.
In quantum theory, there is no analogue of this. (Emphasizing this point of dis-analogy
is another way QBism distinguishes itself from Bohr [11].) RQM tries to invent one, but
the attempt flounders. We can see exactly how this happens if we examine Smerlak and
Rovelli’s paper “Relational EPR” [46]. The authors take a certain notion of consistency
among multiple observers over from Rovelli’s original paper:
It is one of the most remarkable features of quantum mechanics that indeed it
automatically guarantees precisely the kind of consistency that we see in na-
ture [Rovelli 1996]. Let us illustrate this assuming that both A and B measure
the spin in the same direction, say z, that is n = n′ = z.
But on the very next page, they describe the following scenario:
A observes the spin in a given direction to be ↑ and B observes the spin in the
same direction to be also ↑.
And they say that this is an ill-posed statement, because
it does not happen either with respect to A or with respect to B. The two se-
quences of events (the one with respect to A and the one with respect to B)
are distinct accounts of the same reality that cannot and should not be juxta-
posed.
But if the second statement is an invalid proposition, then the first must be as well. The
description “both A and B measure the spin in the same direction” cannot apply “either
with respect to A or with respect to B”; it presumes a view from nowhere. (One could
try to evade this by interpreting the story of what both A and B measure as told relative
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to a third party, the superobserver C. This might look like it could ameliorate the prob-
lem, at least if the difficulties we saw above could be resolved. But presuming that a su-
perobserver is always available, and that the expectations of the superobserver override
those of any other participant, just de-relationalizes the theory all over again. And why
should physics guarantee on a fundamental level that a superobserver is always available?
When children or politicians quarrel, life does not always provide a responsible adult who
can restore the peace.) In short, the description of the gedankenexperiment that Smerlak
and Rovelli use to put forth their notion of “consistency” is exactly the kind of language
which they elsewhere insist is meaningless.
One philosophy paper that compared QBism and RQM [47] must be mentioned in
particular.3 We reproduce the relevant passage with its absence of citations preserved in-
tact:
QBism is the view that quantum mechanics is not a theory about the world,
but about our degrees of credence concerning predictions. The theory pro-
vides universal, objective rules for updating these degrees from the informa-
tion one gets on the world through events. All this is shared by RQM. One
difference is that QBism is human-centered, while RQM is not: any physical
object qualifies as a potential observer. But what remains of it if all talk of ex-
ternal observers boils down to talk of events relative to us? If anything, RQM
is more radically instrumentalist than QBism: after all, the latter assumes that
events are objective and publicly accessible. . .
Most of this is at least a little wrong, so we will go through it in detail.
3We have the sense that, like Bohmian mechanics, RQM has been of interest to philosophers more than
it has been to physicists. The question of what biases the philosophy community perpetuates by always
turning to its familiar authorities for opinions is an interesting one.
230
QBism is the view that quantum mechanics is not a theory about the world,
but about our degrees of credence concerning predictions.
In QBism, quantum mechanics is not a theory directly about the world, but rather, a the-
ory that any of us can use to manage our “degrees of credence” in light of the fact that the
world has a specific character.
The theory provides universal, objective rules for updating these degrees from
the information one gets on the world through events.
Yes, the rules that quantum theory provides are “universal” (anyone can pick up the hero’s
handbook [3]) and “objective” (or as objective as anyone could want of a physical the-
ory). The emphasis on “updating” echoes a misconception we have seen elsewhere, that
Bayesian probability is fundamentally about the Bayes update rule (see §8.9). And in the
QBist understanding of personalist probability, the rules allow more loose play in updat-
ing expectations than this formulation grants.
All this is shared by RQM.
To us, it seems a better fit for RQM than for QBism. As we wrote above, a preference for
objective probability runs through RQM, holding it back.
One difference is that QBism is human-centered, while RQM is not: any
physical object qualifies as a potential observer.
Human-centered, no, but agent-centered, yes. An agent does not have to be human (see
sections §8.17 and §8.19).
If anything, RQM is more radically instrumentalist than QBism: after all, the
latter assumes that events are objective and publicly accessible. . .
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No, it doesn’t. Fuchs put it this way in 2010 [48]:
Whose information? “Mine!” Information about what? “The consequences
(for me) of my actions upon the physical system!” It’s all “I-I-me-me mine,”
as the Beatles sang.
That article goes on to draw an explicit contrast between QBism and Pauli’s claim that
measurement outcomes “are objectively available for anyone’s inspection”.
The introductory paper by Fuchs, Mermin and Schack [4] expresses the point as fol-
lows:
The personal internal awareness of agents other than Alice of their own pri-
vate experience is, by its very nature, inaccessible to Alice, and therefore not
something she can apply quantum mechanics to. But verbal or written reports
to Alice by other agents that attempt to represent their private experiences are
indeed part of Alice’s external world, and therefore suitable for her applica-
tions of quantum mechanics. Having always stressed the crucial importance
of stating the results of experiments in ordinary language, Bohr would prob-
ably have been comfortable with Alice’s indirect access to Bob’s experience,
through language.
But Bohr would not have approved of Alice superposing reports from Bob
about his own experience, as QBism requires her to do if she wants to subject
those reports to analysis before they enter her own experience. We believe
that Bohr would have viewed Bob’s reports — formulations in ordinary lan-
guage — as beyond the scope of quantum mechanics. But because Alice can
treat Bob as an external physical system, according to QBism she can assign
him a quantum state that encodes her probabilities for the possible answers to
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any question she puts to him. When Alice elicits an answer from Bob, she
treats this as she treats any other quantum measurement. Bob’s answer is
created for Alice only when it enters her experience. A QBist does not treat
Alice’s interaction with Bob any differently from, say, her interaction with a
Stern–Gerlach apparatus, or with an atom entering that apparatus.
Or, later and more compactly:
What the usual story [of Wigner’s Friend] overlooks is that the coming into
existence of a particular measurement outcome is valid only for the agent
experiencing that outcome.
8.14 Why do QBists prefer de Finetti over Cox?
The Cox approach is too psychologically loaded in the direction of hidden variables
and inferences about them. This sentiment dates back to the 1990s, when Fuchs and col-
leagues were hashing out the basics of being Bayesian in a quantum world. During 1993
and 1994, Fuchs and Schack became disenchanted with Cox’s development of probability
theory and attracted instead more to the development of de Finetti and Savage and oth-
ers. The essence of the latter school is the Dutch-book notion and/or the simultaneous
development of probabilities with utilities (i.e., decision theory). Looking back on it, the
attraction to the one over the other cuts to a rather fundamental point:
QBism regards physics, and science in general, in Darwinian terms. The mathemat-
ics we develop is practical because, at root, it helps agents to survive. From this point of
view, the idea of a probability as a gambling commitment, a belief made quantitative and
ready to be acted upon, is an attractive notion. On the other hand, the idea of probability
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being used for a “theory of inference” in the usual sense — i.e., a measure of plausibility
for something that is “out there” but unknown — is a bit off-putting.
(This also seems to be a fundamental distinction between our program and that of Rob
Spekkens. The general tenor of the Spekkensian program has been to interpret quantum
states as states of information about some type of hidden variable as yet unspecified, per-
haps degrees of freedom that are “relational” in some way. The Coxian attitude is a natu-
ral fit for this view, but it is not so for QBism.)
All the way back in July 1996, Fuchs wrote the following, in a note to Sam Braun-
stein:
While in Torino, you really got me interested in the old [Cox derivation]
question again. I noticed in this version of the book that Jaynes makes some
points about how there are still quite a few questions about how to set priors
when you don’t even know how many outcomes there are to a given experi-
ment, i.e., you don’t even know the cardinality of your sample space. That,
it seems to me, has something of the flavor of quantum mechanics . . . where
you have an extra freedom not even imagined in classical probability. The
states of knowledge are now quantum states instead of probability distri-
butions; and one reason for this is that the sample space is not fixed — any
POVM corresponds to a valid question of the system. The number of out-
comes of the experiment can be as small as two or, instead, as large as you
want.
However I don’t think there’s anything interesting to be gained from sim-
ply trying to redo the Coxian “plausibility” argument but with complex num-
bers. It seems to me that it’ll more necessarily be something along the lines
of: “When you ask me, “Where do all the quantum mechanical outcomes
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come from?” I must reply, “There is no where there.” [. . . ] That is to say,
my favorite “happy” thought is that when we know how to properly take into
account the piece of prior information that “there is no where there” concern-
ing the origin of quantum mechanical measurement outcomes, then we will
be left with “plausibility spaces” that are so restricted as to be isomorphic to
Hilbert spaces. But that’s just thinking my fantasies out loud.
More recently, we have made steps in this direction, as documented in our earlier pa-
pers [3, 4, 36] and outlined in §8.10.
8.15 Why so much emphasis on finite-dimensional Hilbert spaces?
Quantum theory can be formulated for finite- and infinite-dimensional systems. By
any standard, genuinely nonclassical effects are present in finite-dimensional systems,
suggesting that these may be all that is strictly necessary for capturing the conceptual core
of the theory. Indeed, it might even be distracting to let infinite dimensions complicate
foundational considerations. In some ways the infinite-dimensional situation is the limit
of large dimensions, but in other ways it isn’t.
Infinite dimensions are subtle and complicated, but it seems they are not so for “quan-
tum” reasons.
The goal of our research is to bring clarity to the quantum mysteries. When one looks
up what the “quantum mysteries” are, one finds that either they are expressed in finite-
dimensional terms from the get-go [49], or, if the presentation includes continuous de-
grees of freedom, all the interesting stuff happens in the finite-dimensional part. For ex-
ample, Asher Peres’ book explains a Bell–EPR scenario using both position and spin de-
grees of freedom, but the essence of the problem lies in the spins, while the position coor-
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dinates just provide conceptual scaffolding. To “go for the jugular” of the quantum enig-
mas, we have chosen to focus on finite dimensions — and the results have been so pretty
that we can’t help but wonder if they offer a guide for where physics should go next, as it
pushes beyond the continuum theories we all know so well.
The authors of this FAQ spend our weekdays reformulating finite-dimensional quan-
tum theory (see §8.10). However, we would have nothing personal against anyone who
tried to find a new representation for, say, algebraic quantum field theory. We do offer a
cautionary note: Even the most successful and most “fundamental” physical theories are
provisional, their applicability contingent on physicists’ limited abilities as agents to in-
tervene into the affairs of other natural systems. Indeed, the way we extract any empirical
utility from a QFT is, in practice, to remind ourselves that it cannot be valid to arbitrarily
high energies, and then deal with that limitation in a mature way (a process technically
known as regularization and renormalization). When one cannot trust any physical the-
ory to provide ultimate, metaphysical bedrock; when all the theories one might wish to
reformulate and reconstruct are inextricably provisional — then, unavoidably, picking the
theory to focus upon becomes a judgment call.
It is intriguing that the possibility that physically accessible Hilbert-space dimension
is always finite — possibly quite large, but still finite — is a recurring theme in quantum-
gravity research. For various flavors of this idea, see, e.g., [50–53]. Fuchs and BCS gave a
QBist spin on this speculation in 2016 [3], following a lead that Fuchs set out in 2010 [48]
and 2004 [54].4
4And, in correspondence with Bill Unruh and others, even before that [55, pp. 659–52].
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8.16 Aren’t the probabilities in quantum physics objective?
The intuition that the probabilities in quantum physics are objective properties of a
system is deeply ingrained. For many, the suggestion that it might be otherwise is so out-
landish as to obviate the need for rebuttal. Thus the starting point of QBism, adopting a
strict, de Finettian/Ramseyan interpretation of all probabilities, turns out to be a big pill
to swallow once the full seriousness of its consequences are realized. However, QBists
do not deny the objective probability intution. What we claim is that the advantages that
subjectivity brings (which may be found in any exposition of QBism) outweigh the draw
of untutored impulses. In fact, the appeal of this intuition may be understood from and
thereby absorbed into a purely personalist point of view.
There is nothing about the intuition which demands the invocation of quantum the-
ory. For instance, we might just as well consider a coin or a die. One often hears that the
symmetries of the matter distribution making up a “fair” coin or a die determine the prob-
ability of a flip landing “heads” or of rolling a “3”. But what does it mean for a coin to be
“fair”? It means that one assigns equal probability to the heads and tails outcomes. How
does one certify that a coin is fair? If the answer involves checking that the coin’s mass
distribution closely matches that of a thin cylinder, claiming that the probability distri-
bution comes from the mass distribution is circular. We bring many expectations and a
lifetime of experience to the table when asserting a probability. Among these is experi-
ence with the effects of gravity on differently shaped objects. The reason that it feels our
probabilities are properties of objects is just that we feel the force of our priors so strongly
that we feel they were given to us by nature.
More generally, if we wanted the probability to be physically determined, a little re-
flection reveals it couldn’t be a property only of the coin itself. It must also depend on the
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flipping process. A coin can have a very even mass distribution while it sits forgotten on
the bedside table. For that matter, it is quite possible to engineer a machine which pre-
cisely flips a coin to land heads up every time [56]. Furthermore, couldn’t a high-speed
camera and a sufficiently advanced computer program predict the result of any particular
coin toss with amazingly few errors given the first few fractions of a second of the flip?
With such a setup, what should we say is the probability of heads after the machine an-
nounces its prediction?
Supposing the force of these arguments is felt and the conclusion that probability is
about personal expectations is accepted, there remains one refuge for the objective proba-
bilists — essentially, that quantum theory legitimizes them. Classically, one might argue,
complete information is in principle possible, but quantum mechanically, maximal infor-
mation is incomplete. What’s left over is the objective chance. If one knew the objective
chance, they would be best served by setting their personal expectation equal to it.
First, we note that maximal information being incomplete doesn’t require the nature
of probability to change. Supposing there is a correct probability in a given circumstance
remains a big leap. But there is a more critical issue, namely, if there were a correct prob-
ability, there’s no way to be sure you’ve got it. Here’s how Fuchs and BCS put it in a pre-
vious paper [3].
Previous to Bayesianism, probability was often thought to be a physical property—
something objective and having nothing to do with decision-making or agents
at all. But when thought so, it could be thought only inconsistently so. And
hell hath no fury like an inconsistency scorned. The trouble is always the
same in all its varied and complicated forms: If probability is to be a physi-
cal property, it had better be a rather ghostly one—one that can be told of in
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campfire stories, but never quite prodded out of the shadows. Here’s a sample
dialogue:
Pre-Bayesian: Ridiculous, probabilities are without doubt objec-
tive. They can be seen in the relative frequencies they cause.
Bayesian: So if p = 0.75 for some event, after 1000 trials we’ll
see exactly 750 such events?
Pre-Bayesian: You might, but most likely you won’t see that ex-
actly. You’re just likely to see something close to it.
Bayesian: “Likely”? “Close”? How do you define or quantify
these things without making reference to your degrees of be-
lief for what will happen?
Pre-Bayesian: Well, in any case, in the infinite limit the correct
frequency will definitely occur.
Bayesian: How would I know? Are you saying that in one billion
trials I could not possibly see an “incorrect” frequency? In one
trillion?
Pre-Bayesian: OK, you can in principle see an incorrect fre-
quency, but it’d be ever less likely!
Bayesian: Tell me once again, what does “likely” mean?
This is a cartoon of course, but it captures the essence and the futility of ev-
ery such debate. It is better to admit at the outset that probability is a degree
of belief, and deal with the world on its own terms as it coughs up its objects
and events. What do we gain for our theoretical conceptions by saying that
along with each actual event there is a ghostly spirit (its “objective probabil-
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ity,” its “propensity,” its “objective chance”) gently nudging it to happen just
as it did? Objects and events are enough by themselves.
To see how quantum physics does not make probabilities somehow more objective,
consider the following [4]. Take a two-qubit system for which an agents could make ei-













(|0〉 ± |1〉) . (8.9)
These state assignments are “compatible” in that they have overlapping supports on the
two-qubit state space. Yet suppose the first qubit is measured in the “computational basis”
{|0〉, |1〉} and outcome 1 is found. The agent updates her state accordingly, using the stan-
dard Lüders rule, and her postmeasurement state for the second qubit is then |+〉. How-
ever, if she had begun with the joint state ρ−, then experiencing outcome 1 would have led
her to update her state for the second qubit to |−〉 instead. The two possibilities for the
initial state were compatible, but the two possible final states, updated in response to ex-
actly the same data, are orthogonal! This is an illustrative extreme case of a phenomenon
that is much more general: Priors do not inevitably wash out, even in the limit of infinite
data [57].
8.17 Don’t you have to define “agent”?
Fuchs and BCS wrote the following in an earlier paper:
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Thinking of probability theory in the personalist Bayesian way, as an exten-
sion of formal logic, would one ever imagine that the notion of an agent, the
user of the theory, could be derived out of its conceptual apparatus? Clearly
not. How could you possibly get flesh and bones out of a calculus for making
wise decisions? [. . .] Look as one might in a probability textbook for the in-
gredients to reconstruct the reader herself, one will never find them. So too,
the QBist says of quantum theory.
This perspective is essentially that of L. J. Savage, who developed rational decision the-
ory in terms of “consequences”, “acts” and “decisions” [58], though where Savage says
“person” we say agent instead.
An analogy may be helpful. In the Peano axioms for arithmetic [59], the terms num-
ber, zero and successor are undefined primitives. They gain meaning by how they play
together. Seeking a more elementary meaning of those terms within the same theory is
not helpful. Instead of trying an analysis — in the literal sense, a “breaking down” —
one develops an understanding by synthesis, by a bringing-together. The same can be
said of Hilbert’s axiomitazation of geometry, in which point and line are undefined primi-
tives [60].
The situation in personalist Bayesian probability is somewhat similar. There is no way
of carving up the terms gambler or expectation into smaller conceptual atoms, at least not
within probability theory itself. Personalist Bayesianism is a synthetic theory of quanti-
fied expectations, and there is nothing troublesome about this. QBism simply inherits this
situation, applying that synthetic understanding to quantum phenomena.
Just like point and line, or zero and number and successor, the terms agent and expe-
rience gain meaning through their interplay. Using them in physics brings some baggage
from their use in everyday speech, though their meaning is altered — refined, honed —
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by deployment in the more quantified setting. This is nothing remarkable: Think of force,
potential, field and so forth.
8.18 Does QBism lose the “explanatory power” of other interpretations?
In the philosophy of science, explanations can be causal, unificationist, deductive-
nomological, statistical relevantist, inducto-statistical, asymptotic and probably other
types besides [61]. Sometimes, epochal progress is made by declaring that an entire genre
of attempted explanations is unnecessary, misguided and counterproductive. We’ve been
doing that ever since some clever ancient Greek decided that they could contemplate
thunder without drawing the family tree of the Thunderer. While Descartes pictured the
planets as being dragged about in a material whirlpool, Newton declared, “I feign no hy-
potheses” and gave us classical mechanics. The manifold complexities of living beings
did not require central planning — only, as Darwin taught us, heredity and luck. Ein-
stein postulated the constancy of the speed of light, without worrying about how moving
through the ether might elastically deform the electron, and that is why we learn Lorentz’s
equations but with Einstein’s motivation.
In a sense, Newton explained less than Kepler did, because Kepler had a reason why
there were six and only six planets: After six planets, we run out of Platonic solids. We
can rightly reject Kepler’s explanation, even in the absence of a complete story about how
the solar system happened — and even though Newton’s explanation was, by the stan-
dards of his time, frankly un-“physical”.5 Quantum physics leads us to go further than
5Kepler’s image of nested spheres and regular solids seems absurdly numerological today, though any-
one who has wanted E8 or the Monster group to appear in fundamental physics, just for the æsthetics of it,
should feel the tug of the Platonic solids! (We strongly doubt that there is any “theory of everything” inside
E8 [62], although the corresponding lattice does turn out to involve a peculiarly nice quantum measure-
ment [63, 64].) Kepler’s geometrical model was wrong, but it was specific, quantitative, directly inspira-
tional and, unlike many bits of our scientific heritage [65], not breathtakingly racist, which maybe counts
for something.
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Newton. Instead of merely saying “I feign no hypothesis”, we can declare that the charac-
ter of the natural world is such that “feigning a hypothesis” — erasing agency and telling
a story from a God’s-eye perspective — is a bad idea. This is an affirmative statement
about ontology, and the furthest thing possible from asserting that the world vanishes
when I close my eyes (see §8.4).
To ask quantum theory for a story about what happens at the slits of a double-slit ex-
periment “when nobody is looking” is like taking thermodynamics and saying, “OK, but
where is the phlogiston?”, or seeing the inverse-square law of gravity and demanding to
be shown the dodecahedron that makes it go.
One motivation for the technical side of QBism (see §8.10), particularly the project
of reconstructing quantum theory from physical principles, is to elevate the quality of ex-
planations of which quantum physics is capable. The quantum formalism can be applied
to any physical system, minuscule or vast, and so any lesson gleaned from the formalism
itself must be a very general one — a why that pertains, in some measure, anywhere. We
physicists tend to like explanations that cut to the fundamental principles of a subject, par-
ticularly with a dramatic twist that makes the argument more obvious in retrospect. The
opaque nature of the textbook quantum formalism doesn’t just make teaching the subject
difficult. (“Master these fifty pages of differential equations and operator theory. Just trust
us. Yours not to question why.”) It also buries the enigmatic features of the theory, like the
violation of Bell inequalities, and limits physicists’ abilities to devise good explanations.
We aim to fix this — but that is a whole project (§8.10).
When critics have challenged us on the issue of QBism’s “explanatory power”, the
type of explanation they’ve often had in mind is something like what solid-state physics
has to say about matter being solid. Pauli exclusion keeps you from falling through the
floor; checkmate, QBists! And in fairness, this does sound rather removed from the sce-
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narios that the QBist literature has mostly dwelled upon — an example of QBism show-
ing its ancestry in quantum information science. Where are agents and interventions in
the topics preferred in solid-state society?
In physics, an explanation is not a statement made in isolation. We do not just say,
“That rock will sit there without collapsing in on itself.” We naturally go a step further:
“That rock will resist being squeezed.” Squeezing a rock in one’s hands is a quantum
measurement — merely a very imprecise one, for which the textbooks don’t say much
about representing by a POVM. When we invest meaning in words like solid and rigid
and incompressible, we are, at least tacitly, making claims about how a physical system
will react against interventions. And thus, even in solid-state mechanics, agenthood was
there all along. The fact that we do not make single predictions in isolation is ultimately
baked into the formalism, because asserting a quantum state assignment ρ for a system
implies quantitative expectations about the outcomes of any experiment that one can rep-
resent in the theory. No expectation value stands alone.6
8.19 Where does the agent end?
At a conference in 2016, Wayne Myrvold asked this:
Okay, help me understand this restriction of [the] scope of quantum mechan-
ics you’re proposing, because you’re telling me I should only use quantum
mechanics to calculate probabilities for outcomes of my future experiences,
and that, compared to what most people think is the scope of the theory, is a
6When our measurements are sloppy, we can typically get by without the full apparatus of quantum
theory to guide our actions. We can use dodges like average densities of energy levels. We can cheat and
model a phenomenon as a classical stochastic process with mundane parameters like average reaction rates.
The more closely we interrogate the world, the more we need quantum theory in order to prosper in it. Free-
dom to intervene, and precision of intervention, are resources. When an agent is limited in these regards, the
full vitality of quantum phenomena is denied them.
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really serious restriction of scope. So imagine that yesterday someone came
to me and said, “Wayne I want your advice on how to construct a nuclear
waste storage facility.” To do this I need to know about calculating proba-
bilities of decays. So should I not care about any decays that might happen
after I’m gone? Would it be a mistake to use quantum mechanics to calculate
probabilities of radioactive decays hundreds of years after I’m dead?
The quantum formalism, understood as a normative criterion for an agent’s behavior,
is rather agnostic about the character of the agent. It says nothing about the agent’s mem-
ory capacity, their rate of energy consumption, how long they maintain conscious thought
at a stretch, or how quickly the molecules of their body are replaced by food. Looking for
this kind of information in the quantum formalism confuses the roles of agent and object.
If one is dully reductionist and tries to specify the properties of an agent in more and more
physical detail, one will eventually be writing a many-body wavefunction. But any wave-
function is only meaningful as a mental tool an agent carries to manage their expectations
about something else.
Likewise, the quantum formalism itself does not tell Alice how to attach POVM el-
ements to her experiences. Instead, it is a handbook that she can use to help herself be
consistent, howsoever she sets about mathematizing her life. The formalism does not care
whether she believes that she will die tomorrow, whether she thinks she can cryogenically
freeze herself and wake up on Mars a thousand years from now still essentially Alice,
whether she regards potential genetic descendants of herself as sharing in her good or ill
fortune — nothing of the sort. Instead, the formalism helps her gamble consistently, using
whatever beliefs she currently has about such matters.
In the case of a gamble with consequences beyond an individual’s expectations for
their own longevity, the “agent” making the bet may be a community, rather than a sin-
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gle human being. Perhaps it is a collaboration of a number of scientists which grows or
shrinks as years go by. The situation is similar to that of an individual buying life insur-
ance. Why would anyone ever do this? Life insurance pays out only if the individual mak-
ing the purchase dies — it’s impossible for anyone to reap the benefits of their own life
insurance policy. The answer is quite intuitive: Because they consider their family to be
an extension of themselves. Even though they, personally, will be gone, a conceptual part
of themselves remains which can cash the check. It is like the couple who shares a bank
account and makes purchasing decisions on the basis of “us” rather than either of them
alone. The concept of an agent is extremely flexible.
Quantum theory tells us that an agent can express her expectations in terms of prob-
abilities for a hypothetical “Bureau of Standards” experiment (see §8.8 and §8.10). The
BoS experiment might be exceedingly difficult to carry out: Perhaps it costs a hundred
million dollars in optical equipment. But, even though Alice does not physically perform
it, it is mentally useful for her in her cogitations.
What about an experiment that requires a forbiddingly large investment of another
resource — not money, but time? The same binding of expectations between different
hypothetical scenarios should still apply. Mathematically, all the prolongation implies is
an orthogonal transformation of her probability vector.
To push it a step further: What if Alice contemplates the hypothetical experiment
of extending her own life radically? She sees no ready path to doing so, but she lets her
imagination wander. Could she replace her neurons one by one with nanomachines? Does
her overall mesh of beliefs about her own agenthood permit the idea that any meaningful
aspect of her could persist? Even if Alice finds the whole notion exceedingly implausible,
can she treat it simply as another experiment that would require a large resource invest-
ment to realize?
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The QBist answer is “Yes” — or, more carefully, that nothing in the quantum formal-
ism itself forbids it.
We are reminded of a lesson from a colleague.
This is a good example of the primary point of Dirac notation: it has many
built in ambiguities, but it is designed so that any way you chose to resolve
those ambiguities is correct. In this way elementary little theorems become
consequences of the notation. Mathematicians tend to loathe Dirac notation,
because it prevents them from making distinctions they consider important.
Physicists love Dirac notation, because they are always forgetting that such
distinctions exist and the notation liberates them from having to remember.
— N. David Mermin, “Lecture Notes on Quantum Computation” (2003)
The philosophy of personal identity is brimming with ambiguities, but living in accord
with the normative principles of the quantum formalism means that any way I choose to
resolve them is correct.
8.20 Aren’t probabilities an insufficient representation of beliefs?
We don’t claim that personalist Bayesian probability theory is the end of the story. We
only hold that it is adequate where it is needed: It is a tool applicable when experiments
can be defined quantitatively and the sample spaces of their potential outcomes tabulated
in advance. BCS notes, “This is one reason why I say expectation instead of belief some-
times. It carries a bit of a connotation of belief quantified and rigorized, rather than left
raw. Plus, the X makes it sound cool.”
A great amount of confusion has been stirred up by the misconception that personal-
ist Bayesianism presumes that living human beings actually do act as perfectly rational
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expectation-balancing agents. In this regard, we share a wry observation of Diaconis and
Skyrms [56]:
In a large and growing experimental literature in psychology and behavioral
economics, it appears that almost all theories are systematically violated by
some significant proportion of the population. It also appears that there are
different types in the population. Some violate one principle; some violate
another. And there are even some expected utility maximizers.
In other words, the theory of personalist Bayesian probability is normative, not descrip-
tive.
8.21 What does unitary time evolution mean in QBism?
This is a point that we addressed a bit tersely in earlier publications [3, 4, 15, 24], and
which we approached from multiple directions amid a large samizdat of miscellany [55].
In this section, we will attempt a balance between these two levels of verbosity.
Fuchs pointed out some time ago that the arguments for the subjectivity of quantum
states also apply to unitary time evolutions [24]. Unitaries can be toggled from a distance;
they can be teleported. More recent work on the probabilistic representation of quantum
theory makes the point even more directly: Quantum states are probability distributions
(§8.8), and unitaries are conditional probabilities, used in a way that respects the nonexis-
tence of hidden variables.
Consider an agent Alice, who uses quantum theory to help herself navigate the world.
Accordingly, she carries a probability distribution for an informationally complete mea-
surement, which she uses to summarize her expectations. Alice can calculate other prob-
ability distributions from it, including distributions for other informationally complete
248
measurements which she might carry out in the distant future. The textbook way of writ-
ing a unitary evolution is to say
ρ′ = U(t)ρU(t)†, (8.10)
where the operator U(t) models the passage of an amount of time t. Both density oper-
ators ρ and ρ′ express beliefs that Alice holds now. The former encodes her present be-
liefs about a reference measurement performed immediately, while the latter encodes her
beliefs about what she might experience were she to instead perform that reference mea-
surement at a later time. All of these beliefs, which she expresses quantitatively as gam-
bling commitments, are commitments she makes at the present time. If time 0 is Monday
at noon, and time t is noon on Tuesday, then ρ is Alice’s gambling commitment about
a measurement on Monday, and ρ′ is the commitment she holds simultaneously about a
measurement to potentially be done on Tuesday. The unitary operator U(t) is, likewise, a
belief that she holds as part of the same mesh of expectations that includes ρ and ρ′. It is,
in this sense, a statement synchronic with ρ and ρ′. It does not express how Alice’s beliefs
must necessarily change as time passes, though if Tuesday rolls around and Alice has not
yet performed a measurement, she can adopt her old numbers ρ′ as her new expectations
for a reference measurement.
For simplicity, let’s assume that the system Alice is contemplating experiments upon
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Then, she can write the Born Rule for any other POVM {Dj} as a simple modification of









P (Dj|Hi) . (8.13)
If Alice uses something other than a SIC as her reference measurement {Hi}, the formula
will be more complicated, but the concepts are the same. A unitary transformation of ρ
can be shifted onto the elements of the reference measurement, since
P ′(Hj) = tr (ρ
′Hj) = tr [U(t)ρU
†(t)Hj] = tr [ρ(U
†(t)HjU(t))] . (8.14)
















is a doubly stochastic matrix. Note that classically, we would express the relation between





P (Hi)R(Hj|Hi, t) . (8.17)
In quantum mechanics, we cannot think of time evolution as shifts in the values taken by
hidden variables, so we do not use this expression, but rather its quantum replacement,
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which simplifies to







All of the quantities P (Hi), P ′(Hj) and R(Hj|Hi, t) are beliefs that Alice holds simulta-
neously. They all have the same status, in that they are personalist Bayesian probabilities,
every one of them.
Over the years, we have noticed that some people who are on board with quantum
states being subjective still balk at the prospect of regarding quantum operations that way.
Imbuing unitaries with subjectivity, they fear, risks the whole Standard Model going up
in a puff of arthouse smoke. This concern is understandable, but misplaced. We find that
a personalist Bayesian take on unitaries, and the “all QFTs are effective QFTs” ethos of
weekday field theory [66], meet quite nicely if we only let them. What follows is specula-
tion for the future development of physics, guided by the lessons of practical applications.
Let’s suppose that Alice is a physicist who is preparing to do an experiment, say on
a spin system. Following ordinary procedure, she writes down a unitary time-evolution
operator generated by a Hamiltonian. What does this Hamiltonian encode? Well, it ex-
presses what Alice is doing with her laboratory equipment: the ~E and ~B fields established
by charged capacitor plates and current-carrying wires, for example. An old book might
have called this information “a complete description of the apparatus in everyday lan-
guage, suitably augmented with the concepts of classical physics”. But Alice knows that
she can treat any item of her laboratory apparatus as a quantum system in its own right.
For instance, she can use the quantum theory of solids to explain why she can force a cur-
rent through her coiled wire. So, that which she expresses as a unitary operator, she also
recognizes from a broader perspective as a mathematical consequence, in principle, of a
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quantum state assignment. The “effective unitary” she implements naturally has, there-
fore, the same physical status as her quantum-state ascriptions: They are all, at root, per-
sonalist Bayesian expectations.
What, then, of the most “fundamental” time evolutions of all? Let us go all the way, or
at least as far as modern physics can take us. What is the status of the Standard Model La-
grangian in QBism? Apart from the last two words, this is a question already generations
old; the project of grand unification, seen as quite respectable, has with game persistence
tried to understand the Standard Model as the low-energy limit of a new theory, not too
dissimilar to it in basic conceptions.
We do not want to prejudge the matter and ennoble some part of a theory too rashly.
After all, human mathematicians have yet to express a nontrivial QFT in a way that meets
even their own standards of rigor, let alone a way that would be suitable for the “eyes
of God”. Among the manifold interesting complications is the fact that not all QFTs are
written in terms of a Lagrangian, and it is conceivable that not all of them can be [67].
In order to wring practical numbers out of a QFT, one admits that the theory only ap-
plies up to some high-energy or short-distance cutoff, and then one deals with this lim-
itation in an emotionally mature manner. This discipline is known as regularization and
renormalization [68]. A scattering amplitude is computed as a function, not just of parti-
cle momenta and coupling strengths, but also of the ultraviolet cutoff. Changes in some of
these parameters can be absorbed by changes in others, leaving the scattering amplitude
numerically unchanged. The theory is not just a single choice of terms and coefficients,
but the entire renormalization-group flow.
Seen in this light, the core of a QFT begins to take on a role akin to the Born Rule: a
normative constraint relating expectations for different experiments. The story of integrat-
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ing over UV degrees of freedom, beta functions, the running of coupling “constants” — it
brings the message that gambles at one energy ought to be tied with gambles at another.7
It is conceivable that when the foundational unscrambling (§8.6) is complete, unitary
operators will join quantum states on the doxastic side of the line, while the fundamental
core of a “grand unified” theory will, like the Born Rule, reveal itself as an empirically
motivated, normative addition to probability theory.
8.22 What do the recent Extended Wigner’s Friend thought-experiments imply for QBism?
The past few years have seen the birth of a mini-field, where the thought-experiment
called Wigner’s Friend is wrapped around a no-hidden-variables argument [5, 6, 71, 72].
We’ve read the papers, we’ve been to a workshop [73], and we’re still not convinced
that the introduction of additional friends, robots or Wigners goes beyond the original
Wigner’s Friend “paradox” that QBism already answered on its own terms [3]. In order
to deserve attention, a “paradox” should reveal an actual inconsistency following from
the premises of some interpretation. From our perspective, every new variant just does
other things that we know are fallacious: treating unitaries as ontic, acting like systems
have a quantum state when there is no agent to assign one, pretending that probabilities
follow from frequencies, etc. The extra complexity introduces additional opportunities
for confusion, without making the argument more forceful. We would like this situation
to change; for example, it would be interesting to derive a new quantitative criterion of
classicality from these considerations. But the mini-field that studies Wigner’s friends,
cousins and former roommates is not quite there yet. So far, the conditions deduced from
7A related hint comes from lattice gauge theory, where the gauge group is specified at a quite primi-
tive level of setting up the problem [69, §VII.1], much like the selection of Hilbert-space dimensionality in
quantum computation, and what follows is rather like a complexified MaxEnt [70].
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these thought experiments have been Bell-type inequalities given slightly rephrased justi-
fications, and thus they have not pointed to fundamentally novel issues.
8.23 Is QBism compatible with the Many Worlds Interpretation?
Sometimes, when ideas are presented as going off in two opposite directions, the rea-
son is that they really are, and there isn’t any secret centrist wisdom in trying to yoke
them back together.
There is no one single Everettian faith, any more than there is truly a unified “Copen-
hagen Interpretation” (see §8.5). Instead, the genus has many species, frequently incom-
patible with one another [74]. On rare occasions, an apostle of one of these creeds might
make a statement that, in isolation, has a vague affinity to a QBist position. That much
is to be expected, since we are all talking about quantum physics, and we are not try-
ing to hang a bag of hidden variables on the side of it (as, say, the Bohmians are wont to
do). But we QBists have no physical state vector for the entire universe, no All-Function
evolving unitarily in the eye of God.
Imagine, if you can, a physical state vector for the entire cosmos |Ψ〉, and a factoriza-
tion of the cosmic Hilbert space into distinguished subsystems. (An Everettian creed will
either presume this or attempt to derive it, generally by way of an argument that turns out
to be circular.) Now, pick one of those subsystems and take the trace of |Ψ〉 over all the
others. The marginal state of the focal subsystem is then the unique, physically mandated
density operator for that subsystem, fixed by ontology. But in QBism, there is no such
thing.
The same holds true if one tries to decompose the All-Function into “relative states”
of observers and observed. When the carving is all done, the pieces are each physically
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mandated, ontologically fixed — and that’s simply not the role that any quantum state
plays in QBism.
A typical move for modern Everettians is to take the quantum-mechanical formalism,
chop off the Born rule and then claim to re-derive it. Generally, the algebra can be made
to cough up a set of numerical weights, but the identification of those weights as probabil-
ities in any meaningful sense turns out rather unwarranted.
Take another look at the infrastructure underlying the Everettian story: complex Hilbert
space, time evolution as unitary operator, etc. To us, all of those cry out for explanation.
Indeed, the Born Rule, the very part of the theory that Everettians wish to excise — the
part to be re-derived as a technicality, delegated to the afterthoughts — may be the most
important part of all. Properly formulated, it might well bring the essential enigma of the
quantum into the spotlight with a clarity never before achieved [36].
By contrast, we see nothing in the Everettian picture that is uniquely compelled by
quantum theory specifically. For instance, you could invent a Many-Worlds Interpretation
of Spekkens’ toy model (as John Smolin once admitted [55, p. 1407]). The result would
be baroque and contrived, revealing nothing about the model itself.
We suspect that the appeal of multiverse imagery has more to do with psychology than
with physics. Quoting a letter Fuchs wrote in 2002 [55, p. 347]:
What I find egocentric about the Everett point of view is the way it purports
to be a means for us little finite beings to get outside the universe and imag-
ine what it is doing as a whole. And what is it doing as a whole? Something
fantastic? Something almost undreamable?! Something inexpressible in the
words of man?!?! Nope. It’s conforming to a scheme some guy dreamed up
in the 1950s.
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This whole fantastic universe can be boiled down to something repre-
sentable within one of its most insignificant components — the brain of man.
Even toying with that idea, strikes me as an egocentrism beyond belief. The
universe makes use of no principle that cannot already be stuffed into the
head of an average PhD in physics? The chain of logic that leads to the truth
of the four-color theorem (apparently) can’t be stuffed into our heads, but the
ultimate operating principle for all that “is” and “can be” can?
Other varieties of multiversitarianism also leave us unmoved. To adapt a line of Mar-
tin Gardner, observable universes are not even as common as two blackberries. Procla-
mations about “the multiverse” appear to us like failures of imagination, wrapped up in
extravagances that provide a certain unsubtle, bulk-rate imitation of it. Our cynical view
of these proclamations may be due to our preference for the philosophy of pragmatism.8
Most likely, we are doing ourselves few favors in the pop-science media by taking this
position, but we are willing to be cast as the stodgy ones.
As for the high-flying speculations of the “all mathematical structures are physically
real” variety, we find that an observation by the philosopher William James rather encap-
sulates our sentiments. The quote that follows is from a 1906 lecture. While a modern
multiversitarian would use newer terminology, it boils down to nothing essentially differ-
8It also seems to us that arguments in this area tend to disconnect from actual scientific progress. For
example, it is a genre convention to quote Weinberg’s “prediction” of a small, nonzero cosmological con-
stant from anthropic reasoning [75]. Varying one parameter in isolation — a parameter that we have no
good reason to consider fundamental [76], at that — while holding all others fixed strikes us as having du-
bious physical relevance. Moreover, Weinberg’s calculation requires as input the maximal observed redshift
of a galaxy [77]. His formula coughed up a decent answer when this was z = 4.4, but it fares dramatically
worse now that we have seen a galaxy at z = 11.1 [78]. Weinberg’s argument now gives a bound on the
vacuum energy density of about 5800 times the present cosmic mass density. This is three orders of magni-
tude larger than the observed value, a ratio well into the regime where Weinberg himself says the cosmolog-
ical constant would be “so small that even the anthropic principle could not explain its smallness” [79].
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ent from the “Absolute” and the “mind of God” that had taken hold of the “rationalists” at
the time.
The more absolutistic philosophers dwell on so high a level of abstraction that
they never even try to come down. The absolute mind which they offer us,
the mind that makes our universe by thinking it, might, for aught they show
us to the contrary, have made any one of a million other universes just as well
as this. You can deduce no single actual particular from the notion of it. It
is compatible with any state of things whatever being true here below. [. . .]
Absolutism has a certain sweep and dash about it, while the usual theism is
more insipid, but both are equally remote and vacuous.
8.24 What are good things to read about QBism?
While we’re quoting William James, it’s a good time to share a remark from his Prag-
matism (1907), which by itself is enough to elevate him to the first rank of intellectuals:
Whatever universe a professor believes in must at any rate be a universe that
lends itself to lengthy discourse.
Accordingly, there is no shortage of primary sources about QBism. The essay by Fuchs,
Mermin and Schack in the American Journal of Physics introduces the interpretation with
an emphasis on how it gives meaning to the standard mathematical formulation of quan-
tum theory [4]. Mermin [12, 80] and Fuchs [13, 81] have both written pieces that go more
in depth on the historical setting of QBism. Of these essays, Fuchs’s explains more of the
technical side of current research. Additional details of that technical work are presented
in [3, 4]. Fuchs also discusses the genesis of QBism in the introduction to the samizdat
compilation [55].
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As for secondary sources, the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy has a pretty good
article on QBism and related interpretations:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/quantum-bayesian/
This was written by Richard Healey, who is not a QBist but has an interpretational at-
titude that is in many ways QBism-adjacent. Being written for an SEoP audience, it is
heavier on the philosophical matters and gives less time to the technical research that
those matters have motivated.
If you want a whole book that you can carry around, Hans von Baeyer’s QBism: The
Future of Quantum Physics (Harvard University Press, 2016) is an accurate portrayal,
pitched to the interested-layperson audience.
(And incidentally, on the topic of books, Persi Diaconis and Brian Skyrms recently re-
leased Ten Great Ideas about Chance, which lays out a school of thought about probabil-
ity that is pretty much aligned with the one QBism adopts. Diaconis and Skyrms confine
the quantum stuff to a single chapter, but they do recommend a David Mermin essay on
QBism as good reading [56].)
QBism has been written up both in New Scientist [82] and in Scientific American [83],
though not terribly accurately in either case, thanks to the editorial process [80, 84, 85]. A
better treatment, albeit in German, appeared in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung [86].
Nature addressed it briefly in the context of information-oriented reconstructions of quan-
tum theory [87].
In June 2015, the pop-science website Quanta Magazine ran an interview with Fuchs [2].
The accompanying profile is largely accurate, except for a figure caption that implies
QBism is a hidden-variable theory:
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A quantum particle can be in a range of possible states. When an observer
makes a measurement, she instantaneously “collapses” the wave function into
one possible state. QBism argues that this collapse isn’t mysterious. It just
reflects the updated knowledge of the observer. She didn’t know where the
particle was before the measurement. Now she does.
A better caption would go more like the following:
In the textbook way of doing quantum physics, a quantum particle has a
“wave function” that changes smoothly when no one is looking, but which
makes a sharp jump or “collapse” when the particle is observed. QBism ar-
gues that this collapse isn’t mysterious. It just reflects the altered expectations
of the observer. Before the measurement, she didn’t know what would happen
to her when she interacted with the particle. After the measurement, she can
update her expectations for her future experiences accordingly.
Originally, the subhead was also misleading; soon after the interview appeared, Quanta
fixed the subhead, but not the figure caption. So it goes.
Later, Fuchs was interviewed for the Australian Broadcasting Company’s program,
The Philosopher’s Zone [88].
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It is time for some concluding remarks. In the introduction, we noted that our techni-
cal investigations were motivated by the QBist foundational perspective. Walking just a
few steps along that path revealed unknowns we needed to tackle. Each one we dealt with
produced at least a few more. And so it goes and grows. Now, at the end of the adventure
that is graduate school, the author finds himself more excited by this general direction of
research than ever before. Perhaps most exciting of all, we are beginning to see possibil-
ities for inroads and bridges to other subfields. The next step is to clearly articulate these
connections. The payoffs could be remarkable; some of the most important advances hap-
pen when diverse backgrounds meet.
Further study of minimal informationally complete measurements and their associa-
tions to other structures is likely to produce considerable advances in our understanding
of quantum theory. It is a widely unappreciated fact that a quantum state may be thought
of as a single probability distribution. The vast majority of work on quantum theory re-
stricts attention almost exclusively to orthogonal projective measurements. Obviously
these have their place, uses, and practicalities, but if one only ever thinks of measure-
ments derived from “observables,” one will never notice when a different kind of mea-
surement is better suited for their purposes. And for the purpose of understanding what
a quantum state actually is, a MIC is clearly superior because it allows us to see that a
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quantum state is conceptually no more than a probability distribution; as a von Neumann
measurement is not informationally complete, its outcome probabilities are only a partial
picture. The MIC probabilistic approach we have described in several of the chapters of
this dissertation similarly clarifies the meaning of a general measurement — with respect
to a fixed reference process, any POVM takes the form of a conditional probability ma-
trix.
But this way of thinking stands a chance of doing much more than clarifying. We have
every reason to believe this approach could turn out to be as productive as more mature
reformulations of quantum theory. Phase space quantum mechanics and the path integral
formulation are useful because they preserve key concepts from pre-quantum physics.
Our reference measurement approach does the same thing. This time the most basic con-
cept preserved is that of informational completeness. Classically, an informationally com-
plete measurement is one which reads off the “physical condition” of the system. In me-
chanics, this would be the (potentially only hypothetical) measurement which reads off
the system’s precise phase space coordinates. If one has a probability distribution for the
outcomes of such a measurement, i.e. a Liouville distribution, then one may compute the
probability distribution for any other measurement, say, of the system’s total energy, by
coarse graining appropriately. Bell and Kochen–Specker type results tell us something
about the Liouville picture cannot be made to work. If one insists on leaving the phase
space intact, one has to abandon probabilities, in effect abandoning the intuition of infor-
mationally complete measurements — because of its negativity, a quasiprobability distri-
bution loses the operational significance that probabilities have. However, if one is ready
to learn a different lesson about quantum theory, one can forgo directly imposing a phase
space and keep informational completeness instead. In the absence of an obvious notion
of an ontic state, hidden variable, physical condition, phase space point, element of real-
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ity, or otherwise, it is surprising to classical intuitions that we can nonetheless keep the
concept of informational completeness. If not the probability for something that is “out
there”, what does it mean that such probability distributions contain all of the information
about a system necessary to consistently assign probabilities to any other measurement?
Our approach provides a framework to attack these types of questions head on.
In Chapter 2, we explored some immediate consequences of the definition of a MIC,
primarily through the Gram matrix. Even this close to the ground, it is clear that the na-
tive quantum replacements for phase space are extremely diverse and fundamentally
different in each Hilbert space dimension. In Chapter 3, we provided for the first time
(chronologically) a mathematical justification for the intuition that SICs occupy a privi-
leged position from which to assess the differences between the quantum and the classi-
cal. In addition to seeking significant bases for the understanding of quantum theory it-
self, we extended our knowledge of MICs through their connections to other areas. In the
other three technical chapters, this is done in two ways: connection to channels and con-
nection to quasiprobability representations. In Chapter 4, we defined a new class channels
called Lüders MIC channels and found that their properties allow for another characteri-
zation of SIC existence. We also saw that our definition suggests new information-related
questions, some of which we solved with entropic bounds. In Chapter 5, we took MICs
in another direction when we noticed that the MIC-specific way of expressing the Born
rule naturally suggested an associated Wigner basis as kind of orthogonalization. This
observation suggests a strategy for further development and classification of MIC proper-
ties and has the potential to reciprocally influence the study of discrete Wigner functions.
Although we didn’t know it at the time, through this association our study of Wigner
bases in the manuscript which became Chapter 6 should have downstream effects for un-
derstanding what sum negativity of a Wigner function means in the language of MICs.
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There, in current terminology, we revealed that while the principal and shifted principal
Wigner bases of a SIC extremize ceiling negativity among all unbiased Wigner bases, this
fact does not extend in complete generality to the sum negativity setting, which is also of
conceptual and practical interest.
On the conceptual side, we believe that evidence continues to mount that the QBists
are on the right track. We hope that Chapter 7, QBism’s response to recent extensions of
the Wigner’s friend paradox, will make this intuition more widespread. For many other
interpretations, the original Wigner’s friend thought experiment was mildly alarming,
although perhaps not catastrophic. The appearance of two recent, more elaborate, varia-
tions of the experiment, however, have raised concerns as to the foundational strength of
many of the same interpretations. The QBists have always thought the Wigner’s friend
experiment exemplified a powerful and beautiful fact of reality — it was a feature, not
a bug. Although slow to digest, the extensions of the thought experiment have actually
strengthened our convictions. The resolution is simply a matter of truly treating all agents
on equal footing, an attitude long present in descriptions of QBism, but never quite so
forcefully brought to the fore.
Speaking of convictions, we QBists have long said that the best judge of an interpre-
tation of quantum mechanics is in what it spurs. A good interpretation would inspire so-
lutions to outstanding problems, suggest particular questions, and provide intuitions for
technologies. A bad one tries to close off the story as quickly as possible, leaving ev-
eryone wondering whether it was worth the bother to think more about the meaning of
quantum theory at all. Of course, this criterion applies more broadly. Good things respond
and grow. It feels like we have started a good thing, that we are on the cusp of important
breakthroughs. Well, that will only be true if we make it so. It’s time to get to work!
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